| People v Perez |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 07686 [132 AD3d 911] |
| October 21, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Rene Perez, Appellant. |
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Bryan D. Kreykes of counsel), forappellant.
Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove andJoyce Adolfsen of counsel; Roxanne Garcia on the brief), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Sullivan, J.), rendered May 16, 2013, convicting him of robbery in the second degree,upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support hisconviction is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Carncross, 14 NY3d319, 324-325 [2010]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 491-492 [2008];People v Hines, 97 NY2d 56, 62 [2001]; People v Pitre, 108 AD3d 643, 643 [2013]). In any event,viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People vContes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establishthe defendant's identity and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Gordon, 23 NY3d643 [2014]; People vGilocompo, 125 AD3d 1000 [2015]; People v Hoffman, 2 AD3d 749, 749 [2003]; People vWilliams, 155 AD2d 394, 395 [1989]; cf. People v Hiraeta, 117 AD3d 964, 965 [2014]).
In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of theevidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we neverthelessaccord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony,and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; Peoplev Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we aresatisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d633 [2006]).
The defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his contention that the sentenceimposed by the trial court improperly penalized him for exercising his right to a jury trial,because he did not articulate this issue at the time of sentencing (see People vHurley, 75 NY2d 887, 888 [1990]; People v Cherry, 127 AD3d 879, 881 [2015]; People v Lerner, 116 AD3d1065, 1067 [2014]). In any event, the contention is without merit (see People v Seymore, 106AD3d 1033, 1034 [2013]; People v Romero, 101 AD3d 906, 907 [2012]). "The factthat the sentence imposed after trial was greater than the sentence offered during pleanegotiations is not, standing alone, an indication that the defendant was punished forasserting his [or her] right to proceed to trial" (People v Griffin, 98 AD3d 688, 690 [2012]; see Peoplev [*2]Romero, 101 AD3d at 907). There is noindication in the record that the sentence was the result of vindictiveness or retributionfor the defendant's refusal to accept a plea offer and his exercise of the right to a jurytrial.
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80[1982]). Dillon, J.P., Miller, Maltese and LaSalle, JJ., concur.