Alejandro v North Tarrytown Realty Assoc.
2015 NY Slip Op 04792 [129 AD3d 749]
June 10, 2015
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 5, 2015


[*1](June 10, 2015)
 Ramona D. Alejandro, Plaintiff,
v
NorthTarrytown Realty Associates et al., Respondents. Domingo Antonio Burgos, NonpartyAppellant.

Sim & Record, LLP, Bayside, N.Y. (Sang J. Sim of counsel), for nonpartyappellant.

Margaret G. Klein (Mischel & Horn, P.C., New York, N.Y. [Scott T. Horn andNaomi M. Taub], of counsel), for respondents.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, nonparty Domingo AntonioBurgos, as administrator of the estate of Ramona D. Alejandro, appeals, as limited by hisbrief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (O.Bellantoni, J.), dated August 19, 2014, as granted the defendants' motion pursuant toCPLR 1021 to dismiss the complaint, with prejudice, for failure to timely substitute arepresentative, and denied that branch of his motion which was, in effect, pursuant toCPLR 1015 for leave to substitute himself as a party plaintiff in place of the plaintiff,Ramona D. Alejandro, and to amend the caption accordingly.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

CPLR 1021 provides, in pertinent part, that if the event requiring the substitution ofa party "occurs before final judgment and substitution is not made within a reasonabletime, the action may be dismissed as to the party for whom substitution should have beenmade, however, such dismissal shall not be on the merits unless the court shall soindicate." CPLR 1021 requires a motion for substitution to be made within a reasonabletime (see Reed v Grossi, 59AD3d 509, 511 [2009]). The determination of reasonableness requires considerationof several factors, including the diligence of the party seeking substitution, the prejudiceto the other parties, and whether the party to be substituted has shown that the action orthe defense has potential merit (see Riedel v Kapoor, 123 AD3d 996 [2014]; Terpis v Regal Hgts. Rehabilitation& Health Care Ctr., Inc., 108 AD3d 618, 619 [2013]; Largo-Chicaiza v WestchesterScaffold Equip. Corp., 90 AD3d 716, 717 [2011]).

Here, the administrator's failure to effect the required substitution until more than61/2 years after the decedent's death and nearly 51/2 yearsafter he was appointed administrator of the decedent's estate evinced a lack of diligenceon the part of the administrator in prosecuting this action, which had been pending fornearly eight years at the time the administrator sought substitution (see Bauer v Mars Assoc., 35AD3d 333, 333-334 [2006]; McDonnell v Draizin, 24 AD3d 628, 629 [2005]). Theadministrator failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the delay in seekingsubstitution, which [*2]he did only after the defendantsmoved to dismiss the complaint (see Borruso v New York Methodist Hosp., 84 AD3d 1293[2011]; Thompson v ClearwayAuto., Inc., 50 AD3d 1014, 1015 [2008]; Bauer v Mars Assoc., 35AD3d at 333-334; McDonnell v Draizin, 24 AD3d at 629). Furthermore, theadministrator failed to demonstrate a potentially meritorious cause of action through thesubmission of admissible evidence, and did not rebut the defendants' allegations ofprejudice. Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion ingranting the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 1021 to dismiss the complaint, withprejudice, and denying that branch of the administrator's cross motion which was, ineffect, pursuant to CPLR 1015 for leave to substitute himself as a party plaintiff and toamend the caption accordingly (see Terpis v Regal Hgts. Rehabilitation &Health Care Ctr., Inc., 108 AD3d at 619; Largo-Chicaiza v Westchester ScaffoldEquip. Corp., 90 AD3d at 717; Borruso v New York Methodist Hosp., 84AD3d at 1294).

The administrator's contention that the Supreme Court did not obtain personaljurisdiction over him because the defendants' motion was served upon the decedent'sattorneys, and not upon him personally, is improperly raised for the first time on appeal(see Lischinskaya v CarnivalCorp., 56 AD3d 116, 120-121 [2008]; Matter of Felix M., 9 AD3d 432, 433 [2004]). Skelos, J.P.,Leventhal, Austin and Miller, JJ., concur.


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