| Matter of Natasha W. v New York State Off. of Children &Family Servs. |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 08099 [145 AD3d 401] |
| December 1, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1](December 1, 2016)
| In the Matter of Natasha W.,Respondent, v New York State Office of Children and Family Services et al.,Appellants, and New York City Administration for Children's Services,Respondent. |
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York (Matthew W. Grieco ofcounsel), for appellants.
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, New York (Elana Rose Bealeof counsel), for respondent.
Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (AliceSchlesinger, J.), entered February 18, 2015, which granted the petition seeking to, amongother things, amend and seal an indicated report of child maltreatment by petitioner, tothe extent of annulling the report and the determination of an administrative law judge(ALJ), dated February 11, 2014, which had denied petitioner's request, and remandingthe matter to respondents for further proceedings, affirmed, without costs.
Respondent New York City Administration for Children's Services (ACS) explicitlyconcluded, after a two-month long investigation, that petitioner's child was not "likely tobe in immediate or impending danger of serious harm." Nonetheless, the ALJ determinedthat the child is in imminent danger. Accordingly, and as more fully set forth below, themotion court correctly found that the ALJ's decision was based on an error of law in thatit misapplied the legal standard, lacked a reasonable basis, and was made without regardto the facts (CPLR 7803 [3]; seealso Matter of Peckham v Calogero, 12 NY3d 424, 431 [2009]). Moreover, themotion court correctly found that the ALJ failed to consider the 10 factors set forth in theGuidelines for Determining Whether Indicated Instances of Child Abuse andMaltreatment Are Relevant and Reasonably Related to Employment or Licensure (theguidelines), which is published by respondent New York State Office of Child andFamily Services (OCFS).
Before addressing the legal issues, it is important to clarify exactly what is at stake onthis appeal. No one disagrees that what petitioner did was foolish and demonstrated poorjudgment. However, notwithstanding that, no city or state agency has contended thatpetitioner's son should be removed from her, or that she cannot safely care for him, orthat her care of him should be supervised by any court or agency. What is at issue here issolely whether her name should be maintained on a list which would make it difficult forher to obtain a job in childcare, which is her chosen profession.
The essential underlying facts are undisputed. At the time of the relevant events,petitioner, then 25, and her five-year-old son lived with petitioner's parents. Petitionerhad an associate's degree in early childhood education, and was planning to obtain abachelor's degree and pursue a career in that field. On December 30, 2012, petitioner andher son entered Bloomingdale's department store. After they emerged from a fittingroom, a store detective detained petitioner, and found a coat hidden under her own coatand several concealed cell phone cases. In addition, he found two coats under her son'sclothing, and determined that the child [*2]was wearing apair of boots for which petitioner had not paid. Petitioner immediately phoned her familyand arranged for her sister to pick her child up.[FN1] Petitioner was arrested for shopliftingand later pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct, a violation, which was later sealed. Shehas no criminal record from this incident, or before.
For the next two months, ACS conducted an investigation of a report of childmaltreatment to the Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (SCR)based on these events. The store detective reported that, during the incident, the childwas "not at all distraught," and was playing video games and "interacting normally."After visits to petitioner's home, a Child Protective Specialist (CPS) concluded that thechild did not need medical or mental health treatment and that the petitioner was not adanger to the child. The investigation established that neither petitioner nor her familyhad any history with ACS, and that petitioner's mother, father and sisters were allsurprised by her actions on December 30, and had never known her to have doneanything similar in the past, consistent with petitioner having no prior criminal history.Petitioner's family members also reported having no concerns for her ability to care forher son, and uniformly stated that he was well cared for. Similarly, the child's schoolsocial worker confirmed that she had never had any reason for concern, and the child hadnearly perfect school attendance. Petitioner advised the investigator that she did not usephysical discipline, but disciplined her son by giving him "timeouts" and taking awaygames. The ACS investigator observed that the child had no marks or other signs ofphysical harm.
