| Paar v Bay Crest Assn. |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 05131 [140 AD3d 1137] |
| June 29, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Louis Paar et al., Appellants, v Bay CrestAssociation, Also Known as Bay Crest Association, Inc. and Others, et al.,Respondents. |
Darrin H. Berger, Huntington, NY, for appellants.
Hamburger, Maxson, Yaffe & McNally, LLP, Melville, NY (RichardHamburger pro se and William P. Caffrey, Jr., of counsel), for respondents Bay CrestAssociation and Hamburger, Maxson, Yaffe, Wishod & McNally, LLP.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, tortiousinterference with contractual relations, and breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiffs appeal(1), as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, SuffolkCounty (Spinner, J.), dated February 6, 2014, as (a) granted those branches of the motionof the defendants Bay Crest Association, Richard Hamburger, and Hamburger, Maxson,Yaffe, Wishod & McNally, LLP, which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismissthe complaint and pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 for the imposition of sanctions andcosts in the form of a reasonable attorney's fee and expenses against the plaintiffs, and(b) imposed sanctions against the plaintiffs, and (2) from a money judgment of the samecourt entered March 26, 2014, which, after a hearing on the amount of a reasonableattorney's fee and expenses to be awarded, is in favor of the defendant Bay CrestAssociation and against them in the principal sum of $54,098.33.
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order as granted that branch of themotion of the defendants Bay Crest Association, Richard Hamburger, and Hamburger,Yaffe, Wishod & McNally, LLP, which was pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 for theimposition of costs in the form of a reasonable attorney's fee and expenses against theplaintiffs is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,
Ordered that the money judgment is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendants Bay Crest Association,Richard Hamburger, and Hamburger, Maxson, Yaffe, Wishod & McNally,LLP.
The appeal from so much of the order as granted that branch of the motion of the[*2]defendants Bay Crest Association, RichardHamburger, and Hamburger, Yaffe, Wishod & McNally, LLP, which was pursuantto 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 for the imposition of costs in the form of a reasonable attorney'sfee and expenses against the plaintiffs must be dismissed, as that portion of the order wassuperseded by the money judgment.
The plaintiffs are homeowners in Bay Crest, a private community in the Village ofHuntington Bay in Suffolk County. They commenced this action against, among others,the Bay Crest Association (hereinafter the Association), Hamburger, Maxson, Yaffe,Wishod & McNally, LLP (hereinafter the law firm), the Association's attorneys, andRichard Hamburger, a member of the law firm (hereinafter collectively the defendants).The plaintiffs asserted causes of action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach ofcontract, tortious interference with contractual relations, and breach of fiduciary duty.The defendants sought dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it was barred by thedoctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and further sought the imposition ofsanctions against the plaintiffs and costs in the form of a reasonable attorney's fee andexpenses for frivolous conduct. The Supreme Court granted the motion to the extent ofdirecting the dismissal of the complaint, imposing sanctions against the plaintiffs, anddirecting a hearing on the issue of an attorney's fee and expenses. After the hearing, thecourt issued a judgment in favor of the Association and against the plaintiffs in theprincipal sum of $54,098.33, representing an attorney's fee and expenses. The plaintiffsappeal.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, "once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, allother claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, evenif based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" (O'Brien v City ofSyracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357 [1981]; see SSJ Dev. of Sheepshead Bay I, LLC v Amalgamated Bank,128 AD3d 674, 675 [2015]; Dupps v Betancourt, 121 AD3d 746, 747 [2014]). Thedoctrine of res judicata bars a party from relitigating any claim which could have been orshould have been litigated in a prior proceeding (see SSJ Dev. of Sheepshead Bay I,LLC v Amalgamated Bank, 128 AD3d at 675; County of Nassau v New YorkState Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 151 AD2d 168, 185 [1989], affd 76 NY2d579 [1990]). Similarly, collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "precludes a party fromrelitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior actionor proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity, whether or not thetribunals or causes of action are the same" (Ryan v New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d494, 500 [1984]; see Matter ofS&R Dev. Estates, LLC v Feiner, 132 AD3d 772, 773-774 [2015]). Here,in view of the previous litigation between the parties, the Supreme Court properlydirected the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the claims therein were barredby the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Moreover, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in imposingsanctions and costs in the form of a reasonable attorney's fee and expenses against theplaintiffs pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (see generally Matter of Wen Zong Yu v Fan, 124 AD3d906 [2015]; Capetola vCapetola, 96 AD3d 612 [2012]; Davey v Davey, 44 AD3d 701 [2007]). Further, after ahearing, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding theAssociation an attorney's fee and expenses in the principal sum of $54,098.33 (seeDavey v Davey, 44 AD3d at 701).
The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit, are improperly raised for thefirst time on appeal, or need not be reached in light of the foregoing determination. Eng,P.J., Mastro, Maltese and LaSalle, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2014 NY Slip Op30389(U).]