| People v Cornelius |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 07547 [132 AD3d 495] |
| October 15, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Abdul Cornelius, Appellant. |
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Danielle Von Lehmanof counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Philip Morrow of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles H. Solomon, J., atreassignment of counsel; Bruce Allen, J., at jury trial and sentencing), renderedSeptember 18, 2012, convicting defendant of robbery in the second degree, andsentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, to a term of eight years, andjudgment, same court (Edward McLaughlin, J.), rendered April 29, 2013, convictingdefendant, upon his guilty plea, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the thirddegree, and sentencing him, as a second felony drug offender previously convicted of aviolent felony, to a concurrent term of 9
The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weightof the evidence (see People vDanielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing thejury's determinations concerning identification and credibility. Although the victim couldnot identify defendant at trial, he was certain of his identification of defendant shortlyafter the robbery. Additional corroboration for the identification was provided by one ofthe officers, who observed defendant carrying the victim's backpack, which defendantimmediately discarded when he saw the officer. The evidence also supports the inferenceof accessorial liability (see Penal Law § 20.00).
Viewing the record as a whole, we conclude that defendant did not make a clear andunequivocal request to proceed pro se, sufficient to express the "definitive commitmentto self-representation" that would trigger the need for a full inquiry by the court (see People v LaValle, 3 NY3d88, 106 [2004]). Defendant's expression of a desire to represent himself came withinthe context of his complaints about his counsel and other statements and applications (see People v Gillian, 8 NY3d85, 88 [2006]; People v Payton, 45 NY2d 300, 314 [1978], revd on othergrounds 445 US 573 [1980]). When the court assigned new counsel, defendant nevermade it clear that he still wanted to proceed pro se, nor did he raise the issue again orexpress further dissatisfaction with his counsel.
The court properly admitted evidence that defendant and a person whose wallet wasfound along defendant's escape route, and who was alleged to be one of defendant'sunapprehended accomplices, had received disorderly conduct summonses together sixweeks earlier. The probative value of that evidence exceeded any minimal prejudicialimpact, as it provided background information showing that the other man was known todefendant and that the two lived in the same building (see e.g. People vBradley, 250 AD2d 502 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 893[1998]).
Turning to the drug case in which defendant pleaded guilty, we find that the totalityof circumstances establish that his plea was voluntary (People v Fiumefreddo, 82NY2d 536, 543 [1993]). The voluntariness of the plea was not undermined by the factthat it covered a potential perjury prosecution (see People v France, 241 AD2d525 [2d Dept 1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 873 [1997]), or by any statements madeby the court in that connection. We have considered and rejected defendant's argumentsconcerning his motion to withdraw his plea.
[*2] Defendant made a valid waiver of his right to appeal (see People v Lopez, 6 NY3d248, 256-257 [2006]), foreclosing review of his excessive sentence claim regardinghis drug conviction. Regardless of whether defendant made a valid waiver of his right toappeal his drug conviction, we perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.Concur—Acosta, J.P., Renwick, Moskowitz and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.