The child, interviewed on at least three occasions, was "clean, healthy looking andcared for," "calm," and consistently stated that he felt safe and happy and was not afraidof anyone at home. When asked, he stated that the police took his mother to jail becauseshe stole, and that she had not told him to steal. Although petitioner declined to discussthe details of the events of December 30 on the advice of her attorney, she told the ACSinvestigator that she had "learned her lesson."
ACS's investigation summary concluded that "there is no child[ ] likely to be inimmediate or impending danger of serious harm," the "Final Risk Rating" was "Low,""No Safety Factors were identified at this time," and "No Safety Plan/ControllingInterventions are necessary at this time." Consistent with its findings, ACS did notcommence a neglect proceeding against petitioner, or in any other way seek theassistance of a court with regard to petitioner's child. Nonetheless, the final progressnarrative states: "The investigation is approved for closing indicated. Childreported that his mother was arrested with him in her care due to her stealing. CPS is toprovide mom with information to community based services such as parenting to teachher appropriate disciplinary method as well as decision making" (emphasis added).Despite this conclusion, the record does not show that ACS saw any need to, or did, takeany steps to ensure that petitioner took a parenting class or engaged in any othercommunity based services.
Once petitioner was advised that OCFS determined, as stated above, that the reportagainst her was "indicated," petitioner promptly requested that SCR amend the report to"unfounded." OCFS denied the request, and scheduled a hearing.
At the hearing on October 25, 2013, the ALJ received into evidence only the ACSinvestigation notes and summary, and the New York State Criminal Record search forpetitioner dated October 23, 2013, which showed that petitioner had no criminal historyas of that date. No witnesses testified. Counsel for the parties made opening and closingstatements, and statements on the record denominated "direct testimony . . .in narrative form" for their respective clients.
The ALJ issued a decision dated February 11, 2014 (the decision). The ALJdetermined that petitioner had "maltreated" her child and therefore denied her requestthat the "indicated" [*3]report against her be amended.Although he did not find any evidence in the record that petitioner's child had beenharmed, he concluded that her "action creates an imminent risk to the child's emotionalcondition in that [the child] will not control his impulses and will proceed fromaccompanying his mother in shoplifting to doing it on his own." The decision also foundthat petitioner's actions were relevant and reasonably related to childcare employment,adoption and foster care because petitioner had failed to present "evidence of remedialsteps which would prevent this behavior from reoccuring." This roughly corresponds toguidelines factor 8, information regarding rehabilitation, but the decision does notaddress any of the other nine guidelines factors.
Petitioner sought judicial review of the decision pursuant to CPLR 7803 (3), whichauthorizes the court to determine "whether a determination was made in violation oflawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or anabuse of discretion" (CPLR 7803 [3]). The motion court granted the petition, and heldthat (1) the ALJ made errors of law because the undisputed facts do not, as a matter oflaw, show that the petitioner put the child in "imminent danger," which is the requisitestandard for a finding of maltreatment; and (2) the ALJ erred by failing to consider the10 guideline factors for determining whether the acts giving rise to the report wererelevant and reasonably related to employment in childcare, provision of foster care, oradoption.
Under New York's child protective scheme, a report of suspected child abuse orneglect will be marked "indicated" if the local agency determines after investigation thatthere is "some credible evidence of the alleged abuse or maltreatment" (Social ServicesLaw § 412 [7]). All childcare agencies and other agencies licensed by thestate to provide certain services to children are required to inquire whether applicants foremployment or to become foster or adoptive parents are subjects of indicated reports(Social Services Law § 424-a). An agency may choose to hire or approvepersons on the list of those with indicated reports, but if it does, the agency must"maintain a written record, as part of the application file or employment record, of thespecific reasons why such person was determined to be appropriate" for approval (SocialServices Law § 424-a [2] [a]). The names of subjects of indicated reportsremain on the list until 10 years after the youngest child referred to in the report turns 18,unless earlier expunged (Social Services Law § 422 [6]).
