| Orellana v Maggies Paratransit Corp. |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 02973 [138 AD3d 941] |
| April 20, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Ernesto Campos Orellana,Appellant, v Maggies Paratransit Corp. et al., Respondents, et al.,Defendants. |
Subin Associates, LLP, New York, NY (Robert J. Eisen and Brian Isaac of counsel),for appellant.
Shein & Associates, P.C., Syosset, NY (Steven Morgenlender of counsel), forrespondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from anorder of the Supreme Court, Kings County (King, J.), dated April 8, 2015, which deniedhis motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability insofar as asserted against thedefendants Maggies Paratransit Corp. and Theo R. Ramos.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff's motionfor summary judgment on the issue of liability insofar as asserted against the defendantsMaggies Paratransit Corp. and Theo R. Ramos is granted.
The plaintiff allegedly sustained personal injuries when a vehicle owned by thedefendant Maggies Paratransit Corp. (hereinafter Maggies Paratransit) and operated bythe defendant Theo R. Ramos, in which the plaintiff was a passenger, struck the rear ofanother vehicle. The plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, MaggiesParatransit and Ramos. He then moved for summary judgment on the issue of liabilityinsofar as asserted against Maggies Paratransit and Ramos. The Supreme Court deniedthe motion. We reverse.
" 'A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is requiredto maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditionsto avoid colliding with the other vehicle' " (Billis v Tunjian, 120 AD3d 1168, 1169 [2014], quoting Scheker v Brown, 85 AD3d1007, 1007 [2011]; see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129 [a]; Pelikan v Latney-Castillo, 135AD3d 839 [2016]). A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicleestablishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle,thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing anonnegligent explanation for the collision (see Tutrani v County of Suffolk, 10 NY3d 906, 908 [2008];Theo v Vasquez, 136 AD3d795 [2016]).
Here, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter oflaw. In support of his motion, the plaintiff submitted evidence demonstrating that thevehicle driven by Ramos struck the vehicle in front of it in the rear as the front vehiclewas stopping, and that the plaintiff did not contribute to the happening of the accident(see Phillip v D&D Carting Co., Inc., 136 [*2]AD3d 18, 22-23 [2015]; Anzel v Pistorino, 105 AD3d784, 786 [2013]). In opposition, the defendants Maggies Paratransit and Ramosfailed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a nonnegligent explanationfor the collision (seeArazashvilli v Executive Fleet Mgt., Corp., 90 AD3d 682, 683 [2011]; Kimyagarov v Nixon TaxiCorp., 45 AD3d 736, 737 [2007]).
Furthermore, contrary to the contention of Maggies Paratransit and Ramos, themotion was not premature, as they failed to show that additional discovery might lead torelevant evidence, or that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion wereexclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiff (see CPLR 3212 [f];Arazashvilli v Executive Fleet Mgt., Corp., 90 AD3d at 683; Kimyagarov vNixon Taxi Corp., 45 AD3d at 737; Rainford v Sung S. Han, 18 AD3d 638, 639-640[2005]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiff's motion forsummary judgment on the issue of liability insofar as asserted against the defendantsMaggies Paratransit and Ramos. Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Dickerson and Hinds-Radix, JJ.,concur.