| People v Taylor |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 00539 [135 AD3d 1237] |
| January 28, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vDavid Taylor, Appellant. |
James P. Milstein, Public Defender, Albany (Theresa M. Suozzi of counsel), forappellant.
P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Christopher D. Horn of counsel), forrespondent.
Garry, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Breslin, J.), entered August13, 2013 in Albany County, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime ofrobbery in the second degree.
Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, defendant entered a guilty plea to robbery in thesecond degree as charged in an indictment and waived his right to appeal. The charge,which defendant factually admitted, stemmed from his conduct in forcibly stealingproperty from a hotel employee on February 12, 2013 aided by another, unnamed person.At sentencing, defendant made a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea claimingineffective assistance of counsel, which Supreme Court denied. In accordance with theplea agreement, defendant was sentenced, as an admitted second felony offender, to aprison term of 10 years with five years of postrelease supervision, and he nowappeals.
We affirm. The record reveals that defendant made a "knowing, voluntary andintelligent choice among alternative courses of action" (People v Conceicao, 26 NY3d375, 382 [2015] [citation omitted]; see People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d 536,543 [1993]). Supreme Court explained the trial-related rights that defendant wasrelinquishing by his plea as well as the consequences of the plea; defendant's responsesto the court's questions during the plea allocution established that he accepted the plea[*2]terms and had sufficient time to discuss them withcounsel, he had no questions and was pleading guilty because he was, in fact, guilty. Hisclaim that he was pressured into pleading guilty and wanted more time is belied by hisassurances during the plea colloquy that he had sufficient time to confer with counsel andhad not been threatened or coerced into accepting the plea, and "amounts to the type ofsituational coercion faced by many defendants offered a plea deal [that] does notundermine the voluntariness of [his] guilty plea" (People v Colon, 122 AD3d 956, 957 [2014] [internalquotation marks and citations omitted]).
With respect to defendant's contention that Supreme Court erred in denying themotion to withdraw his guilty plea, we discern no abuse of discretion, as his claims ofineffective assistance of counsel are not supported by the record on appeal and he madeno "showing of innocence, fraud or mistake in the inducement" (People v Ramey, 123 AD3d1290, 1291 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 953 [2015] [internal quotation marksand citations omitted]; see CPL 220.60). To the extent that defendant claims thatcounsel failed to investigate his defenses or to meet with him, these allegations "concernmatters outside of the record and are properly the subject of a CPL article 440 motion"(People v Trimm, 129AD3d 1215, 1216 [2015]). Finally, defendant's challenge to the agreed-uponsentence as harsh and excessive is precluded by his valid waiver of appeal (see People v Lopez, 6 NY3d248, 256 [2006]; People vToback, 125 AD3d 1060, 1061 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 993 [2015]).Defendant's remaining claims also lack merit.
Peters, P.J., Rose and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.