| Perdios v Perdios |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 00349 [135 AD3d 840] |
| January 20, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Panayiota Perdios, Appellant, v DemetriosPerdios, Respondent. |
Sim & Record, LLP, Bayside, NY (Sang J. Sim of counsel), for appellant.
Gassman Baiamonte Betts, P.C., Garden City, NY (Rosalia Baiamonte of counsel),for respondent.
Appeal from stated portions of a judgment of divorce of the Supreme Court, SuffolkCounty (Andrew A. Crecca, J.), entered November 18, 2013. The judgment, after anonjury trial, inter alia, awarded the plaintiff certain maintenance and child supportpayments, made an equitable distribution of the parties' marital assets, and awarded theplaintiff an attorney's fee.
Ordered that the judgment of divorce is affirmed insofar as appealed from, withcosts.
The parties were married in 1989 and have three children. In 2007, the plaintiffcommenced this action for a divorce and ancillary relief. By order dated January 27,2011, after a hearing, the Supreme Court valued the marital portion of the asset EssexBuilding, LLC, at 1%. By decision and order dated September 4, 2012, after a nonjurytrial, the court, inter alia, directed the dissolution of the marriage and madedeterminations as to maintenance, child support, and equitable distribution. OnNovember 18, 2013, judgment was entered upon the order. The plaintiff appeals fromstated portions of the judgment, contending that the court erred in determining that 99%of the Essex Building, LLC, was not marital property subject to equitable distribution,and in awarding her weekly taxable maintenance in the sum of only $600 per week foronly 10 years, weekly child support in the sum of only $597.40, only a 20% share of thecombined value of the defendant's business interests, and the sum of only $112,166.76 inattorney's fees and disbursements.
The Supreme Court properly determined that 99% of the Essex Building, LLC, wasowned by the Perdios 2003 Irrevocable Family Trust and therefore was not maritalproperty subject to equitable distribution (see Domestic Relations Law§ 236 [B] [3]; EPTL 7-1.18; Marshall v Marshall, 91 AD3d 610, 611 [2012]; Villi v O'Caining-Villi, 10Misc 3d 1060[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 52049[U], *12 [Sup Ct, Westchester County2005]; cf. Riechers v Riechers, 267 AD2d 445 [1999]; Surasi v Surasi,2001 NY Slip Op 40408[U], *1 [2001]).
Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised itsdiscretion in awarding her a 20% share of the combined value of the defendant's businessinterests. [*2]The award of 20% of the value of thebusinesses properly accounts for the plaintiff's minimal direct and indirect contributionsto the business, while not ignoring her contributions as the primary caretaker of theparties' children, which allowed the defendant to focus on the businesses (see Gordon v Gordon, 113AD3d 654, 655 [2014]; Elias v Elias, 101 AD3d 938, 939 [2012]; Davis v O'Brien, 79 AD3d695, 696 [2010]; Baron vBaron, 71 AD3d 807, 809 [2010]; cf. Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d 710, 713 [2007]; Meza vMeza, 294 AD2d 414, 415 [2002]).
Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised itsdiscretion in not imputing additional income to the defendant for purposes ofdetermining the defendant's child support obligation (see generally Brady v Bounsing-Brady, 131 AD3d 1189,1190 [2015]). The plaintiff's remaining contentions regarding the child support award arewithout merit.
The "amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sounddiscretion of the trial court, and every case must be determined on its unique facts" (Massirman v Massirman, 78AD3d 1021, 1022 [2010]). "The court may order maintenance in such amount asjustice requires, considering, inter alia, the standard of living of the parties during themarriage, the income and property of the parties, the distribution of marital property, theduration of the marriage, the health of the parties, the present and future earning capacityof both parties, the ability of the party seeking maintenance to become self-supporting,and the reduced or lost lifetime earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance" (Merrick v Merrick, 132 AD3d742, 742-743 [2015] [emphasis omitted]). Taking these factors into consideration,the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the plaintiff, who wasthe primary caretaker of the parties' children and was out of the workforce for anextended period of time, $600 per week in maintenance for 10 years (see Walter v Walter, 38 AD3d763 [2007]; Wortman vWortman, 11 AD3d 604 [2004]; Ventimiglia v Ventimiglia, 307 AD2d993 [2003]; see also Griggs vGriggs, 44 AD3d 710 [2007]; Fridman v Fridman, 301 AD2d 567[2003]).
Given the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised itsdiscretion in awarding the plaintiff the sum of $112,166.76 in attorney's fees anddisbursements, which represented 40% of the amount of legal fees the plaintiff incurred(see Domestic Relations Law § 237; Cohen v Cohen, 73 AD3d832, 834 [2010]; Ciampa vCiampa, 47 AD3d 745, 748 [2008]; Prichep v Prichep, 52 AD3d 61, 64 [2008]; Morrissey vMorrissey, 259 AD2d 472, 473 [1999]; Tayar v Tayar, 250 AD2d 757[1998]; see also Raynor vRaynor, 68 AD3d 835, 839 [2009]; Litvak v Litvak, 63 AD3d 691, 693 [2009]).
The plaintiff's remaining contention regarding the proceeds of the marital home isnot properly before this Court. Rivera, J.P., Chambers, Sgroi and LaSalle, JJ.,concur.