If the subject of an indicated report timely requests that SCR amend the report, SCRmust consider whether there is sufficient evidence that the subject committed childmaltreatment or abuse, and, if so, must also determine whether, based on the guidelines,the acts of maltreatment or abuse are "relevant and reasonably related" to, among otherthings, certain employment involving children, or approval as a foster or adoptive parent(Social Services Law § 422 [8] [a] [ii]). If the request to amend the report isdenied, the person is entitled to a fair hearing (Social Services Law § 422[8] [a] [v]; 18 NYCRR 434.3 [a] [2]).
Until 2008, the Social Services Law provided that the investigating child protectiveagency only had to show that there was "some credible evidence" of maltreatment orabuse, at both the SCR administrative review and at any subsequent fair hearing.However, in 1994 and 1996, respectively, the Second Circuit and the New York StateCourt of Appeals held that the use of the "some credible evidence" standard violates theDue Process Clause of the US Constitution because the resulting impediment to potentialfuture employment, licensure as foster parents, or approval as adoptive parents as aconsequence of an indicated report implicates constitutionally protected liberty interests(Matter of Lee TT. v Dowling, 87 NY2d 699 [1996]; Valmonte v Bane,18 F3d 992 [2d Cir 1994]). As a result, the Social Services Law was amended in 2008 torequire that the state prove child maltreatment or abuse at the administrative level by afair preponderance of the evidence (Social Services Law § 422 [8] [a] [i],[ii]; [b] [ii]; [c] [ii]; see also L 2008, ch 323, §§ 10, 11; 18NYCRR 434.3).[FN2] Only if the agency makes thatdetermination may it [*4]go on to consider whether theperson is unsuited for employment in the childcare field (Social Services Law§ 422 [8] [c] [ii]).
The fair preponderance of the evidence standard requires the finder of fact to weighconflicting evidence, and is intended to protect against rulings based on " 'thesubjective values of' the factfinder," a risk that is particularly high in cases where childabuse and neglect are alleged (Valmonte, 18 F3d at 1004, quoting Santosky vKramer, 455 US 745, 762 [1982]).
The statutory definition of a maltreated child, as relevant to this matter, includes achild under 18 "whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is inimminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent or otherperson legally responsible for his care to exercise a minimum degree of care. . . in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, byunreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or a substantial risk thereof,including the infliction of excessive corporal punishment; or by misusing a drug ordrugs; or by misusing alcoholic beverages to the extent that he loses self-control of hisactions; or by any other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of thecourt" (18 NYCRR 432.1 [b] [1] [ii] [emphasis added]; see also Family CtAct § 1012 [f] [i] [B] [supplying an identical definition of the term"neglected child"]).
Consistent with this, the Court of Appeals held in Nicholson v Scoppetta (3NY3d 357, 368 [2004]) that a finding of neglect requires a showing, by apreponderance of the evidence, that (1) a child's "physical, mental or emotional conditionhas been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired," and (2) "the actual orthreatened harm to the child is a consequence of the failure of the parent or caretaker toexercise a minimum degree of care in providing the child with proper supervision orguardianship." This standard is intended to "ensure[ ] that the [agency] . . .will focus on serious harm or potential harm to the child, not just on what might bedeemed undesirable parental behavior" (id. at 369; see also Matter of Parker vCarrión, 80 AD3d 458, 459 [1st Dept 2011] [parent who intended to hit childon her behind, but instead hit her on the face with a belt, entitled to amendment of reportfinding maltreatment where there was no evidence the child required medical treatmentor that the parent used excessive corporal punishment]).
