| People v Tucker |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 06686 [131 AD3d 713] |
| August 26, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Cordell Tucker, Appellant. |
Robert C. Mitchell, Riverhead, N.Y. (Louis E. Mazzola of counsel), forappellant.
Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Rosalind C. Gray of counsel),for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County(Camacho, J.), rendered June 27, 2013, convicting him of manslaughter in the seconddegree, unlawful fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in the first degree, assault inthe second degree, aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the thirddegree, grand larceny in the third degree, and criminal possession of stolen property inthe third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The County Court properly denied the defendant's Batson challenge (seeBatson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 [1986]) to the prosecutor's exercise of a peremptorychallenge to exclude a prospective African-American juror. The County Court'sdetermination that the facially neutral explanation provided by the prosecutor forexcluding this prospective juror was not pretextual, which is entitled to great deferenceon appeal, is supported by the record (see People v Hecker, 15 NY3d 625, 656, 663-665 [2010];People v Adams, 118 AD3d717 [2014]; People vSmith, 98 AD3d 533, 534 [2012]; People v Waters, 81 AD3d 673, 673-674 [2011]).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People vContes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establishthe defendant's guilt of manslaughter in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt.Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weightof the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007]), wenevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses,hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410[2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing therecord here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt of manslaughter in the second degreewas not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
For his conviction of assault in the second degree, the defendant was sentenced to adeterminate term of imprisonment of seven years plus three years of postreleasesupervision. However, the uniform sentence and commitment form transposed thesentence imposed for assault in the second degree with the sentence imposed for fleeinga police officer in a motor vehicle in the [*2]first degree.The uniform sentence and commitment form was later amended to reflect the sentenceactually imposed by the court at sentencing, without producing the defendant forresentencing. Contrary to the defendant's contention, this procedure was proper (see People v Marks, 128 AD3d852 [2015]; People vMercado, 74 AD3d 990 [2010]; cf. People v Haywood, 124 AD3d 798 [2015]).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80[1982]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Eng, P.J., Hall,Hinds-Radix and LaSalle, JJ., concur.