| People v Smith |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 04851 [140 AD3d 1774] |
| June 17, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vKathryn V. Smith, Appellant. |
The Abbatoy Law Firm, PLLC, Rochester (David M. Abbatoy, Jr., of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Leah R. Mervine of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Vincent M. Dinolfo, J.),rendered January 29, 2015. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, ofburglary in the first degree, burglary in the second degree and robbery in the seconddegree (three counts).
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimouslyaffirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her following a jurytrial of burglary in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.30 [4]), burglary in thesecond degree (§ 140.25 [2]), and three counts of robbery in the seconddegree (§ 160.10 [1]). The charges arose from two residential burglariescommitted by defendant, her boyfriend and several other accomplices, one of whomcooperated with the prosecution and testified against defendant at trial. Viewing theevidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we reject defendant's contention that the verdict is againstthe weight of the evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495[1987]). Defendant's contention is based largely on her assertion that the accomplicetestimony is incredible as a matter of law. "[R]esolution of issues of credibility, as well asthe weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to bedetermined by the jury" (Peoplev Witherspoon, 66 AD3d 1456, 1457 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 942[2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and we perceive no reason to disturb thejury's resolution of those issues in this case.
We reject defendant's further contention that she unequivocally invoked her right toremain silent and that County Court therefore erred in refusing to suppress her statementsto the police. Affording deference to the court's determination, which is supported by therecord, and viewing defendant's alleged invocation of the right to silence in context, weconclude that defendant did not unequivocally invoke her right to silence (see People v Zacher, 97 AD3d1101, 1101 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1015 [2013]). Defendant failed topreserve for our review her further contention that the court erred in instructing the jurywith respect to the count of burglary in the first degree (see CPL 470.05 [2]), andwe decline to exercise our power to address it as a matter of discretion in the interest ofjustice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). Contrary to defendant's further contention,because it was not legally impossible for the jury to convict her of burglary in the firstdegree and acquit her of robbery in the first degree, as charged by the court, the verdictwith respect to those counts is not repugnant (see People v Muhammad, 17 NY3d 532, 539-540 [2011];People v James, 112 AD2d 380, 381-382 [1985]).
Finally, contrary to defendant's contentions, the court did not abuse its discretion inrefusing to afford her youthful offender status (see People v Middlebrooks, 25 NY3d 516, 527 [2015]),and her sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Present—Centra, J.P., Peradotto,Lindley, DeJoseph and Curran, JJ.