| People v Edmonds |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 08557 [133 AD3d 1332] |
| November 20, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Kenneth G. Edmonds, Appellant. |
Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (James Eckert of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Nancy Gilligan of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from an order of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), enteredJanuary 7, 2014. The order determined that defendant is a level three risk pursuant to theSex Offender Registration Act.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed withoutcosts.
Memorandum: On appeal from an order determining that he is a level three riskpursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law § 168 etseq.), defendant contends that County Court erred in assessing 20 points against himunder the risk factor for a continuing course of sexual misconduct. We agree. Althoughthe People presented evidence that defendant engaged in acts of sexual contact with thevictim on more than one occasion, they failed to establish "when these acts occurredrelative to each other" (People vRedcross, 54 AD3d 1116, 1117 [2008]).
Reducing defendant's score on the risk assessment instrument by 20 points results ina total risk factor score of 95 points, placing defendant within the range of a presumptivelevel two risk. The court, however, properly concluded in the alternative that defendant isa level three risk based on the presumptive override for a prior conviction of a felony sexcrime (see People v Erving,124 AD3d 447, 447 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 905 [2015]; Sex OffenderRegistration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 3-4 [2006]). We rejectdefendant's contention that the presumptive override for prior felony sex crimeconvictions was held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid in People v Moss (22 NY3d1094 [2014]) or People vMoore (115 AD3d 1360 [2014]). In Moss, the Court of Appeals statedonly that "[a]s conceded by the People, no basis in law exists for . . . [the]conclusion that an automatic override increased [the] defendant's presumptive risk leveltwo designation to risk level three" (id. at 1095). In Moore, this Courtquoted that language from Moss and held that the court "erred in increasing [the]defendant's risk level based on its determination that there was an automatic override"(id. at 1361). Moore supports the well-established principle that theapplication of the override for a prior felony sex crime is presumptive, not mandatory orautomatic (see People vEdney, 111 AD3d 612, 612 [2013]; People v Reynolds, 68 AD3d 955, 956 [2009]; see also People v Pace, 121AD3d 1315, 1316 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 914 [2015]) and, contrary todefendant's contention, it should not be interpreted as holding that the presumptiveoverride for a prior felony sex crime conviction is per se invalid.Present—Scudder, P.J., Centra, Carni, Whalen and DeJoseph, JJ.