| Matter of Dolan v New Hyde Park Fire Dept. |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 01844 [137 AD3d 1026] |
| March 16, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Michael Dolan, Sr.,Respondent, v New Hyde Park Fire Department et al.,Appellants. |
Siler & Ingber, LLP, Mineola, NY (Maria Nanis of counsel), forappellants.
Leeds Brown Law, P.C., Carle Place, NY (Rick Ostrove of counsel), forrespondent.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the NewHyde Park Board of Fire Commissioners dated April 8, 2013, which, after a hearing,adopted the recommendation of a hearing officer and dismissed the petitioner from theNew Hyde Park Fire Department, and to compel the New Hyde Park Board of FireCommissioners and the New Hyde Park Fire Department to reinstate the petitioner, theappeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCormack, J.),entered March 5, 2014, which granted the petition.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements,and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court for consideration of the penalty imposedby the New Hyde Park Board of Fire Commissioners.
The petitioner, Michael Dolan, Sr., was a member of the New Hyde Park FireDepartment (hereinafter the fire department) and also an elected Commissioner on theNew Hyde Park Board of Fire Commissioners (hereinafter the Board). Dolancommenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 against the fire department andthe Board to annul a determination of the Board, made after a hearing and based on therecommendation of a hearing officer, to remove him from his position as a firefighterwith the fire department. The Supreme Court granted the petition. We reverse.
Dolan argues that the actions for which he was removed from his position as afirefighter were taken in his capacity as an elected Commissioner on the Board ratherthan as a member of the fire department and, therefore, the only permissible remedy wasto initiate proceedings to remove him as a Commissioner pursuant to Public OfficersLaw § 36 rather than to remove him as a firefighter pursuant to GeneralMunicipal Law § 209-l. However, the fact that Dolan could also have beenremoved from his position as Commissioner pursuant to Public Officers Law§ 36 did not abrogate the Board's right to remove him as a member of thefire department (see Matter of Black v Board of Fire Commrs. of Seaford FireDist., 191 AD2d 551 [1993]; Matter of Martelle v Margeson, 116 AD2d 989[1986]; Matter of Sommers v Board of Fire Commrs. of Mastic Beach Fire Dist.,99 AD2d 784 [1984]).
The evidence at the hearing that Dolan removed, without authorization, certainsmoke detectors that he admitted were the property of the fire district sufficientlyestablished that Dolan violated a provision of the Rules and Regulations of the NewHyde Park Fire District. This [*2]provision, whichapplied to Dolan as a firefighter, provided that "[a]ll members shall conduct themselvesat all times in such a manner so as not to bring disgrace or adverse criticism or ill feelingagainst the Company, Department, or District . . . Violation of this rule willbe grounds for dismissal." The evidence was also sufficient to establish that Dolanviolated the provision of the Supplemental Rules of Conduct and Procedure whichprovided that "[i]t shall be the duty of all members and officers to refrain from takingdistrict, department and company property without proper authorization."
Although the Supreme Court further opined that the Board's determination shouldhave been annulled on the basis that the three Commissioners who rendered it shouldhave each recused themselves, there was no evidence that those three Commissioners hadsuch personal involvement as would mandate recusal (cf. Matter of Baker v PoughkeepsieCity School Dist., 73 AD3d 916, 917 [2010], affd 18 NY3d 714[2012]).
Dolan's remaining contentions on appeal, that the Board failed to adhere to all of therequirements of General Municipal Law § 209-l, and that the determinationwas arbitrary and capricious, are without merit.
As the Supreme Court did not reach the issue of the excessiveness of the punishmentimposed, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court for consideration of whether thepenalty of dismissal was so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all thecircumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness (see Matter of Featherstonev Franco, 95 NY2d 550 [2000]). Balkin, J.P., Roman, Cohen and Maltese, JJ.,concur.