| People v Jones |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 09201 [134 AD3d 503] |
| December 15, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Lester Q. Jones, Appellant. |
Richard M. Greenberg, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York RosemaryHerbert of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Sylvia Wertheimer of counsel),for respondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Maxwell Wiley, J.), rendered January5, 2011, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree, andsentencing him to a term of 25 years to life, unanimously affirmed.
The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the jury's credibilitydeterminations.
The rulings challenged on appeal, and discussed separately in this decision, wereproper exercises of the court's discretion. In each instance, there was no prejudice todefendant or violation of any constitutional right.
The court properly refused to give a specific instruction regarding the significance ofthe cooperation agreements of two prosecution witnesses (see People v Inniss, 83NY2d 653 [1994]). The charge as a whole, including an instruction regarding interestedwitnesses, adequately conveyed the need to scrutinize the testimony of thesewitnesses.
The court properly excluded an anonymous, unsubstantiated tip regarding a possiblealternative suspect. The tip lacked any indicia of reliability, and even if offered tochallenge the thoroughness of the police investigation, any minimal probative value thetip may have had on that subject was outweighed by its prejudicial effect (see People v Hayes, 17 NY3d46, 52-54 [2011], cert denied 565 US &mdash, 132 S Ct 844 [2011]). Byway of contrast, when the People introduced a statement by a nontestifying declarant asbackground to explain police actions, it is clear that defendant had opened the door tothat evidence through a line of cross-examination (see Tennessee v Street, 471US 409 [1985]; People vReid, 19 NY3d 382 [2012]).
The court properly denied defendant's various mistrial motions, made on the basis ofevidentiary issues. In each instance, the court provided a sufficient remedy by strikingoffending testimony or delivering thorough instructions to the jury.
The court properly discharged an absent juror after waiting two hours after thescheduled resumption of proceedings. Under the "bright-line" rule of People vJeanty (94 NY2d 507, 515 [2000]), a juror "who is . . . more than twohours late can be conclusively presumed to be unavailable and is subject, in the court'sdiscretion, to discharge" (id. at 516). Although the discharged juror arrived 15minutes after being replaced by an alternate, the court, after interviewing the dischargedjuror and considering the totality of circumstances, properly adhered to its ruling anddeclined to reinstate the juror.
[*2] We perceiveno basis for reducing defendant's sentence, or running it concurrently with his lifesentence on another conviction. Concur—Tom, J.P., Sweeny, Renwick andManzanet-Daniels, JJ.