| JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Schott |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 06217 [130 AD3d 875] |
| July 22, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association,Respondent, v Vicki Schott, Also Known as Vicki A. Mosello and Another,Appellant, et al., Defendant. |
Jeffrey I. Klein, White Plains, N.Y., for appellant.
Parker Ibrahim & Berg LLC, New York, N.Y. (Anthony W. Vaughn, Jr., andKashif I. Chand of counsel), for respondent.
Motion by the appellant for leave to reargue an appeal from an order of the SupremeCourt, Westchester County, dated September 5, 2012, which was determined by decisionand order of this Court dated November 19, 2014.
Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in oppositionthereto, it is
Ordered that the motion is granted and, upon reargument, the decision and order ofthis Court dated November 19, 2014 (JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Schott, 122 AD3d 801[2014]), is recalled and vacated, and the following decision and order is substitutedtherefor:
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Vicki Schott, also known asVicki A. Mosello, also known as Vicki A. Schott, appeals, as limited by her brief, fromso much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lefkowitz, J.), datedSeptember 5, 2012, as granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were forsummary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against her and to appoint areferee.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
In 2004, the appellant obtained a mortgage loan from Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.(hereinafter WaMu). In 2008, after WaMu had entered receivership by the FederalDeposit Insurance Corporation (hereinafter the FDIC), the plaintiff and the FDIC enteredinto a purchase and assumption agreement, pursuant to which the plaintiff acquired all ofWaMu's loans and loan commitments (see JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Russo, 121 AD3d 1048[2014]; JP Morgan Chase BankN.A. v Miodownik, 91 AD3d 546, 547 [2012]). In 2010, the plaintiffcommenced this action to foreclose on the appellant's mortgage.
The Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which[*2]were for summary judgment on the complaint insofaras asserted against the appellant and to appoint a referee. In support of its motion, theplaintiff produced the mortgage, the unpaid note, and evidence of default (see Nationstar Mtge., LLC vCatizone, 127 AD3d 1151, 1152 [2015]; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Enaw, 126 AD3d 830 [2015]).The plaintiff also established that it had standing to commence the action, and that itstrictly complied with the notice requirement of RPAPL 1304 (see Emigrant Mtge. Co., Inc. vPersad, 117 AD3d 676, 677 [2014]; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Weisblum, 85 AD3d 95, 103[2011]). Accordingly, the plaintiff established its entitlement to judgment as a matter oflaw. In opposition, the appellant failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to a bona fidedefense (see Wells Fargo Bank,N.A. v DeSouza, 126 AD3d 965 [2015]; Rimbambito, LLC v Lee, 118 AD3d 690 [2014]). Rivera,J.P., Skelos, Dickerson and Barros, JJ., concur.