| People v Burns |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 08471 [133 AD3d 1045] |
| November 19, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vClifford Burns, Appellant. |
Matthew C. Hug, Troy, for appellant, and appellant pro se.
Kathleen B. Hogan, District Attorney, Lake George, for respondent.
Clark, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Warren County (Hall Jr.,J.), rendered September 5, 2014, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of thecrime of murder in the second degree.
In satisfaction of a five-count indictment, defendant entered a guilty plea to murderin the second degree in accordance with a plea agreement that included a waiver ofappeal. The charges stem from defendant's admitted actions on December 24, 2013 indriving to the home of his estranged spouse, Patricia Burns, and intentionally stabbingher with a knife, causing her death. This tragedy occurred in the presence of their14-year-old daughter, as well as the victim's daughter from another relationship, whomdefendant also stabbed with a knife when she attempted to intervene, causing seriousphysical injuries. Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw hisguilty plea, alleging, among other things, that his plea had been involuntary, as it wasentered under severe emotional duress shortly after a courthouse visit with his daughtersand without the benefit of the effective assistance of counsel. The People opposed themotion. County Court assigned substitute counsel to represent defendant and thereafterdenied the motion in a written decision. The court later imposed the agreed-upon prisonsentence of 23 years to life.[FN1] Defendant appeals.
[*2] Defendant contends that County Court erred indenying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which he claims was involuntarilyentered while he was emotionally distraught following the meeting with his daughters.While this claim is not precluded by the appeal waiver and was preserved by hisunsuccessful motion to withdraw his guilty plea (see People v Colon, 122 AD3d 956, 957 [2014]), we findthat it is devoid of any merit. "Whether to permit a defendant to withdraw his or her pleaof guilty is left to the sound discretion of County Court, and withdrawal will generallynot be permitted absent some evidence of innocence, fraud or mistake in its inducement"(People v Massia, 131AD3d 1280, 1281 [2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citationsomitted]).
Here, the record reflects that, although defendant had agreed to accept the profferedplea agreement, he told defense counsel, just prior to the scheduled appearance for thatpurpose on April 17, 2014, that he did not wish to accept the plea offer. With the consentof all parties, the District Attorney granted the request of defendant's daughters to speakwith him; they thereafter met with defendant briefly in the presence of defense counselaccompanied, at their request, by the District Attorney and a crime victims' advocate. Thedaughters urged defendant to accept the plea deal to spare them the ordeal of a trial andto avoid the potential 50-year prison sentence; defendant indicated that he would do so.Accompanied by counsel, defendant then accepted the plea terms on the record, which heindicated he understood and had sufficient time to discuss the plea with counsel and hadno questions. County Court explained the consequences of his guilty plea and thetrial-related rights he was forgoing and defendant admitted the charged conduct andentered a guilty plea.[FN2]
We find that the record provides no support for defendant's claim that he was soemotionally distraught as a result of the family meeting as to render him incapable ofentering a voluntary guilty plea, and otherwise reflects that he was fully advised of hisrights and freely entered a knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea (see People v Haffiz, 19 NY3d883, 884 [2012]; People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d 536, 543 [1993]). In thatregard, neither emotional pleas by family members to accept a plea offer nor the fact thata defendant is emotionally distraught renders a plea involuntary or entitles a defendant tolater withdraw a plea (see People v Alexander, 97 NY2d 482, 486 [2002];People v Lewis, 46 NY2d 825, 826 [1978]; People v Pecararo, 83 AD3d 1284, 1285 [2011], lvdenied 17 NY3d 820 [2011]; People v Flakes, 240 AD2d 428, 429 [1997],lv denied 90 NY2d 1011 [1997]; People v Hernandez, 207 AD2d 659,659 [1994]; People v Martin, 157 AD2d 674, 674 [1990]). Likewise,accommodating the daughters' request to be positioned in the courtroom during the pleaproceedings so as to enable them to observe defendant admit to murdering their motherdid not render the plea involuntary.
We similarly find that defendant's claim that he was deprived of meaningfulrepresentation in connection with his guilty plea is belied by the record, which reflectsthat counsel secured a favorable plea after extensive negotiations, and nothing in therecord casts doubt on counsel's apparent effectiveness (see People v Vonneida, 130AD3d 1322, 1322 [2015]). Further, counsel compiled extensive discovery materials,reviewed the strengths of the [*3]People's case withdefendant at length while investigating possible affirmative defenses and prepared avoluminous omnibus motion, and defendant expressed satisfaction with counsel duringthe plea allocution. Given the overwhelming proof of defendant's guilt, including theeyewitness accounts, we find that, contrary to his claims, counsel reasonably encouragedhim to accept the favorable plea deal and afforded him meaningful representation (see People v Caban, 5 NY3d143, 152 [2005]). In view of the foregoing, County Court's denial of his motion towithdraw his guilty plea without a hearing was a provident exercise of discretion (seePeople v Atkinson, 58 AD3d 943, 943-944 [2009]). Finally, defendant's pro seclaims, including those regarding the arraignment, lack merit or are outside the record onappeal (see People vAnderson, 118 AD3d 1138, 1140 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1117[2015]), and his prearraignment delay claim is unpreserved (see People v Archie, 116AD3d 1165, 1165 [2014]).
McCarthy, J.P., Rose and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.
Footnote 1:Prior to imposingsentence, County Court denied defendant's pro se motion to dismiss the indictment in theinterest of justice.
Footnote 2:While defendant initiallyequivocated on whether he went to the victim's home with the intent of murdering her, heultimately admitted that, at the time he stabbed her, he was angry at the victim andintended to kill her. This satisfied County Court's obligation to assure that defendantunderstood the nature of the charge and that his plea was knowing and voluntary (seePeople v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662, 666 [1988]).