Under article 10 of the Family Court Act, " '[i]mpairment of emotionalhealth' and 'impairment of mental or emotional condition' includes a state of substantiallydiminished psychological or intellectual functioning in relation to, but not limited to,such factors as failure to thrive, control of aggressive or self-destructive impulses, abilityto think and reason, or acting out or misbehavior, including incorrigibility,ungovernability or habitual truancy; provided, however, that such impairment must beclearly attributable to the unwillingness or inability of the respondent to exercise aminimum degree of care toward the child" (Family Ct Act § 1012 [h]). Afinding of imminent risk of impairment "must be near or impending, not merely possible"(Nicholson v Scoppetta, 3 NY3d at 369), and, particularly when based on a singleincident, must "make the necessary causative connection to all the surroundingcircumstances that may or may not produce impairment" (Matter of Nassau CountyDept. of Social Servs. v Denise J., 87 NY2d 73, 79 [1995] [positive toxicology forcontrolled substance in newborn infant and mother generally not sufficient to proveimminent danger of impairment]; see also Nicholson, 3 NY3d at 369).
In this case, there was no evidence before the ALJ that the child suffered any injuryor required any treatment as a result of petitioner's conduct, and no evidence thatpetitioner had ever engaged in the behavior at issue at any other time. Instead, the onlyevidence at the hearing with regard to harm to the child was the ACS finding that thechild had not suffered any harm and that petitioner was not a danger to the child.Consequently, the ALJ's finding of maltreatment was not supported by a preponderanceof evidence and was therefore made in violation of lawful procedure. Indeed, this Courtand its sister courts have refused to find maltreatment in cases involving far moreimmediate harm (see Matter of Parker v Carrión, 80 AD3d at 458; Matter of Sulayne G. [SulayJ.], 126 AD3d 791 [2d Dept 2015] [corporal punishment without evidence ofphysical or emotional injury and a pattern of such behavior did not constitutemaltreatment]; Matter ofSenande v Carrion, 83 AD3d 851 [2d Dept 2011] [mother who hit child onthigh with house slipper, leaving a mark, did not commit maltreatment where noevidence of lasting injury or that mother had ever done this before]).
In the absence of any evidence to support a finding that petitioner had caused actualharm to the child, the ALJ stated, "there are circumstances where a parent's behavior is sooutrageous, that in and of itself, creates an imminent risk of emotional harm to the child. . . . Exploitation of a child to commit a crime, as well as teaching a childhow to commit a crime, rises to such a level of outrageous behavior . . . .The [petitioner's] action creates an imminent risk to the child's emotional condition inthat [the child] will not control his impulses, and will proceed from accompanying hismother in shoplifting to doing it on his own." This is just the type of imposition of thefactfinder's subjective views of parental behavior that the use of the higher evidentiarystandard was intended to correct (Valmonte, 18 F3d at 1004; Nicholson, 3NY3d at 368-369). Instead of applying the correct legal standard to determine whetherthere was serious potential for harm requiring the aid of a court, the ALJ substituted hisconjecture that the child might commit crimes in the future, even though the recordreveals that the mother had no criminal history, that the child understood that his motherwas arrested because she tried to steal, and that he was, by all accounts, calm, happy, wellcared for, well behaved in school and not in need of any medical or mental healthintervention.
The ALJ cites Matter ofRashard D. (15 AD3d 209 [1st Dept 2005]) for the proposition that the child inthis case was in imminent danger of physical harm due to his mother's acts. However,Rashard D. involved a parent who made her 12-year-old child rob a bank byhanding a teller a note that said "GIVE ME $30,000 OR I WILL SHOOT YOU!!!"(id. at 210). Here, there was no evidence that petitioner's child was ever in anyphysical danger. No mental health expert testified as to the impairment, or imminent riskof impairment, of the child's emotional or mental condition as a result of petitioner'sbehavior, and ACS had made an explicit finding to the contrary.
