| Matter of Shalick M. |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 08050 [133 AD3d 413] |
| November 5, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Shalick M., a Person Alleged to be aJuvenile Delinquent, Appellant. |
Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Marcia Egger of counsel),for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Antonella Karlin of counsel),for presentment agency.
Order, Family Court, New York County (Susan R. Larabee, J.), entered on or aboutAugust 28, 2014, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent upon a fact-findingdetermination that he committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute thecrimes of attempted assault in the second degree, attempted assault in the third degree(two counts), reckless endangerment in the second degree, criminal possession of aweapon in the fourth degree and menacing in the second degree, and placed him onprobation for a period of 18 months, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent ofdismissing the finding as to attempted third-degree assault under Penal Law§ 120.00 (2), and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
Except as indicated, the court's finding was based on legally sufficient evidence andwas not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]).There is no basis for disturbing the court's credibility determinations. The record supportsthe inference that when, during an argument, appellant departed and returned with aknife, with which he cut the victim in the stomach area, appellant intended to causephysical injury. The record also supports the finding as to reckless endangerment, andthat finding was consistent with the court's findings as to offenses requiring intent,because the different mental states involved different results under the facts presented(see People v Trappier, 87 NY2d 55 [1995]). However, as the presentmentagency concedes, since Penal Law § 120.00 (2) involves reckless assault, itis legally impossible to attempt that crime.
An 18-month period of probation is the least restrictive dispositional alternativeconsistent with appellant's needs and the community's need for protection (see Matterof Katherine W., 62 NY2d 947 [1984]), particularly given the seriousness of theunderlying conduct. Concur—Sweeny, J.P., Acosta, Richter andManzanet-Daniels, JJ.