| People v Richey |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 09143 [134 AD3d 1254] |
| December 10, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Jamar K. Richey, Appellant. |
Susan Patnode, Rural Law Center of New York, Albany (Cynthia Feathers ofcounsel), for appellant.
Derek P. Champagne, Special Prosecutor, Malone (Jennifer M. Hollis of counsel),for respondent.
McCarthy, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County(Richards, J.), rendered February 10, 2014, convicting defendant upon his plea of guiltyof the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.
Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of criminal possession of a controlledsubstance in the third degree and executed a waiver of appeal. County Court sentenceddefendant, as a second felony offender, to a five-year prison term, followed by threeyears of postrelease supervision, and recommended that defendant be considered for anysubstance abuse programs that the Department of Corrections and CommunitySupervision deemed him eligible for. After the court imposed defendant's sentence,defendant's counsel stated that the court was empowered to order that defendantparticipate in a Comprehensive Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment (hereinafterCASAT) program—a statement that the court construed as a motion for such anorder. The court denied the motion. Defendant appeals.
Initially, the record establishes that defendant's waiver of his right to appeal wasknowing, voluntary and intelligent. County Court confirmed that defendant understoodthat his right to appeal was separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeitedupon a guilty plea and confirmed that defendant understood that certain appeal rights,which the court enumerated, would not be foreclosed by an appeal waiver. Defendantexplicitly waived his appeal rights, without qualification, during the same colloquy.Accordingly, defendant's waiver [*2]was valid, and thatwaiver forecloses our review of discretionary sentencing determinations (see People v Lyman, 119AD3d 968, 969 [2014]; People v Wolz, 112 AD3d 1150, 1152 [2013], lvdenied 23 NY3d 1026 [2014]).
In any event, defendant's challenge to the CASAT determination is without merit.Although County Court was initially unaware of its power to order defendant'sparticipation in CASAT, defendant apprised the court of its statutory authority to do so(see Penal Law § 60.04 [6]). Defendant's contention that the courtnonetheless denied defendant CASAT participation due to a mistaken belief that it didnot have the power to make such an order is without specific support in the record and istherefore speculative. In addition, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining toorder defendant's participation in the CASAT program (see People v Walker, 95 AD3d1240, 1241 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1002 [2012]; People v Herring, 74 AD3d1579, 1580 [2010]).
Lahtinen, J.P., Lynch and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.