People v Maxey
2015 NY Slip Op 05357 [129 AD3d 1664]
June 19, 2015
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 5, 2015


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vJoseph Maxey, Jr., Appellant.

Tyson Blue, Macedon, for defendant-appellant.

Joseph Maxey, Jr., defendant-appellant pro se.

Richard M. Healy, District Attorney, Lyons (Wendy Evans Lehmann of counsel), forrespondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Wayne County Court (Dennis M. Kehoe, J.),rendered July 11, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, ofpredatory sexual assault against a child, rape in the third degree (six counts), rape in thesecond degree (two counts), and endangering the welfare of a child (two counts).

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimouslyaffirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a juryverdict, of predatory sexual assault against a child (Penal Law § 130.96),six counts of rape in the third degree (§ 130.25 [2]), two counts of rape inthe second degree (§ 130.30 [1]), and two counts of endangering thewelfare of a child (§ 260.10 [1]) in connection with offenses committedagainst his three stepdaughters over a 41/2-year period. Defendant failed topreserve for our review his contention that the People were permitted to "overload" theircase with Molineux evidence (see People v Moore, 50 AD3d 926, 927 [2008], lvdenied 10 NY3d 937 [2008]). In any event, defendant's contention is without merit.County Court permitted limited testimony regarding uncharged offenses, and thattestimony was relevant to establish the nature of the relationship between defendant andthe eldest victim (see People vWashington, 122 AD3d 1406, 1408 [2014]). The court also properly permittedevidence establishing that defendant is the father of that victim's child, who wasconceived when the victim was 17 years old, inasmuch as it " 'placed the chargedconduct in context' " (People v Leeson, 12 NY3d 823, 827 [2009]; see People v Cullen, 110 AD3d1474, 1475 [2013], affd 24 NY3d 1014 [2014]). Evidence of othernoncriminal conduct provided background information with respect to the nature of therelationship between defendant and the victims (see Cullen, 110 AD3d at 1475),and provided information regarding the family dynamic, which explained why thevictims delayed in reporting the abuse (see People v Justice, 99 AD3d 1213, 1215 [2012], lvdenied 20 NY3d 1012 [2013]). Contrary to defendant's contention, the probativevalue of the Molineux evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect, which wasminimized by the court's repeated limiting instructions to the jury (seeWashington, 122 AD3d at 1408).

We reject defendant's further contention that he was denied effective assistance ofcounsel based upon the failure of defense counsel to obtain an expert witness to rebut thetestimony of the prosecution's expert witness regarding child sexual abuseaccommodation syndrome. Defendant has failed to establish the absence of any strategicor other legitimate explanation for the failure of defense counsel to call an expert (see generally People v Caban,5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005]). Defendant has failed to demonstrate that such experttestimony was available, that it would have assisted the jury, or that he was prejudiced bythe lack of such testimony (see Washington, 122 AD3d at 1407), especially inlight of defense counsel's vigorous cross-examination of the People's expert witness. Wereject defendant's additional contention in his pro se supplemental brief that he wasdenied effective assistance of counsel based upon defense [*2]counsel's failure to admit in evidence records ofinvestigations of unfounded allegations of sexual abuse by Child Protective Services.The court properly determined that those records were not admissible (see SocialServices Law § 422 [5] [b]), and properly sustained the People's objectionto hearsay testimony of the caseworker called to testify on defendant's behalf that thevictims had denied allegations of sexual abuse. In any event, we note that defensecounsel cross-examined the eldest victim with respect to her prior denials to caseworkersand police that defendant was sexually abusing her. We conclude that defendant receivedmeaningful representation (see generally People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147[1981]).

Defense counsel made only one objection during the prosecutor's summation andthus has failed to preserve for our review his contention regarding two of the threestatements that defendant now alleges constituted prosecutorial misconduct onsummation (see People vJohnson, 121 AD3d 1578, 1579 [2014]). In any event, we conclude thatdefendant's contention that alleged prosecutorial misconduct on summation deprived himof a fair trial is without merit. The prosecutor's remarks were a permissive response to thedefense summation (see Peoplev Walker, 117 AD3d 1441, 1441-1442 [2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 1044[2014]), and "did not exceed the bounds of legitimate advocacy" (People v Miller, 104 AD3d1223, 1224 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1017 [2013] [internal quotationmarks omitted]). Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Sconiers, Valentino andDeJoseph, JJ.


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