| Matter of Hawthorne v Stanford |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 00083 [135 AD3d 1036] |
| January 7, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Philip Hawthorne, Respondent, v TinaM. Stanford, as Chair of the New York State Board of Parole,Appellant. |
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Laura Etlinger of counsel), forappellant.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, New York City (Darcy C. Harris of counsel)and Jennifer J. Parish, Urban Justice Center, New York City, for respondent.
Garry, J. Appeals (1) from a judgment of the Supreme Court (LaBuda, J.), enteredJune 18, 2014 in Sullivan County, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul a determination of the Board of Parole denyingpetitioner's request for, among other things, parole release, and (2) from a judgment ofsaid court, entered November 6, 2014 in Sullivan County, which, upon reconsideration,adhered to its prior decision.
In March 2009, petitioner pleaded guilty to a charge of use of a child in a sexualperformance and was sentenced to a prison term of 5 to 15 years. Petitioner obtained anearned eligibility certificate during his incarceration (see Correction Law§ 805), and appeared before the Board of Parole in March 2013. The Boarddenied release. Petitioner thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding,challenging the Board's decision as arbitrary and capricious and alleging, in essence, thatthe Board had failed to consider his mental illness in the review process. Supreme Courtgranted the petition, directed that a de novo hearing be conducted and further requiredthe Board to administer a COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment instrument (hereinafterthe COMPAS assessment) tailored to address petitioner's mental illness. Thereafter, thecourt [*2]issued a subsequent judgment denyingrespondent's motion for leave to reargue and renew.[FN1] Respondent appeals from bothjudgments.[FN2]
The Board is charged with considering whether "there is a reasonable probabilitythat, if [an] inmate is released, he [or she] will live and remain at liberty without violatingthe law, and that his [or her] release is not incompatible with the welfare of society andwill not so deprecate the seriousness of his [or her] crime as to undermine respect for thelaw" (Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c] [A]). "The decision to grant parolerelease is discretionary, but the Board is required to consider certain guidelines in makingits determination" (Matter ofHamilton v New York State Div. of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268, 1269 [2014][citation omitted]; see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 477 [2000]).These guidelines include such factors as the inmate's institutional record, his or herrelease plans, the seriousness of the offense, and his or her prior criminal record(see Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c] [A] [i], [iii], [vii], [viii]; 9NYCRR 8002.3 [a] [1], [3], [7], [8]). In 2011, the law was amended to further requirethat the Board's "review must include an instrument that measures rehabilitation and thelikelihood of success on parole" (Matter of Montane v Evans, 116 AD3d 197, 202 [2014],appeal dismissed 24 NY3d 1052 [2014]; see Executive Law§§ 259-c [4]; 259-i [2] [c]). The Board utilizes the COMPASassessment to satisfy this requirement (see Matter of Symes v New York State Bd. of Parole, 117AD3d 959, 959 [2014]).
Here, it is undisputed that petitioner has a significant history of mental illness. He hasno prior history of criminal conduct. Before committing the underlying crime, he hadobtained Associate's and Bachelor's degrees, was working on obtaining a Master'sdegree, and had been employed as a substitute teacher and a tutor. In the periodimmediately preceding the criminal conduct, he was suffering from agoraphobia relatedto his mental illness and had withdrawn from all activities, including work andschool.[FN3] Hiscrime involved using computer communications to pose as a 16-year-old boy for thepurpose of exchanging nude photos with a 13-year-old girl. There was no physicalcontact between petitioner and his young victim; all of their exchanges werecomputer-based. Petitioner's online conduct grew worse over time, and he ultimately[*3]threatened the victim that he would distribute andshare her photos if she failed to engage in specific, exceptionally degrading conduct athis direction.
