| People v Sahadeo |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 04967 [140 AD3d 1093] |
| June 22, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v David Sahadeo, Appellant. |
Patrick Michael Megaro, Bayshore, NY, for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (John M. Castellano,Johnnette Traill, and William H. Branigan of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Lopez, J.), rendered July 10, 2014, convicting him of predatory sexual assault against achild, incest in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and endangering thewelfare of a child, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up forreview the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motionwhich were to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials and physicalevidence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
There is no merit to the defendant's contention that he was arrested on less thanprobable cause and that his statements to law enforcement officials and any otherevidence obtained as a result of his arrest should have been suppressed. Where, as here,an identified citizen accuses another individual of a specific crime, the police possessprobable cause to arrest (seePeople v Mendoza, 49 AD3d 559, 560 [2008]). Moreover, as the evidencepresented at the suppression hearing established that the police were invited into thehome shared by the defendant, the complainant, and the complainant's parents withoutany threats or coercion, we reject the defendant's contention that any evidence obtainedas a result of his arrest should have been suppressed as the result of a warrantless arrestin his home in violation of Payton v New York (445 US 573 [1980]).
The evidence at the suppression hearing also established that the defendantvoluntarily permitted the police to swab his cheek for the purpose of obtaining his DNAfor testing purposes and, thus, the Supreme Court properly admitted into evidence theDNA test results based thereon (see People v Dallas, 119 AD3d 1362, 1363 [2014]). Wereject the defendant's contention that his consent to the swab was negated by hisintoxication at the time he volunteered to have the swab taken (cf. People vShields, 295 AD2d 374 [2002]).
The defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved forappellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492 [2008]). In anyevent, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see Peoplev Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we [*2]find that itwas legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weightof the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we neverthelessaccord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony,and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; Peoplev Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we aresatisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d633 [2006]).
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that thecomplainant, who was eight years old at the time of the trial, was competent to givesworn testimony (see CPL 60.20 [2]; People v Morales, 80 NY2d 450,453 [1992]; People v Mendoza, 49 AD3d at 560). The examination of the childrevealed that she knew the difference between telling the truth and telling a lie, knew themeaning of an oath, understood that she could be punished if she lied, promised to tellthe truth, and had the ability to recall and relate prior events (see People vMorales, 80 NY2d at 453; People v Stalter, 77 AD3d 776 [2010]; People vMendoza, 49 AD3d at 560; People v McIver, 15 AD3d 677, 678 [2005]).
Finally, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90AD2d 80 [1982]), and the fact that the sentence imposed after trial was greater than thatoffered during plea negotiations is not, standing alone, an indication that the defendantwas punished for exercising his right to trial (see People v Hernandez, 88 AD3d 907 [2011]). Rivera,J.P., Cohen, Maltese and LaSalle, JJ., concur.