| Chuachingco v Christ |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 07613 [132 AD3d 798] |
| October 21, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Rica Chuachingco, Respondent, v Charles D.Christ et al., Appellants. |
Baker, McEvoy, Morrissey & Moskovits, P.C. (Marjorie E. Bornes, Brooklyn,N.Y., of counsel), for appellants.
Demetri Law Firm, PLLC, Garden City, N.Y. (Adam Demetri of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from anorder of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Peck, J.), entered February 26, 2015, whichgranted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff's motionfor summary judgment on the issue of liability is denied.
The plaintiff allegedly was injured when she was involved in a motor vehicleaccident with a vehicle driven by the defendant Charles D. Christ and owned by thedefendant Glenn Consulting Corp. The accident occurred at the intersection of UnionTurnpike and 263rd Street in Queens. Prior to the impact, the plaintiff had been travelingwestbound on Union Turnpike and Christ had been traveling southbound on 263rdStreet. The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants to recover damagesfor her personal injuries. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on theissue of liability. The Supreme Court granted the motion. We reverse.
The plaintiff demonstrated her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of lawby submitting her own affidavit and that of a nonparty witness, which demonstrated thatChrist violated Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1110 (a) and 1111 (d) (1)by proceeding into the subject intersection despite the plaintiff having a green trafficsignal governing traffic traveling in her direction. The plaintiff and the nonparty witnessalso stated in their affidavits that the plaintiff's vehicle was already within the subjectintersection when the defendants' vehicle entered the intersection, striking the side of theplaintiff's vehicle, which established, prima facie, that the plaintiff's actions did notcontribute to the happening of the accident (see Farris v Reyes, 119 AD3d 734, 735 [2014]; Kalafatis v Royal Waste Servs.,Inc., 95 AD3d 954, 955 [2012]; Deleg v Vinci, 82 AD3d 1146, 1146 [2011]).
In opposition, the defendants raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiffhad a red light when she entered the subject intersection such that she violated theapplicable sections of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (see Fauvell v Samson, 61 AD3d 714, 714-715 [2009];see [*2]generally Sillman v Twentieth Century-FoxFilm Corp., 3 NY2d 395, 404 [1957]; Ruiz v Griffin, 71 AD3d 1112, 1115 [2010]; Lopez v Beltre, 59 AD3d683, 685 [2009]; Scott v Long Is. Power Auth., 294 AD2d 348, 348 [2002]).In opposition to the plaintiff's motion, the defendants submitted, inter alia, Christ'saffidavit, wherein he stated that his vehicle had been the first one stopped at the light on263rd Street at the subject intersection and that he did not proceed into the subjectintersection until the light turned green. Moreover, he stated that the plaintiff's vehiclestruck his vehicle on the driver's side after he had entered the intersection.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff's motion forsummary judgment on the issue of liability.
In light of our determination, we need not reach the parties' remaining contentions.Hall, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.