| People v Rivera |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 07036 [143 AD3d 1002] |
| October 26, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Hector Rivera, Appellant. |
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, NY (Harold V. Ferguson, Jr., of counsel), forappellant.
Eric Gonzalez, Acting District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove and JillOziemblewski of counsel; Matthis Chiroux on the brief), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant, by permission, from an order of the Supreme Court, KingsCounty (Dowling, J.), entered December 16, 2013, which denied, without a hearing, hismotion pursuant to CPL 440.20 (1) to set aside a sentence of the same court, imposedOctober 20, 2009, upon his conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the seconddegree, upon a jury verdict.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, the defendant's motion pursuant toCPL 440.20 to set aside his sentence is granted, the sentence is vacated, and the matter isremitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for resentencing in accordanceherewith.
The defendant was convicted, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession of aweapon in the second degree. Several weeks before sentence was imposed, theprosecutor submitted to the Supreme Court a sentencing letter in which he summarized,among other things, the defendant's criminal history, including convictions of violentfelony offenses in 1986 and 1995. The prosecutor asserted that the defendant was a"mandatory persistent violent felony offender," that the minimum permissible term was16 years to life imprisonment, and the maximum was 25 years to life imprisonment. Heurged the court to impose a sentence of 20 years to life imprisonment. A week beforesentence was imposed, defense counsel responded to the prosecutor's letter. Counselacknowledged that the minimum permissible term was 16 years to life, and he urged thecourt to exercise leniency. The People never submitted a formal statement pursuant toCPL 400.16. At sentencing, the court did not ask the defendant whether he had seen theprosecutor's letter, and it did not give the defendant an opportunity to controvert anyallegations about his prior violent felony convictions. Indeed, the court said nothingabout the defendant's status as a persistent violent felony offender until it actuallyimposed sentence. The defendant appealed his judgment of conviction to this Court, buthe did not raise any claim related to his sentence (see People v Rivera, 98 AD3d 529 [2012]).
In 2013, the defendant moved to set aside his sentence under CPL 440.20 (1). Heasserted that the procedure by which he was sentenced as a persistent violent felonyoffender violated CPL 400.15 and 400.16, and he contended that he was not, in fact, apersistent violent felony offender. Put otherwise, he contended that his sentencing as apersistent violent felony offender was illegal as a matter of law. He also contended thathe had received ineffective assistance of counsel [*2]athis sentencing. The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion without a hearing. Itfaulted the defendant for not objecting to the procedure when he was sentenced and fornot raising his sentencing claims on his direct appeal. The court, however, alsoacknowledged that the procedure by which the defendant was sentenced as a persistentviolent felony offender was not in compliance with CPL 400.15 and 400.16.Nevertheless, it held that there was overwhelming evidence that the defendant was, infact, a persistent violent felony offender. A Justice of this Court granted the defendantleave to appeal.
On appeal, the defendant raises the same claims he raised in the Supreme Court.Contrary to the People's contention, the defendant preserved his claims for appellatereview by raising them in his CPL 440.20 motion. He was not required to raise theseclaims at his sentencing (see People v Brown, 28 NY3d 982, 983 [2016]; People v Jurgins, 26 NY3d 607, 611-612 [2015]; cf.People v Proctor, 79 NY2d 992, 994 [1992]).
CPL 400.15 and 400.16 "govern the procedure that must be followed in any casewhere it appears that a defendant who stands convicted of a violent felony offense. . . has previously been subjected to two or more predicate violent felonyconvictions . . . and may be a persistent violent felony offender" (CPL400.16 [1]). Here, neither the People nor the Supreme Court complied with thatmandatory procedure. Therefore, the sentence was "illegally imposed" (CPL 440.20 [1]),regardless of whether the defendant is, in fact, a persistent violent felony offender(see Penal Law § 70.08 [1]), and the Supreme Court should havegranted the motion to set aside the sentence (see CPL 440.30 [3]). Accordingly,we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for resentencing in compliancewith CPL 400.15 and 400.16. Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Hinds-Radix and Barros, JJ.,concur.