In April 2009, after petitioner was committed to the custody of the Department ofCorrections and Community Supervision (hereinafter DOCCS), he was given an initialpsychiatric screening. He was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and given anOffice of Mental Health service level designation of 1—the highest level ofservices, indicating a diagnosis of a major mental illness and/or severe personalitydisorder with active symptoms. Several psychiatric medications were prescribed.Following his transfer several months later to the Midstate Correctional Facility, hismental health level was downgraded to service level 2, and he was placed in the generalpopulation. In October 2009, his mental health level was again downgraded, to servicelevel 3, which indicates a need for short-term psychiatric medication for relatively minordisorders. In January 2010, a physician at Midstate determined that petitioner no longerrequired any psychiatric medications. Following the discontinuance of his medication,petitioner became actively psychotic, lost 40 pounds and stopped attending to basichygiene. Petitioner's mother, who had maintained regular and frequent contact during hisincarceration, noticed the changes almost immediately. She wrote a series of urgentletters describing petitioner's deteriorating mental health and pleading for appropriatetreatment, but these letters did not apparently generate any timely response. Petitionerwas ultimately reevaluated in March 2010, by which time he had been placed in thespecial housing unit (hereinafter SHU) as a result of disciplinary incidents. Uponreevaluation, he was found to meet the criteria for "serious mental illness," which entitledhim to receive out-of-cell mental health treatment while confined in the SHU.[FN4] His mental health levelwas raised, his medications were reinstated, and he was placed in therapeutic housingfacilities.
There are five disciplinary violations in petitioner's record that arose within the fourmonths immediately following the discontinuance of his psychiatric medication. Theoffenses charged included refusing to obey direct orders, creating a disturbance andengaging in violent conduct. The most grave charges, of violent conduct, arose from anincident in which he struck and kicked correction officers as they attempted to restrainhim; on another occasion he refused to enter his cell and lay on the floor until officersmoved him, and a third incident arose when he hid under his bed and refused to come outuntil he was physically removed. Outside of the four months in which he was not treatedfor his mental illness, petitioner has maintained an almost-perfect disciplinary record,incurring only one tier II disciplinary infraction in July 2011 for being "out of place,"apparently resulting from his mistaken belief that he was scheduled to attend a meeting.Overall, following the reinstatement of appropriate treatment and medication, the recordreveals that petitioner has functioned very well.
The therapy reports in the record indicate that petitioner has accepted responsibilityfor his criminal conduct and understands that he must continue to address the conditionsthat led to this conduct. His participation in programming has been described as"excellent," "exceptional" and "outstanding." He has served as a group leader and wasdescribed by the supervisor of a behavior modification group as an "asset to the programand to his peers." He has expressed remorse for the harm he caused to the young victim.In the course of the parole interview, [*4]petitionerdescribed his criminal conduct as "a disgusting thing." The record further reveals thatpetitioner has substantial community and family support in place to aid his re-entry uponhis eventual release from incarceration. There are identified resources for obtaininghousing and employment, and the Urban Justice Center, which has worked with him forseveral years, has agreed to provide social work and assist his enrollment in continuingmental health and rehabilitation treatment services.
Prior to petitioner's appearance before the Board, a COMPAS assessment wasprepared (see Executive Law § 259-c [4]). This instrument,consisting of 74 questions, indicated that petitioner was at a low risk of arrest (2 out of10), or absconding (1 out of 10), and was unlikely to engage in re-entry substance abuse(1 out of 10). He scored low (3 out of 10) for history of violence, but in the mediumrange for risk of felony violence (7 out of 10). He scored high for prison misconduct (10out of 10). The Board members reviewed this instrument at the outset of petitioner'sinterview, and then conducted a fairly comprehensive colloquy with him addressingvarious factors, specifically including a review of his prison disciplinary history.
In its determination, the Board acknowledged several positive factors, includingpetitioner's programming and community support, and stated that it had taken his mentalillness into account, but relied upon his crime and his disciplinary history in denyingrelease. After discussing petitioner's crime, the Board wrote, "Your poor behavior isnoted and remains disturbing. While your mental health needs at the time are considered,your conduct in a structured environment has been marginal. Due to your deviant actionswith a child, and marginal compliance with DOCCS rules, your release at this time isdenied[.] There is a reasonable probability you would not live and remain at libertywithout violating the law."
We agree with respondent that the record does not support petitioner's assertion thatthe Board relied solely or primarily upon the COMPAS assessment in reaching itsdetermination. Indeed, some of the discussion within the hearing transcript suggests thatthe COMPAS assessment may even have been discounted to some degree. Nonetheless,it is clear that the determination strongly relied upon, and even emphasized, petitioner'sdisciplinary history. In this regard, the determination lacks record support. Other than thedisciplinary issues that arose when petitioner's illness was untreated, there is simply norecord basis for finding that petitioner's "conduct in a structured environment has beenmarginal" or that there was "marginal compliance with DOCCS rules." Only during theperiod when petitioner was deprived of medication for his mental illness—notthrough his own fault, but as the result of a medical decision imposed upon him by aprison physician—did petitioner repeatedly fail to comply with prison rules. TheBoard failed to acknowledge this critical fact, noting that it had taken petitioner's mentalillness into account but failing to address the fact that most of the infractions that it found"disturbing" occurred while this illness was not being treated.
