| People v Williams |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 05186 [140 AD3d 1526] |
| June 30, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vNicklas N. Williams, Appellant. |
Linda B. Johnson, East Greenbush, for appellant.
Palmer Pelella, Special Prosecutor, Binghamton, for respondent.
Peters, P.J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Broome County (Smith,J.), rendered June 26, 2014, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime ofcriminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (three counts).
Upon the execution of a search warrant authorizing the search—including astrip search—of defendant and any vehicle that he was in or operating, defendantwas found in possession of heroin and crack cocaine. Based, in part, on the evidenceseized from the search, another search warrant was issued authorizing the search ofdefendant's residence that resulted in the seizure of additional narcotics. County Courtdenied defendant's motion to, among other things, suppress the evidence seized as aresult of the search warrants. Thereafter, defendant pleaded guilty to the entire indictmentcharging him with three counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in thethird degree and County Court sentenced him, as a second felony offender, in accordancewith the plea agreement to concurrent prison terms of six years, followed by three yearsof postrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals, contending that the evidence seizedshould have been suppressed because the initial search warrant application failed toestablish probable cause for the search of defendant or a vehicle, describe withparticularity the vehicle to be searched or provide a factual basis to permit a stripsearch.
We are unpersuaded by defendant's contention that the initial search warrant was notsupported by probable cause. A presumption of validity is accorded a search warrantapplication approved by a magistrate (see People v Rogers, 94 AD3d 1246, 1247 [2012], lvdenied 19 NY3d 977 [2012]; People v Church, 31 AD3d 892, 894 [2006], lvdenied 7 NY3d 866 [2006]). An [*2]application for asearch warrant "must provide the magistrate with information sufficient to support areasonable belief that evidence of illegal activity will be present at the specific time andplace of the search" (People v Edwards, 69 NY2d 814, 816 [1987]; see People v Pasco, 134 AD3d1257, 1258 [2015]). Furthermore, "[t]he proof underlying a warrant application mustbe of facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a findingof probable cause at that time" (People v Rodriguez, 303 AD2d 783, 784 [2003][internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Ming, 35 AD3d 962, 964 [2006], lvdenied 8 NY3d 883 [2007]).
Here, the information in support of the initial search warrant application included anaffidavit from a confidential informant who identified defendant and set forth detailedinformation about his recent purchases of narcotics from defendant, including onepurchase that was a controlled buy. In addition, the supporting affidavit of the policeinvestigator noted the informant's reliability demonstrated by his signed affidavit as wellas his prior assistance in numerous other arrests and drug seizures. The policeinvestigator also submitted a supporting affidavit setting forth his knowledge andexperience regarding narcotics trafficking and basis for the search warrant request.Contrary to defendant's contention, the foregoing information, together with our reviewof the confidential informant's affidavit, establishes that defendant was engaged inongoing criminal activity of possessing and selling controlled substances that was inclose proximity in time to the application for the search warrant so as to justify a findingthat probable cause existed at the time the warrant was issued (see People v Harris, 83 AD3d1220, 1222 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]; People v Ming,35 AD3d at 964).
Furthermore, we find without merit defendant's contention that the search warrantauthorizing the search of "any vehicle [defendant] may be in or operating" was toogeneral to provide a sufficiently particular description of the vehicle to be searched.Although "[p]articularity is required in order that the executing officer can reasonablyascertain and identify the persons or places authorized to be searched and the thingsauthorized to be seized[,] . . . hypertechnical accuracy and completeness ofdescription" is not required (People v Nieves, 36 NY2d 396, 401 [1975][citations omitted]; see People v Hanlon, 36 NY2d 549, 559 [1975]). "[R]ather,from the standpoint of common sense[,] . . . the descriptions in the warrantand its supporting affidavits [must] be sufficiently definite to enable the searcher toidentify the persons, places or things that the [m]agistrate has previously determinedshould be searched or seized" (People v Nieves, 36 NY2d at 401 [citationsomitted]). Here, we find that the description of the vehicle was sufficiently particular andreadily ascertainable, given that the only vehicle that could be searched was the one thatdefendant was in or operating, if any, at the time that the search warrant wasexecuted.
Finally, to the extent that defendant contends that there was no basis for the searchwarrant to authorize a strip search, we are unpersuaded. "[A] strip search must befounded on a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing evidence underneathclothing and the search must be conducted in a reasonable manner" (People v Hall, 10 NY3d303, 310-311 [2008], cert denied 555 US 938 [2008]). The affidavit of theconfidential informant submitted in support of the search warrant application establishedthat, during the times that the confidential informant purchased drugs from defendant,defendant pulled the drugs out from the front of his pants. In addition, the policeinvestigator seeking the search warrant submitted a sworn statement that set forth hisextensive experience with possession and sale of controlled substances and noted that itwas common for drug traffickers to hide drugs in their genital and buttocks area. Giventhis information, we find that a factual basis to authorize a strip search was provided. Inview of the foregoing, we find no basis upon which to disturb County Court's denial ofthe motion to suppress.
[*3] Garry, Rose,Mulvey and Aarons, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.