| People v Quinn |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 06683 [131 AD3d 710] |
| August 26, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Joshua Quinn, Appellant. |
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Warren S. Landau of counsel), for appellant,and appellant pro se.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano,Johnnette Traill, Nicoletta J. Caferri, and Nancy Fitzpatrick Talcott of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Knopf, J.), rendered April 14, 2011, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (10counts), robbery in the second degree (five counts), and criminal possession of a weaponin the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Theappeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant'somnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, considering all of the available facts andcircumstances, the police possessed probable cause to arrest him (see People vBigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 [1985]) and, therefore, the hearing court properlydenied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress the physicalevidence obtained after his arrest (see People v Vasquez, 94 AD3d 915 [2012]; People v Francis, 44 AD3d788, 789 [2007]).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People vContes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establishthe defendant's guilt of 10 counts of robbery in the first degree, five counts of robbery inthe second degree, and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the seconddegree, under an accomplice theory of liability, beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Cabrera, 85 AD3d942 [2011]; People vRamos, 74 AD3d 991, 992 [2010]). Moreover, upon our independent reviewpursuant to CPL 470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to those crimeswas not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
The defendant's contention that the jury instructions were improper is unpreservedfor appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Joseph, 114 AD3d 878, 879 [2014]; People v Capehart, 61 AD3d885, 886 [2009]) and, in any event, without merit. Since the case against thedefendant consisted of both direct and circumstantial evidence, he was not entitled to acircumstantial evidence charge (see People v Daddona, 81 NY2d 990, 992[1993]; People v Joseph, 114 AD3d at 879; People v Garson, 69 AD3d 650, 651-652 [2010]).Moreover, contrary to the defendant's contention, the charge as a whole adequatelyconveyed to the jury the appropriate burden of proof (see People v Samuels, 99NY2d 20, 25-26 [2002]; People v Swain, 126 AD2d 763 [1987]; People vMan Lee Lo, 118 AD2d 225, 231-232 [1986]).
The defendant's contention that reversal is required because of improper remarksmade by the prosecutor during summation is unpreserved for appellate review (seeCPL 470.05 [2]; People vTerry, 122 AD3d 882 [2014]; People v Collins, 122 AD3d 873, 874 [2014]) and, in anyevent, is without merit (seePeople v Quezada, 116 AD3d 796, 798 [2014]; People v Molinaro, 62 AD3d724, 724-725 [2009]).
The defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel (see Peoplev Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147[1981]).
In his pro se supplemental brief, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of theevidence presented to the grand jury. "Since the defendant's guilt was proven beyond areasonable doubt at trial, there can be no appellate review of the issue of whether a primafacie case was presented to the grand jury" (People v Folkes, 43 AD3d 956, 957 [2007]; seeCPL 210.30 [6]; People vParker, 74 AD3d 1365, 1366 [2010]). Balkin, J.P., Roman, Maltese and Barros,JJ., concur.