| People v Cornelius |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 02285 [137 AD3d 663] |
| March 29, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1](March 29, 2016)
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Emma Cornelius, Appellant. |
Dewey Pegno & Kramarsky LLP, New York (Joseph P. Mueller of counsel), forappellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Diane N. Princ of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Berkman, J., at suppressionhearing; Annalisa Torres, J., at nonjury trial and sentencing), rendered March 13, 2013,convicting defendant of manslaughter in the first degree, and sentencing her to a term ofeight years, unanimously affirmed.
On November 7, 2011, police responded to West 137th Street in New York Countyand learned from EMS workers at the scene that defendant's companion, ChristopherJoseph, had been stabbed. After she came downstairs from the apartment, defendantspoke to a uniformed police officer who asked her what had happened; defendantultimately gave two different accounts of the stabbing. During the time that the officerwas speaking with defendant, police did not search or handcuff her or tell her that shewas under arrest.
At the request of police, defendant went to the precinct to discuss the incident withdetectives. Once defendant was at the precinct, she spoke with detectives, giving anaccount in which Joseph had somehow harmed himself in the apartment. Soon afterdefendant arrived at the precinct, Joseph died from his injuries, but police kept thisinformation from defendant.
Detectives obtained a Miranda sheet so that they could read defendant herMiranda warnings. At that point, one of the detectives told defendant, based uponher conflicting stories, that she was "more than . . . just . . . awitness," and he sought to ask her more specific questions about the incident. Thedetective informed defendant that he would read her rights to her before they beganspeaking again.
The detective wrote defendant's name at the top of the Miranda sheet, entitled"INTERROGATION WARNINGS TO PERSON IN CUSTODY," and asked her toanswer "yes" or "no" verbally after he read each right. Defendant verbally answered "yes"to each question and the detective marked her affirmative answers on the form. The finalquestion the detective asked from the sheet was whether defendant was willing to answerquestions after having been advised of her rights; defendant verbally answered "yes" andthe detective so indicated on the form.
However, defendant refused to initial the "yes" responses or sign the bottom of theMiranda sheet. Instead, defendant underlined the word "interrogation" severaltimes and told the detective that she was uncomfortable with that word, stating that shedid not understand why she was being interrogated. According to the detective'stestimony, he told defendant, "[A]t this point you are not being interrogated." However,the detective told defendant, "[W]e want to make sure that you know your rights and thatyou are aware of your rights. And we are asking you to sign this in agreement that youhave been read your rights and have been made aware of your rights." The detective alsotold defendant that signing the Miranda sheet did not constitute an admission thatdefendant was admitting anything. Nevertheless, defendant refused to sign the sheet,stating that her verbal responses should be sufficient.
Defendant then gave detectives another account of the incident. She first repeatedthat Joseph had been injured when he fell to the floor, but after the detective opined thather story [*2]made no sense, she changed the account. Inthe second account, defendant stated that Joseph had physically tried to prevent her fromleaving the room after the two had had an argument. According to defendant, she fell tothe floor, hoping Joseph would let her go. When Joseph continued to hold defendantdown, she picked up a kitchen knife and began to swing it, stabbing Joseph.
The court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the statements that shemade both before and after she received her Miranda warnings. The Peopleestablished that the pre-Miranda statements were not the product of custodialinterrogation, because a reasonable innocent person in defendant's position would nothave thought she was in custody (see Stansbury v California, 511 US 318, 325[1994]; People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851[1970]; People v Dillhunt,41 AD3d 216, 217 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 764 [2008]). Although theofficer at the scene asked defendant some questions about what had happened, questionsposed in an attempt to gather information about the circumstances surrounding a possiblecrime do not constitute custodial interrogation for the purposes of Miranda(see Dillhunt, 41 AD3d at 217; Matter of Rennette B., 281 AD2d 78, 83[1st Dept 2001]). Further, there is no evidence that, during the pre-warnings period, anyofficer compelled defendant to go or remain anywhere, or created the impression that shewas not free to leave.
The record also establishes that defendant subsequently received full and effectiveMiranda warnings, and made a knowing and voluntary waiver of her rightsbefore making additional statements. The detective did not make any improperstatements of the type discussed in People v Dunbar (24 NY3d 304 [2014], cert denied575 US &mdash, 135 S Ct 2052 [2015]), or that otherwise undermined the effect of theMiranda warnings. In Dunbar, the Miranda warnings werecoupled with statements that directly contradicted those warnings—namely,statements suggesting that the defendant did not, in fact, have the right to remain silentand that his statements would be used to help him rather than to incriminate him. Here,by contrast, nothing in the record suggests that police misinformed or misled defendantabout her right to remain silent, or about the fact that her statements might be usedagainst her. Nor does the record suggest that police misinformed or misled defendantabout any of the other rights recited in the Miranda warnings.
Defendant takes issue with the detective's statement that she was "not beinginterrogated." This statement, defendant asserts, implied that the Mirandawarnings did not apply to the conversation the detective was about to have with her. Wereject this argument. Given the circumstances surrounding the defendant's statements topolice at the scene and at the precinct, her objection to the word "interrogation" merelysuggested surprise that the police apparently believed her to have committed a crimerather than to simply have witnessed an incident in which Joseph had injured himself.Indeed, defendant reiterated that her verbal responses to the Miranda warningsshould be sufficient even if she did not sign the Miranda sheet, thus evincing herunderstanding that she had agreed to waive her rights.
Although the police misinformed defendant that Joseph was still alive, defendantmade no showing that the deception was so fundamentally unfair as to deny due process,or that a promise or threat was made that could induce a false confession (see Peoplev Tarsia, 50 NY2d 1, 11 [1980]). After considering the totality of the circumstances(see People v Aveni, 22NY3d 1114, 1117 [2014]), we conclude that defendant's statements were "theproduct of [her] own choice" (People v Thomas, 22 NY3d 629, 642[2014]).
[*3] Finally, the verdict was notagainst the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]).There is no basis for disturbing the court's credibility determinations.Concur—Friedman, J.P., Sweeny, Renwick, Andrias and Moskowitz, JJ.