These facts also distinguish this case from the cases relied upon by the ALJ for theproposition that certain parental behaviors create imminent risk of emotional harm. Ineach of those cases, the court relied on mental health experts' findings in determining thatthe subject child was emotionally harmed by a parent's behavior (Matter of ChristinaLL., 233 AD2d 705 [3d Dept 1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 812 [1997];Matter of Jessica G., 151 Misc 2d 694 [Fam Ct, Richmond County1991]).[FN3]
Similarly, Matter ofBernthon v Mattioli (34 AD3d 1165 [3d Dept 2006], appeal withdrawn8 NY3d 918 [2007]), cited by the dissent and by respondents for the proposition thatusing a child to facilitate shoplifting constitutes maltreatment as a matter of law, does notso hold. In that case, the only issue on appeal was the admissibility of hearsay statementsat a custody modification trial. The Appellate Division, Third Department held that thehearsay exception under Family Court Act § 1046 (a) (vi) applies in custodyproceedings involving allegations of abuse or neglect (id. at 1165). Indeed, theCourt in Bernthon found only that the child's statements about having been usedto aid her mother's shoplifting "would support a [*5]finding of neglect" (id. at 1166), but no neglectproceeding was brought, the issue of neglect was not tried, and no finding of neglect wasmade, since the applicable standard was whether a change of circumstances justifyingmodification had occurred, and the custody arrangement that would best serve the child'sinterest.
The legal questions at stake in Bernthon are very different than the questionin this case: whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standard in determining whetherrespondents met their burden at the hearing to show imminent harm to the childjustifying government intrusion into petitioner's private life. Furthermore, the facts ofBernthon are distinguishable from the instant matter. In Bernthon, themother had a "history of petit larceny," and had violated a court order by discussing thelitigation with her daughter and conveying that she would never see her mother again ifshe spoke to child protective service workers (34 AD3d at 1166). Here, petitioner had nocriminal history, her family members interviewed all agreed that her behavior was out ofcharacter, petitioner told the ACS investigator that she had "learned her lesson," the childwas reportedly "not at all distraught," and ACS did not find the child to be indanger.
Similarly, the cases cited by respondents for the proposition that shoplifting in and ofitself creates a risk of violence and physical harm to the child are also distinguishable. Inthe first instance, each is an excessive sentence appeal, having nothing to do with afinding of child maltreatment. In People v Jones (199 AD2d 648 [3d Dept 1993],lv denied 83 NY2d 854 [1994]), the defendant threatened to use a baseball bat asa weapon, and choked the property owner's son, whom the defendant encountered whileattempting to burglarize the property. People v Callahan (89 AD2d 517, 518 [1stDept 1982]) involved a robbery arising out of a "drunken escapade," in which thecomplaining witness sustained injuries. There was no evidence that petitioner in this caseintended to or did commit violence. Rather, ACS's investigation notes indicate that shewas cooperative when stopped by the store detective.
The cases relied on by respondents involving unreasonable exposure of children torisk by other behavior are similarly inapposite, since all involve far more extremeparental behavior resulting in obvious danger. In Matter of Rosemary V. (Jorge V.) (103 AD3d 484 [1stDept 2013]), a father left his children home alone at night while he engaged in a drugtransaction, as a result of which the children locked themselves out of the apartment andwent to a stranger's home. In Matter of Febles v Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. ChildProtective Servs. (68 AD3d 993 [2d Dept 2009]), a mother left herseven-year-old child alone in a running car for 20 minutes. In Matter of Pedro C. (JosephineB.) (1 AD3d 267 [1st Dept 2003]), a mother was intoxicated on the street atnight with her two-year-old child.