Considering this factual background, we agree with Supreme Court that the Board'sdetermination was irrational (seeMatter of Comfort v New York State Bd. of Parole, 101 AD3d 1450, 1451[2012]). Further, it was irrational to such a degree that it cannot withstand judicialscrutiny, despite the very limited scope of our review (see Executive Law§ 259-i [5]; Matter of Hamilton v New York State Div. of Parole,119 AD3d at 1269). As petitioner argues, a fair review of this record compels theconclusion that the determination to remove him from all medication for his mentalillness led to a psychotic breakdown that rendered him unable to comply with prisonregulations during the period when the disciplinary infractions occurred. To withholdpetitioner's necessary medications was apparently an error of medical judgment.However, for the Board to then rely upon petitioner's conduct during the psychotic crisisthat was thus precipitated as a primary ground for denying his release is so inherentlyunfair and [*5]unreasonable that it meets the highstandard of "irrationality bordering on impropriety" warranting our intervention(Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]). Tohold otherwise would, in effect, result in punishing petitioner with continuedincarceration for the failure of prison officials to provide him with proper treatment forhis mental illness—a result that we cannot sanction. Accordingly, we agree withSupreme Court that petitioner must be afforded a de novo hearing before the Board.
In reversing the Board's determination, Supreme Court found that the COMPASassessment utilized by the Board was inadequate for use with inmates exhibiting mentalillness and directed the Board to prepare a COMPAS assessment that has been "tailored"to address petitioner's mental health needs.[FN5] We agree with respondent that thecourt erred in this regard. As respondent asserts, courts do not have power to substitutetheir judgment for that of the Board; the scope of judicial review and direction is limited.The legislation that required the Board to utilize a risk and needs assessment did notdeprive it of discretion in determining how to fulfill this requirement (seeExecutive Law § 259-c [4]; Matter of Montane v Evans, 116 AD3dat 201-202; see generally People ex rel. Donohoe v Montanye, 35 NY2d 221,226-227 [1974]). The court's specific findings and directions pertaining to the COMPASassessment exceeded the scope of its authority and must be reversed. We need not reachthe issue of whether compliance with the court's directive is feasible.
Peters, P.J., Egan Jr., Rose and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgments aremodified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as directed the Boardof Parole to administer and prepare an alternative COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessmentinstrument, and, as so modified, affirmed.
Footnote 1:As Supreme Court'ssubsequent judgment addressed the underlying merits, we deem Supreme Court to havegranted reargument and then adhered to its prior determination (see CPLR 5701[a] [2] [viii]; Rodriguez vJacoby & Meyers, LLP, 126 AD3d 1183, 1184 [2015], lv denied 25NY3d 912 [2015]).
Footnote 2:Petitioner againappeared before the Board during the pendency of this appeal and was denied release.Both parties argue that this reappearance did not cause the appeal to be moot. We agree,finding that the exception to the mootness doctrine applies. Supreme Court's dispositionrequired specific relief in a manner that continues to affect the parties' respective rightsand will recur and evade review unless it is addressed (see Matter of Lebron vAlexander, 68 AD3d 1476, 1477 [2009]; Matter of Lovell v New York State Div. of Parole, 40 AD3d1166, 1167 [2007]).
Footnote 3:The record fails to revealwhere petitioner was residing at this time; there are some indications that he had beenattempting to live on his own, and others that he had been residing with either his motheror his father.
Footnote 4:The legislation that nowrequires prisoners who are determined to have serious mental illness to be diverted fromthe SHU into residential mental health treatment had not yet taken effect (seeCorrection Law § 137 [6] [d] [i], as added by L 2008, ch 1,§§ 4, 8 [a]).
Footnote 5:There are apparentlymultiple versions of the COMPAS assessment available; respondent argues that this issuewas not properly preserved, but we note that within petitioner's initial administrativeappeal, he asserted that a 95-question version is routinely utilized by probationdepartments throughout the state.