| People v Harris |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 08755 [133 AD3d 880] |
| November 25, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Crystal Harris, Appellant. |
Golub & Golub, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Mitchell A. Golub of counsel), forappellant.
Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and AnnBordley of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Ingram, J.), rendered November 4, 2013, convicting her of arson in the second degree,upon a jury verdict and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial,after a hearing (D'Emic, J.), of the defendant's motion to suppress her statements to lawenforcement officials.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention on appeal, after she was advised of, andwaived, her Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]),additional warnings were not necessary, as she remained in continuous custody (see People v Pegues, 59 AD3d570 [2009]; People v Glinsman, 107 AD2d 710 [1985]). Moreover, therewas no evidence that her statements were involuntary (see People v Bonds, 118 AD3d717, 718 [2014]; People v Glasper, 160 AD2d 723, 724 [1990]).Accordingly, the hearing court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress herstatements to law enforcement officials.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People vContes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish thedefendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see Penal Law§ 150.15). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct anindependent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d342, 348 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity toview the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People vMateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495[1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was notagainst the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
The defendant's contention that the justice of the Supreme Court who presided at thetrial should have recused himself, sua sponte, is unpreserved for appellate review(see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Jackson, 185 AD2d 363 [1992]) and, inany event, is without merit. Where, as here, no basis for disqualification pursuant toJudiciary Law § 14 was presented, it was up to the conscience anddiscretion of the justice to decide whether or not to recuse himself (see People vMoreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405-406 [1987]; People v Daly, 20 AD3d 542 [2005]; People vHines, 260 AD2d 646 [1999]). Based upon the record before us, the justice did noterr in failing to recuse himself.
[*2] Contrary to the defendant's further contention, the Supreme Court properly allowedtestimony from a witness concerning a conversation he had with the defendant prior tothe fire. This evidence was relevant to show motive and intent (see People vAlvino, 71 NY2d 233, 241-242 [1987]; People v Martinez, 53 AD3d 508, 509 [2008]; People vJean, 297 AD2d 821, 822 [2002]), and the court providently exercised its discretionin determining that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the risk of undueprejudice to the defendant (see People v Alvino, 71 NY2d at 241-242).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80[1982]).
The defendant's remaining contention, that the Supreme Court erred in granting thePeople's motion to amend the indictment during the trial, is without merit (seeCPL 200.70 [1]). Dillon, J.P., Sgroi, Cohen and LaSalle, JJ., concur.