| T-Rex Hyde Park Owner, LLC v Dutchess CountyLegislature |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 09425 [134 AD3d 1024] |
| December 23, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| T-Rex Hyde Park Owner, LLC,Appellant, v Dutchess County Legislature et al., Respondents, et al.,Defendant. |
Corbally Gartland and Rappleyea, LLP, Poughkeepsie, NY (John Holden Adams ofcounsel), for appellant.
Drake, Loeb, Heller, Kennedy, Gogerty, Gaba & Rodd, PLLC, New Windsor,NY (Stephen J. Gaba of counsel), for respondents.
In a hybrid action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that a special assessmentimposed on the plaintiff/petitioner's real property is unlawful, unconstitutional, andinvalid, and, in effect, proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determinationof the Board of Benefit Assessment Review of Dutchess County dated October 25, 2012,the plaintiff/petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County(Brands, J.), dated December 11, 2013, which granted the motion of thedefendants/respondents Dutchess County Legislature and County of Dutchess forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint/petition insofar as asserted against them anddenied its cross motion for leave to amend the complaint/petition.
Ordered that the notice of appeal from so much of the order as granted thosebranches of the motion of the defendants/respondents Dutchess County Legislature andCounty of Dutchess which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of actionasserted, in effect, pursuant to CPLR article 78 insofar as asserted against them, anddenied that branch of the plaintiff/petitioner's cross motion which was for leave to amendthe petition is deemed to be an application for leave to appeal from those portions of theorder, and leave to appeal is granted (see CPLR 5701 [c]; Hertzel v Town of PutnamVal., 131 AD3d 921 [2015]); and it is further,
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, (1) by deleting the provisions thereofgranting those branches of the motion of the defendants/respondents Dutchess CountyLegislature and County of Dutchess which were for summary judgment dismissing thefirst, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth causes of action insofar as asserted againstthem, and substituting therefor a provision denying those branches of the motion, and (2)by deleting the provision thereof denying the plaintiff/petitioner's cross motion for leaveto amend the complaint/petition, and substituting therefor a provision granting theplaintiff/petitioner's cross motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed; and it isfurther,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiff/petitioner.
Dutchess County administers a county-wide water district in accordance with theprovisions of County Law article 5-A (see Public Authorities Law§ 1142). With the assistance of the Dutchess County Water and WastewaterAuthority (hereinafter the DCWWA) (see Public Authorities Law§ 1123), the County adopts annual benefit assessment tax rolls for zones ofassessment in the water district (see Local Law No. 4 [1999] of DutchessCounty).
[*2] In early 2012, theplaintiff/petitioner (hereinafter the plaintiff) purchased an undeveloped parcel ofapproximately 339 acres, located in the County. Soon thereafter, the plaintiff paidoutstanding water district benefit assessments on the property for the years 2010 and2011, and then paid the assessment for the year 2012.
On September 15, 2012, the DCWWA notified the plaintiff that the tentative benefitassessment roll for the year 2013 included an assessment of $134,342.17 on its property.The plaintiff timely filed a grievance objecting to the tentative assessment and appearedat a grievance hearing before the Board of Benefit Assessment Review (hereinafterBBAR) on October 25, 2012. The BBAR denied the grievance at the hearing, and thetentative assessment for the plaintiff's property was included in the final assessment rollfor 2013 adopted by the County Legislature prior to December 31, 2012.
In December 2012, the plaintiff commenced this hybrid action for a judgmentdeclaring that the water district special assessment it had just challenged in theadministrative procedure (which the complaint/petition referred to as the "2012 specialassessment") is unlawful, unconstitutional, and invalid, and for a refund of all specialassessments previously paid, and, in effect, proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 toannul BBAR's determination. The County Legislature and the County (hereinaftertogether the County) moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint/petition(hereinafter the complaint) insofar as asserted against them. Noting that the plaintiff had,in fact, unsuccessfully grieved the special assessment for 2013, the County argued, inpart, that the plaintiff's claims regarding the special assessments for 2012 and prior yearswere barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and time-barred under thefour-month statute of limitations applicable to CPLR article 78 proceedings. The plaintiffcross-moved for leave to amend the complaint to correctly identify the year of the specialassessment at issue as "2013" rather than "2012." The Supreme Court denied theplaintiff's cross motion and granted the County's motion on the grounds of failure toexhaust administrative remedies and expiration of the four-month statute oflimitations.
