| Caravello v One Mgt. Group, LLC |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 07000 [131 AD3d 1191] |
| September 30, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Christopher Caravello et al.,Respondents, v One Management Group, LLC, et al., Defendants, and Elena R.Gelman, Appellant. |
Garcia & Stallone, Deer Park, N.Y. (Karl Zamurs of counsel), forappellant.
Joseph D. Manno, Staten Island, N.Y., for respondents.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice and fraud, thedefendant Elena R. Gelman appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order ofthe Supreme Court, Kings County (Battaglia, J.), dated July 2, 2013, as denied thosebranches of her motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the sixthcause of action insofar as asserted against her and so much of the seventh cause of actionas alleged fraud insofar as asserted against her for failure to state a cause of action or, inthe alternative, for summary judgment dismissing those causes of action insofar asasserted against her.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The complaint alleges that the defendants acted in concert, as part of a mortgageforeclosure rescue scheme, to deprive the plaintiffs of the net proceeds of the sale of theirhome at a closing which took place in February 2008. The defendant Elena R. Gelmanwas the attorney who represented the plaintiffs at the closing. The plaintiffs assertedcauses of action against Gelman alleging, inter alia, legal malpractice and fraud. Gelmanmoved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the sixth cause of action,which alleged fraud, insofar as asserted against her, and so much of the seventh cause ofaction as alleged fraud insofar as asserted against her, or in the alternative, pursuant toCPLR 3212 for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted againsther. The Supreme Court denied those branches of Gelman's motion.
The Supreme Court properly denied those branches of Gelman's motion which werepursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the sixth cause of action insofar as assertedagainst her and so much of the seventh cause of action as alleged fraud insofar asasserted against her. On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7),the pleading is afforded a liberal construction and the court must give the plaintiff "thebenefit of every possible favorable inference, accept the facts alleged in the complaint astrue, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legaltheory" (High Tides, LLC vDeMichele, 88 AD3d 954, 956 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted];see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; McDonnell v Bradley, 109AD3d 592, 593 [2013]).
To state a cause of action sounding in fraud, a plaintiff must allege that "(1) thedefendant made a representation or a material omission of fact which was false and thedefendant knew to be false, (2) the misrepresentation was made for the purpose ofinducing the plaintiff to rely [*2]upon it, (3) there wasjustifiable reliance on the misrepresentation or material omission, and (4) injury"(McDonnell v Bradley, 109 AD3d at 592-593 [internal quotation marks omitted];see Eurycleia Partners, LP vSeward & Kissel, LLP, 12 NY3d 553, 559 [2009]; Pace v Raisman & Assoc.,Esqs., LLP, 95 AD3d 1185, 1188-1189 [2012]). To plead a cause of action torecover damages for aiding and abetting fraud, the complaint "must allege the existenceof [the] underlying fraud, knowledge of the fraud by the aider and abettor, andsubstantial assistance by the aider and abettor in the achievement of the fraud" (Winkler v Battery Trading,Inc., 89 AD3d 1016, 1017 [2011]). Moreover, pursuant to CPLR 3016 (b),where a cause of action is based upon fraud or aiding and abetting fraud, the"circumstances constituting the wrong" must be "stated in detail."
In this case, the complaint, in both the sixth and seventh causes of action,incorporated all prior allegations made therein. Viewing all of the allegations in thecomplaint as true and resolving all inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, we find that theSupreme Court properly determined that the complaint adequately stated causes of actionagainst Gelman sounding in fraud and aiding and abetting fraud (see Goldson v Walker, 65AD3d 1084, 1084-1085 [2009]). The allegations adequately informed Gelman of the"complained-of incidents" (Eurycleia Partners, LP v Seward & Kissel, LLP,12 NY3d at 559; see Pace v Raisman & Assoc., Esqs., LLP, 95 AD3d at1189).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Gelman's motionwhich was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted againsther. Although Gelman established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter oflaw dismissing the sixth cause of action insofar as asserted against her and so much ofthe seventh cause of action as alleged fraud insofar as asserted against her, the SupremeCourt correctly determined that, in opposition, the plaintiffs raised triable issues of factas to whether Gelman was a participant in the alleged fraudulent scheme (see Heaven v McGowan, 40AD3d 583, 584 [2007]).
Gelman's remaining contentions are without merit. Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Miller andLaSalle, JJ., concur.