| Matter of Daniel K.L. (Shaquanna L.) |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 02651 [138 AD3d 743] |
| April 6, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Daniel K.L., a Child Alleged to bePermanently Neglected. SCO Family of Services, Respondent; Shaquanna L., Appellant.(Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Davontay K.L., a Child Alleged to be PermanentlyNeglected. SCO Family of Services, Respondent; Shaquanna L., Appellant. (ProceedingNo. 2.) |
Geanine Towers, Brooklyn, NY, for appellant.
Carrieri & Carrieri, P.C., Mineola, NY (Ralph R. Carrieri of counsel), forrespondent.
Jennifer Reddin, Whitestone, NY, attorney for the children.
Appeals from two orders of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, QueensCounty (Carol Stokinger, J.) (one as to each child), both dated December 19, 2014. Theorders, after fact-finding and dispositional hearings, found that the mother permanentlyneglected the subject children, terminated her parental rights, and transferredguardianship and custody of the subject children to the Commissioner of Social Servicesof the City of New York and the petitioner, SCO Family of Services, for the purpose ofadoption.
Ordered that the orders of fact-finding and disposition are affirmed, without costs ordisbursements.
SCO Family of Services (hereinafter the petitioner) petitioned pursuant to SocialServices Law § 384-b to terminate the mother's parental rights with respectto the subject children on the ground of permanent neglect. In two orders of fact-findingand disposition, both dated December 19, 2014, made after fact-finding and dispositionalhearings, the Family Court found that the mother permanently neglected the subjectchildren and terminated her parental rights. The mother appeals.
The petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that it made diligentefforts to encourage and strengthen the relationship between the mother and the subjectchildren (see Social Services Law § 384-b [7]; Matter of StarLeslie W., 63 NY2d 136, 142-143 [1984]; Matter of Giavanna M. [Cynthia M.-B.], 133 AD3d 760[2015]). These efforts included meeting with her to review [*2]her service plan, discussing the importance of compliance,providing referrals for parenting classes, mental health evaluations and housing, andscheduling weekly visitation with the children (see Matter of Mercedes R.B. [Heather C.], 130 AD3d 1022,1023 [2015]; Matter of ArianaN.T. [Ana D.], 121 AD3d 1009, 1010 [2014]). Despite these efforts, the motherfailed to plan for the future of the children (see Matter of Jahira N.D. [Shaniqua S.S.], 111 AD3d 826,827 [2013]; Matter of TarmaraF.J. [Jaineen J.], 108 AD3d 543, 544 [2013]). The mother's partial and belatedcompliance with the service plan was insufficient to preclude a finding of permanentneglect (see Matter of Nay'amyaW.R. [Kiara D.], 135 AD3d 770, 771 [2016]; Matter of James T.L. [RobertL.], 133 AD3d 759, 760 [2015]; Matter of Kayla S.-G. [David G.], 125 AD3d 980, 981[2015]; Matter of Elasia A.D.B.[Crystal D.G.], 118 AD3d 778, 779 [2014]). Accordingly, the Family Courtproperly found that the mother had permanently neglected the subject children.
The Family Court also properly determined that it was in the children's best intereststo terminate the mother's parental rights, rather than to enter a suspended judgment, andto free the children for adoption by the foster mother (see Family Ct Act§ 631; Matter ofHailey ZZ. [Ricky ZZ.], 19 NY3d 422, 430-431 [2012]; Matter of Devon D.T. [DavinaT.], 135 AD3d 947 [2016]; Matter of Aaliyah L.C. [Jamie A.], 128 AD3d 955, 956[2015]).
The Family Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the application ofthe mother's attorney to adjourn the continued fact-finding hearing upon the mother'sfailure to appear. The granting of an adjournment for any purpose is a matter restingwithin the sound discretion of the trial court (see Matter of Steven B., 6 NY3d 888, 889 [2006];Matter of Anthony M., 63 NY2d 270, 283 [1984]; Matter of Madison B. [DanielB.], 123 AD3d 1027, 1028 [2014]; Matter of Kinara C. [Jerome C.], 89 AD3d 839, 841[2011]). In making such a determination, the court must undertake a balancedconsideration of all relevant factors (see Matter of Sacks v Abraham, 114 AD3d 799, 800[2014]; Matter of Latrell S.[Christine K.], 80 AD3d 618, 619 [2011]). In this case, since the mother hadalready been granted numerous adjournments and she had not contacted her attorney toadvise him regarding her failure to appear, it was not an improvident exercise ofdiscretion for the Family Court to deny the request for another adjournment (see Matter of Evelyn R. [FranklinR.], 117 AD3d 957 [2014]; Matter of Angie N.W. [Melvin A.W.], 107 AD3d 907,908-909 [2013]; Matter ofSanaia L. [Corey W.], 75 AD3d 554, 554-555 [2010]).
Finally, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the mother'srequest for the assignment of new counsel prior to the commencement of thedispositional hearing. Where, as here, an indigent party has a constitutional right toassigned counsel (see Family Ct Act § 262 [a] [iv]), " 'thisentitlement does not encompass the right to counsel of one's own choosing' " (Matter of Wiley vMusabyemariya, 118 AD3d 898, 900 [2014], quoting People v Porto, 16 NY3d93, 99 [2010]; see People v Sides, 75 NY2d 822, 824 [1990]; People vSawyer, 57 NY2d 12, 18-19 [1982]). An indigent party is entitled to new assignedcounsel only upon a showing of good cause for substitution (see People v Sides,75 NY2d at 824; Matter of Wiley v Musabyemariya, 118 AD3d at 900). Here, theFamily Court properly determined that there was no good cause shown for substitution(see Matter of Zulme vMaehrlein, 133 AD3d 608, 609 [2015]; Matter of Munoz v Edmonds-Munoz, 123 AD3d 1038,1039 [2014]; Matter of Wiley v Musabyemariya, 118 AD3d at 901). Rivera, J.P.,Leventhal, Dickerson and Miller, JJ., concur.