"A petition to review a tax assessment may be amended if the change corrects adefect in form rather than adding a matter of substance because 'the taxpayer's right toreview should not be defeated by technicalities' " (Matter of Plaro Estates, Inc. vAssessor, 101 AD3d 886, 888 [2012], quoting Matter of Sterling Estates vBoard of Assessors of County of Nassau, 66 NY2d 122, 127 [1985]). "[T]he lawregarding real property assessment proceedings is 'remedial in character and should beliberally construed to the end that the taxpayer's right to have his assessment reviewedshould not be defeated by a technicality' " (Matter of Garth v Board of Assessment Review for Town ofRichmond, 13 NY3d 176, 180 [2009], quoting Matter of Great E. Mall vCondon, 36 NY2d 544, 548 [1975]). In reviewing the pleading requirements in realproperty assessment proceedings, "the Court of Appeals has outlined a two-prongedinquiry: (1) whether the respondent received adequate notice of the commencement ofthe proceedings, and (2) whether any substantial right of the entity would be prejudicedby disregarding the defect or irregularity" (Matter of Plaro Estates, Inc. vAssessor, 101 AD3d at 888, citing Matter of Great E. Mall v Condon, 36NY2d at 548). "The burden of proving prejudice is upon the respondent" (Matter ofPlaro Estates, Inc. v Assessor, 101 AD3d at 888).
Here, the defect in misidentifying the year of the special assessment at issue wastechnical and not jurisdictional. The complaint and its attached exhibits gave the Countyadequate notice of the actual assessment at issue, and the County failed to prove that asubstantial right would be prejudiced by disregarding the defect (see Matter of Millerv Board of Assessors, 91 NY2d 82, 87 [1997]; Matter of Great E. Mall vCondon, 36 NY2d at 548-549; Matter of Plaro Estates, Inc. v Assessor, 101AD3d at 888; Matter of Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v Board ofAssessors, 212 AD2d 600, 601 [1995]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court shouldhave granted the plaintiff's cross motion for leave to amend the complaint anddetermined the County's motion for summary judgment as addressed to the amendedcomplaint. As the relevant issues were argued before the Supreme Court and have beenbriefed by the parties on appeal, we address them in the first instance in the interests ofjudicial economy (see Dockeryv Sprecher, 68 AD3d 1043, 1046 [2009]).
With respect to those branches of its motion which were for summary judgmentdismissing the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth causes of action, the Countyrelies, inter alia, on the fact that "special assessments are presumed to be valid, regularand legal and . . . the burden of rebutting the presumption falls upon thelandowner" (Matter of Pokoik v Incorporated Vil. of [*3]Ocean Beach, 143 AD2d 1021, 1022 [1988]; see Matter of 1300 Franklin Ave.Members, LLC v Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of Garden City, 62 AD3d 1004,1007 [2009]), and that "a determination by a board with respect to the amount of benefitconferred on properties by improvements involves the exercise of the legislative powerwhich will not be interfered with unless it is shown to be so arbitrary or palpably unjustas to amount to a confiscation of property" (Matter of New York State DormitoryAuth. v Board of Trustees of Hyde Park Fire & Water Dist., 206 AD2d 483,484 [1994], mod 86 NY2d 72 [1995]; see Matter of 1300 Franklin Ave.Members, LLC v Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of Garden City, 62 AD3d at 1007).The County's motion papers, however, failed to establish, prima facie, that the factualallegations in the complaint, as amplified by the exhibits attached thereto, wereinsufficient to overcome the presumption of validity. Accordingly, those branches of theCounty's motion for summary judgment should have been denied, regardless of thesufficiency of the opposing papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).
By contrast, with respect to those branches of its motion which were for summaryjudgment dismissing the second, seventh, and ninth causes of action, the Countyestablished its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, withrespect to the second cause of action, which alleged that the County unlawfully delegatedits taxing power to the DCWWA, the County established, prima facie, that it retained theultimate authority to adopt final assessment rolls (see Local Law No. 4 [1999] ofDutchess County §§ 8, 9). With respect to the seventh cause of action,which sought the reimbursement of special assessments previously paid by the plaintiff,the County established, prima facie, that the plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrativeremedies by grieving the special assessments for the years 2010, 2011, and 2012 beforeBBAR and, in any event, failed to challenge such assessments within the four-monthstatute of limitations (see Press v County of Monroe, 50 NY2d 695, 701-704[1980]; Local Law No. 4 [1999] of Dutchess County § 10). With respect tothe ninth cause of action, which alleged that the County was required to raise funds forthe water district with ad valorem assessments pursuant to County Law§ 270, the County established, prima facie, that, pursuant to PublicAuthorities Law § 1142 and County Law article 5-A, it was entitled to raiserevenue by either special ad valorem levies under County Law § 270 orspecial assessments under County Law § 271 (see Young Men'sChristian Assn. v Rochester Pure Waters Dist., 37 NY2d 371, 376-377 [1975]). Inopposition to these prima facie showings, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact(see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). Dillon, J.P., Chambers,Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.