Matter of Joy v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs.
2015 NY Slip Op 08686 [133 AD3d 1167]
November 25, 2015
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 30, 2015


[*1]
 In the Matter of Raymond E. Joy, Appellant, v NewYork State Department of Motor Vehicles et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 1.) In theMatter of Alex M. Gillman, Appellant,
v
New York State Department of MotorVehicles et al., Respondents. (Appeal No. 2.) In the Matter of Phyllis J. Allen, Appellant,v New York State Department of Motor Vehicles et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No.3.)

Gerstenzang, O'Hern, Sills & Gerstenzang, Albany (Eric H. Sills of counsel),for appellants.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Jeffrey W. Lang of counsel), forrespondents.

Rose, J. Appeals from three judgments of the Supreme Court (Ceresia Jr., J.), enteredMay 30, 2014 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioners' applications, in threecombined proceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78 and actions for declaratory judgment,to, among other things, review three determinations of respondent Department of MotorVehicles denying petitioners' applications for driver's licenses.

Each of the petitioners herein have been convicted of multiple alcohol-relateddriving offenses. Specifically, petitioner Raymond E. Joy was convicted of eight suchoffenses and petitioners Alex M. Gillman and Phyllis J. Allen were each convicted ofthree offenses. As a result of their latest convictions, petitioners' driver's licenses wererevoked for a "minimum" period of one year (Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 1193 [2] [b] [3]). Subsequently, petitioners submitted applications forrelicensing to respondent Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV). DMV heldthe applications in abeyance pending the adoption of emergency regulations concerningthe review of relicensing applications filed by persons with multiple alcohol- ordrug-related driving offenses.

The regulations were adopted in the fall of 2012 and, as applicable to Joy, providethat "[u]pon receipt of a person's application for relicensing, [respondent] Commissioner[of Motor Vehicles] shall conduct a lifetime review of such person's driving record" and,if such review reveals that "the person has five or more alcohol- or drug-related drivingconvictions or incidents in any combination within his or her lifetime, then theCommissioner shall deny the application" (15 NYCRR 136.5 [b] [1]). As applicable toGillman and Allen, the regulations require that the Commissioner, for a period of at leastfive years plus the revocation period imposed by the Vehicle and Traffic Law, deny theapplication of any person with three or four alcohol-related convictions, but no seriousdriving offense,[FN*] within a 25-year look-back period(see 15 NYCRR 136.5 [b] [3]). Once the waiting period expires, theCommissioner may grant a relicensing application and, if granted, shall issue a restrictedlicense "for a period of five years and shall require the installation of an ignitioninterlock device in any motor vehicle owned or operated by such person for suchfive-year period" (15 NYCRR 136.5 [b] [3] [ii]).

Applying the newly-enacted regulations, DMV denied petitioners' respective [*2]applications, and the denials were affirmed uponadministrative appeal. Petitioners then commenced these three combined CPLR article 78proceedings and declaratory judgment actions against DMV and its Commissionerseeking, among other things, orders granting their applications for relicensing anddeclaring that the regulations are unconstitutional because respondents acted without, orin excess of, their rule-making authority. Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, andpetitioners appealed.

Initially, we agree with Supreme Court that certain claims in each of the threepetitions should be dismissed as nonjusticiable. Specifically, Gillman's and Allen'schallenges to the validity of the portions of 15 NYCRR 136.5 that impose presumptivelypermanent bans on relicensing (see 15 NYCRR 136.5 [b] [1], [2]) must bedismissed, as their own applications for relicensing were not denied under thoseprovisions. As for the challenges by all three petitioners to the specific portion of theregulations that require the issuance of a restricted license and the installation of anignition interlock device if their applications for relicensing are eventually granted(see 15 NYCRR 136.5 [b] [3] [ii]), we note that Joy's application was not deniedunder this provision, and Gillman's and Allen's waiting periods for relicensing have notyet expired. Because the Commissioner, in her discretion, has not yet granted theirapplications, these restrictions have not yet been imposed upon them and "the harmsought to be enjoined is contingent upon events which may not come to pass. . . [Accordingly,] the claim[s] . . . [are] nonjusticiable as. . . speculative and abstract" (Matter of New York State Inspection, Sec.& Law Enforcement Empls., Dist. Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Cuomo,64 NY2d 233, 240 [1984]; accord Matter of Acevedo v New York State Dept. of MotorVehs., 132 AD3d 112, 117 [2015]).

Turning to the portions of Gillman's and Allen's petitions that do present justiciablecontroversies, our recent decision in Matter of Acevedo v New York State Dept. ofMotor Vehs. (supra) is dispositive (see also Matter of Shearer v Fiala, 124 AD3d 1291, 1292[2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 909 [2015]). As for Joy's contentions, they are basedupon a subsection of the regulation that, with some exceptions not relevant here, imposesa presumptively permanent licensing ban upon those who have been convicted of five ormore alcohol-related driving offenses (see 15 NYCRR 136.5 [b] [1]; [d]). As wehold in Matter of Carney v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. (133 AD3d 1150 [2015] [decided herewith]), the legal principles and analysis that formed the basisof our decision in Matter of Acevedo are fully applicable to, and confirm thevalidity of, 15 NYCRR 136.5 (b) (1). Thus, we find that Supreme Court properlydismissed the petitions.

Devine, J., concurs.

Lynch, J. (concurring). In view of the majority decisions of the Court in Matter of Acevedo v New YorkState Dept. of Motor Vehs. (132 AD3d 112 [2015]) and Matter of Carney vNew York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. (133 AD3d 1150 [2015] [decided herewith]), we concur.

Garry, J.P., concurs. Ordered that the judgments are affirmed, withoutcosts.

[Prior Case History: 45 Misc 3d 475.]

Footnotes


Footnote *:A "[s]erious drivingoffense" is defined as "(i) a fatal accident; (ii) a driving-related Penal Law conviction;(iii) conviction of two or more violations for which five or more points are assessed on aviolator's driving record pursuant to [15 NYCRR 131.3]; or (iv) 20 or more points fromany violations" (15 NYCRR 136.5 [a] [2]).


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