People v Ellison
2016 NY Slip Op 03189 [138 AD3d 1137]
April 27, 2016
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 1, 2016


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Michael Ellison, Appellant.

Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, NY (Leila Hull of counsel), for appellant.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Robert J. Masters andEdward D. Saslaw of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Braun, J.), rendered March 29, 2012, convicting him of criminal possession of a forgedinstrument in the second degree and attempted grand larceny in the third degree, upon ajury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after ahearing (Paynter, J.), of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was tosuppress his statement to law enforcement officials.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We agree with the defendant's contention that the hearing court erred in denying thatbranch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress his videotaped statement to lawenforcement officials. The preamble read to the defendant by the detective investigatorfrom the district attorney's office who conducted a prearraignment interview, prior toadvising the defendant of his Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona, 384US 436 [1966]), violated the principles enunciated in People v Dunbar (24 NY3d 304, 316 [2014]) and renderedthe subsequent Miranda warnings inadequate and ineffective in advising thedefendant of his rights (see id. at 316; People v Marino, 135 AD3d 877 [2016]; People v Rivera, 128 AD3d1100 [2015]). However, the error in admitting that statement at trial was harmlessbeyond a reasonable doubt.

A constitutional error requires reversal of a conviction and a new trial unless theerror is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, that is, the proof of the defendant's guilt,without reference to the error, is overwhelming, and there is no reasonable possibilitythat the error might have contributed to the defendant's conviction (see People vCrimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237-242 [1975]). Here, in the absence of the defendant'sstatement, the other proof presented at trial overwhelmingly established the defendant'sguilt. That evidence included, inter alia, the defendant's personal identification and thevisibly altered forged check he attempted to cash, both of which he left at thecheck-cashing business when he ran out of the store upon hearing police sirens, as wellas a customer profile photograph taken of the defendant at the store as part of thecheck-cashing process. Considering the weight and nature of the other proof of thedefendant's guilt, there is no reasonable possibility that the admission of the defendant'sstatement, the substance of which was largely [*2]exculpatory, contributed to his convictions (see Peoplev Crimmins, 36 NY2d at 237).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, J.P., Dillon, Millerand Barros, JJ., concur.


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