| People v Williams |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 07866 [132 AD3d 1155] |
| October 29, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vRobert Williams, Appellant. |
Neal D. Futerfas, White Plains, for appellant.
James R. Farrell, District Attorney, Monticello (Meagan K. Galligan of counsel), forrespondent.
Garry, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Sullivan County (LaBuda,J.), rendered June 5, 2012, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime ofcriminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.
In satisfaction of a multicount indictment stemming from an incident in which hewas discovered operating a motor vehicle containing a quantity of heroin, defendantpleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. Hewas thereafter sentenced in accord with his plea agreement to a prison term of sevenyears to be followed by two years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals.
Initially, we find defendant's waiver of his right to appeal invalid, as County Court"did not adequately convey that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from thoserights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty but, rather, improperly lumped thoserights together" (People vVences, 125 AD3d 1050, 1051 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citationomitted]; see People vBlackmon, 122 AD3d 1071, 1072 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1218[2015]). Further, although defendant executed a detailed written waiver, the court'scolloquy was not adequate to ensure that defendant understood the content orconsequences of the appeal waiver (see People v Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257, 264-265 [2011]; People v Mones, 130 AD3d1244, 1245 [2015]).
Turning to the merits, we reject defendant's contention that the traffic stop of hisvehicle [*2]was without legal justification. It isfundamental that "probable cause exists for a traffic stop if an officer observes adefendant committing a traffic violation" (People v Portelli, 116 AD3d 1163, 1164 [2014]). Thearresting officer testified at the suppression hearing that defendant's vehicle passed by hislocation and he observed that the vehicle did not have an illuminated license plate(see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 [2] [a] [4]). The officer thenfollowed the vehicle to confirm his initial observation and, upon catching up to it, furtherobserved that the vehicle had excessively tinted windows (see Vehicle andTraffic Law § 375 [12-a] [b] [2]). The officer then initiated the traffic stop.County Court credited this testimony, and "we accord great weight to the suppressioncourt's factual findings that are supported by the record" (People v Morris, 105 AD3d1075, 1077 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1042 [2013]). Here, as theuncontroverted testimony of the arresting officer confirmed that the stop was initiatedonly after the officer had observed two violations, we find no error in County Court'sdetermination that the stop of defendant's vehicle was justified (see People v Thompson, 106AD3d 1134, 1135 [2013]; People v Hawkins, 45 AD3d 989, 990-991 [2007], lvdenied 9 NY3d 1034 [2008]; People v Brooks, 23 AD3d 847, 849 [2005], lvdenied 6 NY3d 810 [2006]).
Finally, we disagree with defendant's assertion that the sentence imposed by CountyCourt was harsh and excessive. Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of seven yearswith two years of postrelease supervision despite his plea agreement allowing for aprison term of eight years. Moreover, defendant possesses a lengthy criminal history thatspans five decades and includes multiple periods of incarceration. Accordingly, we findno abuse of discretion or extraordinary circumstances warranting a reduction of thesentence imposed (see People vEdwards, 96 AD3d 1089, 1092 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1102 [2012];People v Kelly, 71 AD3d1292, 1292-1293 [2010]). Defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved.
Lahtinen, J.P., Lynch and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.