People v Rodriguez
2015 NY Slip Op 09212 [134 AD3d 512]
December 15, 2015
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 11, 2015


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Maria Rodriguez, Appellant.

Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Marisa K. Cabrera ofcounsel), for appellant.

Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Eric C. Washer of counsel), forrespondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Peter J. Benitez, J.), rendered July 12,2012, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of two counts of murder in the seconddegree, and sentencing her to concurrent terms of 25 years to life, unanimouslyaffirmed.

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are unreviewable on directappeal because they involve matters not reflected in, or fully explained by, the record(see People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705, 709 [1988]; People v Love, 57NY2d 998 [1982]). Accordingly, since defendant has not made a CPL 440.10 motion,the merits of the ineffectiveness claims may not be addressed on appeal. The apologeticstatements counsel made at sentencing about his trial performance do not render apostconviction motion unnecessary, especially because they are contradicted bystatements counsel made in colloquies during the trial.

In the alternative, to the extent the existing record permits review, we find thatdefendant received effective assistance under the state and federal standards (seePeople v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 713-714 [1998]; Strickland vWashington, 466 US 668 [1984]). Defendant has not shown that any of counsel'salleged deficiencies, as discussed further in this decision, fell below an objectivestandard of reasonableness, or that, viewed individually or collectively, they depriveddefendant of a fair trial or affected the outcome of the case.

First, we conclude that defendant was not deprived of effective assistance bycounsel's decision not to call a clinical psychologist to testify in support of a duressdefense, a decision that counsel made after reviewing the psychologist's report ondefendant and the incident (see generally Harrington v Richter, 562 US 86[2011]). Notwithstanding counsel's statements at sentencing, the extensive discussionsbetween the court and counsel at trial reflect that counsel made a sound strategic decisionto challenge the reliability of the sole evidence of defendant's guilt, her written statement,rather than to call the psychologist and defendant to testify that defendant was coercedinto committing the murder, which could have opened the door to defendant's admissionsto the psychologist about her participation in the killing.

Next, we find that counsel's decision not to call the psychologist to testify at thesuppression hearing may have been based on a reasonable tactic of depriving the Peopleof an opportunity for an examination before trial of the psychologist, whom counsel wasstill considering calling as a trial witness. Defendant has not established that counsel'sdecision to rest on the record at the suppression hearing was ineffective, since there is noindication that any suppression argument would have had any chance of success (see e.g. People v Ashby, 21AD3d 839 [1st Dept 2005]).

We also conclude that defendant has not established that she was prejudiced bycounsel's isolated mistake in eliciting a brief amount of unfavorable testimony from anexpert witness (see People vBlake, 24 NY3d 78, 81 [2014]), or by counsel's overall manner of trying thecase (see People v Martinez,35 AD3d 156, 157 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 924 [2007];People v Malave, 271 AD2d 204 [1st Dept 2000], lv denied 95 NY2d836 [2000]).

[*2] Turning to defendant'sarguments other than her ineffective assistance claim, we find no basis for reversal. Sincedefendant only sought to introduce a third party's statement to the police for the purposeof impeaching the interrogator's credibility at trial, defendant failed to preserve her claimthat the statement should have been admitted to show the third party's consciousness ofguilt, and she likewise failed to preserve her claim that she was deprived of herconstitutional right to present a defense (see People v Lane, 7 NY3d 888, 889 [2006]). We declineto review these claims in the interest of justice. Were we to review them, we would findthem unavailing. We also find that the court properly exercised its discretion indeclining, after a suitable inquiry, to discharge a juror whose unauthorized absence fromcourt amounted to minor misconduct under the circumstances, and did not render himgrossly unqualified (see Peoplev Paulino, 131 AD3d 65, 71-72 [1st Dept 2015]). Concur—Friedman,J.P., Andrias, Gische and Kapnick, JJ.


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