| People v Goldson |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 01343 [136 AD3d 1053] |
| February 24, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Tafahri Goldson, Appellant. |
Iannuzzi and Iannuzzi, New York, NY (John Nicholas Iannuzzi of counsel), forappellant.
Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove andSholom J. Twersky of counsel; Craig Marinaro on the brief), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Chun, J.), rendered April 23, 2014, convicting him of attempted criminal possession of aweapon in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appealbrings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Sullivan, J.), of those branches of thedefendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and his statementsto law enforcement officials.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
In order to justify a frisk or "pat-down" of a suspect's outer clothing, a police officermust have "knowledge of some fact or circumstance that supports a reasonable suspicionthat the suspect is armed or poses a threat to safety" (People v Batista, 88 NY2d650, 654 [1996]; see People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]; People v Shuler, 98 AD3d695, 696 [2012]; CPL 140.50 [1], [3]). "In determining whether an individual'sactions rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, police officers are permitted to interpretthe behavior in light of their training and experience" (People v Solano, 46 AD3d1223, 1224 [2007]; seePeople v Fletcher, 130 AD3d 1063, 1065 [2015], lv granted 26 NY3d1044 [2015]). Here, in light of the large bulge observed in the defendant's waistband, thenature of the defendant's movement of his hand down the length of that bulge, thetestifying police officer's training and experience, and the other attendant circumstances,the evidence at the suppression hearing established that the police had reasonablesuspicion to stop and frisk the defendant (see People v Fletcher, 130 AD3d at1064; People v Caicedo, 69AD3d 954 [2010]; see alsoMatter of George G., 73 AD3d 624 [2010]). Therefore, the hearing courtproperly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress thefirearm recovered as a result of the frisk.
The hearing court also properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibusmotion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials. Thedefendant's statements, although made before being informed of his Mirandarights (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), were spontaneous and were"not triggered by any police questioning or other conduct which reasonably could havebeen expected to elicit a declaration from him" (People v Barley, 82 AD3d 996, 996 [2011] [internalquotation marks omitted]; seePeople v Wallace, 128 AD3d 866 [2015]). Rivera, J.P., Leventhal and Sgroi, JJ.,concur.
Hinds-Radix, J., concurs in the result on constraint of this Court's majority decisionand order in People vFletcher (130 AD3d 1063 [2015], lv granted 26 NY3d 1044[2015]).