Finally, the ALJ's determination that petitioner's actions were reasonably related to aposition in childcare, the field of study petitioner is pursuing, was not rational. The legalstandards for determining whether a child is maltreated (18 NYCRR 432.1 [b];Nicholson, 3 NY3d at 368-369) are repeated in the guidelines. The ALJ failed toset forth his consideration of the relevant guidelines for making such a determination,many of which, as the motion court pointed out, weighed in petitioner's favor, includingfactors 2 (the seriousness and extent of any injury to child), 3 (harmful effect on the childof the subject's actions or inactions), 5 (time since most recent incident of maltreatment),6 (number of indicated incidents of abuse or maltreatment), 8 (a) (whether the acts havebeen repeated) and 10 (whether reported behavior involved serious injury to, or death of,a child). The single factor the ALJ discussed, factor 8 (b), "any information produced. . . in regard to . . . rehabilitation," failed to consider that all ofthe evidence at the hearing indicated that petitioner has never been convicted of anycrime, including for the events of December 30, 2012; no further such incidents hadoccurred; petitioner had no prior history with ACS; all of her family membersinterviewed expressed surprise at her behavior on the occasion leading to the report; andshe told the caseworker she had "learned her lesson."
Like the plaintiffs in the cases leading up to amendment of Social Services Law§ 422 to require a higher burden of proof to deny a request to amend anindicated child abuse or neglect report, petitioner here will essentially be barred frompursuing a career in her chosen field of early childhood development, since "she will berefused employment simply because her inclusion on the list results in an added burdenon employers who will therefore be reluctant to hire her" (Valmonte, 18 F3d at1001).
[*6] Furthermore, although "[a] trier offact may draw the strongest inference that the opposing evidence permits against awitness who fails to testify in a civil proceeding" (Matter of Nassau County Dept. ofSocial Servs. v Denise J., 87 NY2d at 79), the ALJ improperly inferred that thebehavior in which petitioner engaged "will in fact reoccur," based solely on petitioner'sfailure to testify at the hearing, even though no evidence supported such a finding.
Accordingly, we affirm the motion court's order annulling the indicated reportagainst petitioner. Concur—Mazzarelli, Andrias and Gesmer, JJ.
Tom, J.P., and Manzanet-Daniels, J., dissent in a memorandum by Tom, J.P., asfollows: In this CPLR article 78 proceeding, petitioner challenges a determination byrespondents that she was "indicated" for child maltreatment based on the use of her childto facilitate a crime. I would find that petitioner's utilization of her five-year-old son tosteal two coats and a pair of boots from Bloomingdale's constituted maltreatment andwas sufficiently egregious so as to create an imminent risk of physical, mental andemotional harm to the child (seeMatter of Bernthon v Mattioli, 34 AD3d 1165, 1166 [3d Dept 2006], appealwithdrawn 8 NY3d 918 [2007]; see generally Social Services Law§ 412 [2] [a]). Further, I would find that the ALJ's determination thatpetitioner's actions were reasonably related to employment in childcare was rational (see Matter of Peckham vCalogero, 12 NY3d 424, 431 [2009]), and that petitioner's name should remainon the registry maintained by respondent New York State Office of Children and FamilyServices (OCFS) for the purposes of informing providers and licensing agencies that sheis the subject of an indicated child maltreatment report for future employment in childcare or foster care, and adoption (see Social Services Law§§ 422, 424-a).
Initially, petitioner does not contest any of the underlying facts regarding theshoplifting incident or the factual findings made by the ALJ. Nor did she testify orpresent any evidence at the hearing before the ALJ to contradict respondent New YorkCity Administration for Children's Services' (ACS) investigation notes and summaryadmitted into evidence. Thus, all the evidentiary facts and record evidence presented tothe ALJ's were unchallenged.
The undisputed evidence shows that on December 30, 2012 petitioner tried to stealmerchandise from Bloomingdale's using her five-year-old son to facilitate the theft.Specifically, after entering a fitting room, she hid two coats under her son's clothing andmade him put on a pair of boots. She also concealed a coat under her own clothing andhid several cell phone cases on her person. The total value of the stolen merchandise wasapproximately $2,700.
