U.S. Bank N.A. v DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc.
2016 NY Slip Op 05440 [141 AD3d 431]
July 7, 2016
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 31, 2016


[*1]
 U.S. Bank National Association,Appellant,
v
DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc., Respondent. U.S. Bank NationalAssociation, Appellant-Respondent, v DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc.,Respondent-Appellant, et al., Defendant.

Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman LLP, New York (Hector Torres ofcounsel), for appellant/appellant-respondent.

Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, New York (Robert Loeb and Barry Levinof counsel), for respondent/respondent-appellant.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Marcy S. Friedman, J.), entered March25, 2015, which dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground that plaintiffdid not fulfil a contractual condition precedent to suit, but found the complaint to betimely, unanimously affirmed, with costs. Order, Supreme Court, New York County(Eileen Bransten, J.), entered January 3, 2014, which held that the complaint wasuntimely and dismissed it with prejudice, unanimously affirmed, withcosts.

I. ABSHE 2006-HE7 Trust Action

In the first appeal, involving the ABSHE 2006-HE7 Trust, trustee U.S. BankNational Association sues under a mortgage loan purchase and interim servicingagreement (MLPA), a reconstitution agreement, and a pooling and servicing agreement(PSA) for breach of representations and warranties made in connection with thesecuritization of a pool of residential mortgage-backed securities, in which the ABSHE2006-HE7 Trust invested more than $1 billion.

Although the trustee commenced this action within the applicable statute oflimitations, it did not meet the condition precedent to enforcement of defendant DLJMortgage Capital, Inc.'s secondary "backstop" repurchase obligation, which required thatthe trustee first provide notice of the alleged breaches to defendant Ameriquest MortgageCompany, and allow a 90-day cure period to expire. Under these circumstances, thetrustee's timely claims were properly dismissed without prejudice to refiling pursuant toCPLR 205 (a) (ACE Sec. Corp.v DB Structured Prods., Inc., 112 AD3d 522, 523 [1st Dept 2013], affd25 NY3d 581 [2015]; SouthernWine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v Impact Envtl. Eng'g, PLLC, 104 AD3d 613[1st Dept 2013]).

II. HEAT Trusts Action

The second appeal concerns three separate trusts for which U.S. Bank also acts astrustee: Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-5, Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-6, and HomeEquity Asset Trust 2006-7 (collectively, the HEAT Trusts). The HEAT Trusts contain14,790 residential [*2]mortgage loans with an aggregateprincipal balance of about $2.8 billion. Under similar circumstances as those involved inthe ABSHE 2006-HE7 Trust action, the trustee sues based on alleged breaches ofrepresentations and warranties made in connection with the mortgages securing theirinvestment.

This action was originally commenced within the statute of limitations period byFederal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), in its role as conservator for Freddie Mac, acertificateholder in each of the HEAT Trusts. However, pursuant to the "no action"provision in the PSAs, which limits the circumstances under which a certificateholdermay commence suit under those agreements, FHFA lacked standing to sue. FHFA latersubstituted the trustee as plaintiff.

Because FHFA commenced this action within the limitations period, the originalclaims were timely. Moreover, the fact that FHFA sued before meeting the conditionprecedent to suit by serving repurchase notices on DLJ, does not, in and of itself, renderthe claims time-barred. Rather, they would be subject to refiling by a proper plaintiffpursuant to CPLR 205 (a), if they were not time-barred on standing grounds (ACESec. Corp. v DB Structured Prods., Inc., 112 AD3d at 523; Southern Wine& Spirits of Am., Inc. v Impact Envtl. Eng'g, PLLC, 104 AD3d at 613).

Generally, actions dismissed on standing grounds may be refiled pursuant to CPLR205 (a) (see Rivera vMarkowitz, 71 AD3d 449, 450 [1st Dept 2010]). However, here, the trustee isnot entitled to refile the claims under CPLR 205 (a), because it is not a "plaintiff" underthat statute (Reliance Ins. Co. vPolyVision Corp., 9 NY3d 52, 56-58 [2007]; ACE Sec. Corp. at 523).Moreover, the trustee may not rely on relation-back (CPLR 203 [f]) to save its refiledclaims, because there was no "valid preexisting action" to relate back to (SouthernWine & Spirits, 104 AD3d at 613; see ACE Sec. Corp. at 523). Becausethe trustee cannot benefit from either CPLR 203 (f) or 205 (a), the refiled claims aretime-barred on standing grounds.

The Court has considered the parties' remaining arguments and finds themunavailing. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Friedman, Andrias, Webber and Gesmer,JJ.


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