| Rankel v County of Westchester |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 00172 [135 AD3d 731] |
| January 13, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Robert Rankel et al., Appellants, v County ofWestchester et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant. |
Mark Guterman, White Plains, NY, for appellants.
Robert F. Meehan, County Attorney, White Plains, NY (James Castro-Blanco andThomas G. Gardiner of counsel), for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for civil rights violations pursuant to 42 USC§ 1983, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their notice of appeal and brief,from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Colabella, J.H.O.),dated March 5, 2014, as granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was forleave to amend their answer to assert an affirmative defense of qualified immunity anddenied that branch of their cross motion which was for summary judgment on the issueof liability.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
This action arises out of the emergency removal of the plaintiffs' three children bythe Westchester County Department of Social Services (hereinafter DSS) in earlyFebruary 2001. Within days of the emergency removal, (1) DSS commenced abuse andneglect proceedings against the plaintiffs with respect to the three children; and (2) theFamily Court held a hearing, pursuant to Family Court Act § 1028, and didnot return the children to the parents, instead remanding the children to the custody ofDSS. On February 28, 2001, DSS withdrew the abuse and neglect petitions withoutprejudice, the children were returned to the care of the plaintiffs, and the DSS case wasdetermined to be unfounded and closed.
The plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the children, commenced this actionpursuant to 42 USC § 1983, alleging, inter alia, that the emergency removalof the children without court authorization, and the four-to-five-day period after theremovals wherein DSS did not initiate postdeprivation proceedings, violated their rightsunder the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.They further alleged that such deprivations were caused by DSS's pattern, practice,custom, and policy of not training caseworkers with respect to the proper standards foremergency removals, with callous indifference to citizens' rights.
Thereafter, all of the defendants who were served in the action (hereinaftercollectively the defendants) moved, inter alia, for leave to amend their answer to includethe affirmative defense of qualified immunity. The plaintiffs cross-moved, inter alia, forsummary judgment on the issue of liability. The Supreme Court granted that branch ofthe defendants' motion which was for leave to amend their answer, and denied thatbranch of the plaintiffs' cross motion [*2]which was forsummary judgment on the issue of liability, finding the existence of triable issues of fact.The plaintiffs appeal.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in permitting the defendantsto amend their answer to assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity (seeCPLR 3025 [b]). State officials are entitled to qualified immunity under 42 USC§ 1983 for discretionary functions if either (1) their conduct did not violateclearly established constitutional rights, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for them tobelieve that their acts did not violate clearly established rights (see Doe ex rel. Doe vWhelan, 732 F3d 151, 155 [2d Cir 2013]; Southerland v City of New York,680 F3d 127, 141 [2d Cir 2012]). A parent's right to not have a child removed and thechild's concomitant right not to be removed "without court order, parental consent, oremergency circumstances was firmly established" in 2001 (Southerland v City ofNew York, 680 F3d at 160; see Tenenbaum v Williams, 193 F3d 581,604-605 [2d Cir 1999]). Accordingly, qualified immunity is an appropriate defense ifthere was an objectively reasonable basis for the removal decision, such that" 'officers of reasonable competence could disagree on the legality of the actionat issue in its particular factual context' " (Doe ex rel. Doe v Whelan, 732F3d at 155, quoting Southerland v City of New York, 680 F3d at 141; seeTenenbaum v Williams, 193 F3d at 596). Here, there was no prejudice or surprise tothe plaintiffs, given that the basis for the removals was fully explored during discovery(see CPLR 3025 [b]; Marcum, LLP v Silva, 117 AD3d 917, 917 [2014]; Bonavita v McNicholas, 72AD3d 859, 859 [2010]).
The Supreme Court also properly denied that branch of the plaintiffs' motion whichwas for summary judgment on the issue of liability. Although parents have a libertyinterest in the care and custody of their children, and children have a parallel libertyinterest in not being dislocated from their family (see Santosky v Kramer, 455 US745, 753-754 [1982]; Southerland v City of New York, 680 F3d at 142), inemergency situations, where a child is at imminent risk of harm, the child may beremoved from a parent's care without court authorization or parental consent (seeSoutherland v City of New York, 680 F3d at 149; Tenenbaum v Williams,193 F3d at 594; see also Family Ct Act § 1024 [a]). Whereemergency circumstances do not exist, a removal will violate the procedural due processrights of both parent and child (see Southerland v City of New York, 680 F3d at142; Tenenbaum v Williams, 193 F3d at 600). Further, a plaintiff may have aviable procedural due process claim even where emergency circumstances existed at thetime of removal, if the plaintiff does not receive a prompt postdeprivation hearing(see Southerland v City of New York, 680 F3d at 151 n 22; Gomes vWood, 451 F3d 1122, 1128 [10th Cir 2006]; Kia P. v McIntyre, 235 F3d749, 760 [2d Cir 2000]). A removal in the absence of court authorization or emergencycircumstances also violates the child's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawfulseizures (see Southerland v City of New York, 680 F3d at 161; Tenenbaum vWilliams, 193 F3d at 604-605).
" '[B]rief removals [of a child from a parent's home] generally do not rise tothe level of a substantive due process violation, at least where the purpose of the removalis to keep the child safe during investigation and court confirmation of the basis forremoval' " (Southerland v City of New York, 680 F3d at 153, quotingNicholson v Scoppetta, 344 F3d 154, 172 [2d Cir 2003]). Moreover, once courtconfirmation of the basis for removal is obtained, any liability for the continuation ofremoval can no longer be attributed to the caseworker who removed the child. Thus,where a postremoval court order is promptly obtained, there is no substantive due processviolation (see Southerland v City of New York, 680 F3d at 153). Here, therelevant time period was approximately five days from the time the two younger childrenwere removed until the hearing was held; the oldest child was not removed until after theFamily Court order remanding the children to the custody of DSS was issued.
The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, the absence of emergencycircumstances when the two younger children were removed from their parents' carewithout court authorization (see Kia P. v McIntyre, 235 F3d at 760 n 4), nor didthey show, as a matter of law, that the brief removals of those children prior to courtauthorization rose to the level of a substantive due process violation (see Southerlandv City of New York, 680 F3d at 153-155). The plaintiffs further failed todemonstrate as a matter of law that they did not receive a prompt postdeprivation hearing(see Kia P. v McIntyre, 235 F3d at 761; Cecere v City of New York, 967F2d 826, 830 [2d Cir 1992]; see also former Family Ct Act § 1026[c], as effective prior to L 2005, ch 3, § 1, part A, § 14), orthat a [*3]removal of the oldest child was actuallyeffectuated prior to court order.
Moreover, the plaintiffs also failed to demonstrate that any constitutional violationswere attributable to any policy on the part of the defendants of not training caseworkerson the proper standards for emergency removals of children, amounting to a deliberateindifference to their rights (see Walker v City of New York, 974 F2d 293, 297[2d Cir 1992]; Johnson v Kings County Dist. Attorney's Off., 308 AD2d 278,294 [2003]).
Accordingly, since the plaintiffs failed to meet their prima facie burden ofdemonstrating the absence of triable issues of fact, the Supreme Court properly deniedthat branch of their cross motion which was for summary judgment on the issue ofliability (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).Balkin, J.P., Hall, Duffy and LaSalle, JJ., concur.