A store detective noticed the merchandise was missing and stopped petitionerimmediately as she tried to exit the fitting room. In response to questioning, petitioneradmitted stealing the items. Petitioner was detained and arrested in the presence of thechild and petitioner's sister came to pick up the child.[FN1]
Petitioner was charged with petit larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, andendangering the welfare of a child. She ultimately pleaded guilty to a lesser violation ofdisorderly conduct which was later sealed.
The Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment(SCR)—operated by OCFS—received a telephone report of petitioner'sarrest and referred the matter to ACS. Over the next two months, ACS investigated theissue.
According to the ACS notes in evidence, on December 31, 2012, the investigatorwent to [*7]petitioner's home and spoke with the familymembers including her mother and sisters. They were surprised about the stealingincident and stated that the child "gets everything he needs."
The investigator also met with the child, who appeared "calm," stated that he felt"happy" and "safe" at home. However, the child reported that petitioner had hit him inthe past with her hands and had once smacked his lip causing him to bleed. The childalso reported that his mother was taken to jail by the police because she was stealing,and, when asked if petitioner had ever stolen before, first responded "yes," then "no."The child also stated that the mother put shoes on him and the police took themaway.
On January 4, 2013, the investigator spoke with the store detective who handled thematter at issue, and who stated that he did not see any suspicious marks on the child, thatthe child did not appear distraught by the incident, and that the child was playing withvideo games and interacting normally at that time.
On that same date, the investigator spoke with the school social worker, who alsostated that she never observed any marks or bruises on the child or anything concerningregarding the child.
On January 7, 2013, the investigator met with petitioner at her home, who declined tocomment on the shoplifting incident on the advice of counsel. She claimed that thechild's basic needs were met at home and, in contrast with the child's statements, deniedusing any physical discipline. At the end of the visit, the child was described as "clean,healthy looking and cared for."
On January 31, 2013, the investigator again met with petitioner at her home. Sheasserted that the child did not see her getting arrested, that he was not separated from herfor a long time, and that he was not "effected [sic]."
Apparently based on its investigation summary that "there is no child[ ] likely to bein immediate or impending danger of serious harm" and that no "Safety Plan/ControllingInterventions are necessary at this time," ACS did not commence a neglect proceedingagainst petitioner. However, on February 28, 2013, ACS closed the report as "indicated"against petitioner. In particular, the investigation narrative found that the allegation ofinadequate guardianship was substantiated as petitioner was arrested for shoplifting inthe presence of the child and used the child to "harbor stolen items." The narrative foundthat petitioner exercised poor judgment "and as a result the child's mental and emotionalcondition has been placed at risk of impairment. Child reported that he witnessed[petitioner] stealing items and being arrested as a result." CPS was directed to providepetitioner "with information to community based services such as parenting to teach herappropriate disciplinary method as well as decision making."
As noted above, the sole consequence of an "indicated" report is that petitioner'sname was included in the registry maintained by OCFS for the purposes of informingproviders and licensing agencies concerning petitioner's future application for childcarerelated employment, and foster care and adoption. Yet, as the majority notes, an agencymay still choose to hire or approve persons with indicated reports provided they"maintain a written record, as part of the application file or employment record, of thespecific reasons why such person was determined to be appropriate to receive a fostercare or adoption placement or to provide day care services" (Social Services Law§ 424-a [2] [a]).
Because petitioner claimed the indicated report would be a "huge barrier in obtainingemployment in the childcare/education fields" she was interested in, she asked SCR toamend the report of maltreatment to unfounded. In May 2013, SCR denied the request,scheduled a hearing, and specifically determined that the maltreatment report "is relevantand reasonably related to employment, licensure or certification in the child care field."SCR noted that it had considered each of the factors set forth in the Guidelines forDetermining Whether Indicated Instances of Child Abuse and Maltreatment are Relevantand Reasonably Related to Employment or Licensure, and referenced the factors that itdeemed particularly relevant, including the detrimental or harmful effects of petitioner'sactions on her son and her son's age at the time of the incident.
A hearing was held on October 25, 2013. ACS introduced its investigation records,and petitioner, who was represented by counsel, did not testify or call witnesses.Petitioner's attorney [*8]argued that her actions did notrise to the level of maltreatment and that "there's no sign that this is a pattern of behaviorat all." Petitioner's attorney also contended that ACS argued that petitioner's actions roseto the level of maltreatment because any act of theft risks a physical confrontation, eventhough no violence occurred in this case. ACS also contended that her actions placed thechild at risk of mental or emotional harm by exploiting her child to commit a crime. ACSfurther argued that her improper conduct was reasonably related to work in the field ofchildcare because it showed that she failed to exercise even a minimum degree of care ofher child and showed that she would be a poor role model for children.
In a written decision on February 11, 2014, the ALJ denied petitioner's appeal,finding that (i) a fair preponderance of the evidence demonstrated maltreatment; and (ii)the maltreatment was relevant and reasonably related to employment in childcare.Significantly, the ALJ made the following relevant findings of fact:
"The [petitioner] was arrested while attempting to steal three coats, a pair of shoes,and several cell phone cases from Bloomingdales [sic]. At the time of her arrest, the[petitioner] had hidden two coats under [the child's] clothing and stolen a pair of boots,by having [the child] put on the stolen boots.
"[The child] was present when the [petitioner] was arrested.
"[The child] was not at all distraught and was playing with video games andinteracting normally after the [petitioner] was detained for shoplifting.
"[Petitioner] exploited . . . her 5 year old son for the purposes ofshoplifting."
Based on the record evidence, the ALJ concluded that petitioner's actions placed thechild "at imminent risk of physical and mental impairment," that petitioner "failed toexercise a minimum degree of care under the circumstances in question," and "[t]hatfailure is what placed [the child] in imminent risk of physical and emotionalimpairment." More specifically, the ALJ found that "[t]he criminal act of shoplifting canresult in a physical or violent response, creating a threat of harm to the child's physicalcondition." As to the child's mental or emotional health, the ALJ found that"[e]xploitation of a child to commit a crime, as well as teaching a child how to commit acrime, rises to . . . a level of outrageous behavior," and "create[d] animminent risk to the child's emotional condition in that [the child] will not control hisimpulses, and will proceed from accompanying his mother in shoplifting to doing it onhis own." He also remarked that "[o]ne expects a parent to teach a child . . .to not steal" but that petitioner exploited her son and taught him stealing was "acceptablebehavior" and "how to shoplift." Moreover, he noted that the fact that the child does not"comprehend the gravity of the circumstances under which the mother is being arrested,does not negate the fact that the child is being endangered by the mother's action."
The ALJ also found that petitioner's maltreatment is "currently relevant andreasonably related to childcare employment, the adoption of a child or the provision offoster care." This determination was based on his prior discussion of petitioner's actionsin "exploiting a child in order to commit a criminal act," and a negative inference hedrew against petitioner for failing to testify. In that regard, he noted that petitioner failedto present "evidence of remedial steps which would prevent [her] behavior fromreoccurring."
Petitioner commenced this article 78 proceeding challenging the determination asaffected by errors of law and as lacking a rational basis in law and fact. Supreme Courtgranted the petition on the grounds that the ALJ "misapplied the statutory standard formaltreatment and misapplied the Nicholson standard," and that the ALJ failed toconsider all of the OCFS Guideline factors for whether maltreatment is relevant andreasonably related to employment or licensure.
It is well established that the scope of review of petitioner's article 78 petition iswhether respondents' determination denying petitioner's request to amend her indicatedreport to unfounded was arbitrary and capricious, lacked a rational basis or was affectedby an error of law (CPLR 7803 [3]; Peckham, 12 NY3d at 431; Matter of Pellv Board of Educ. of Union Free [*9]School Dist. No. 1 ofTowns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 231[1974]). Notably, "[a]rbitrary action is without sound basis in reason and is generallytaken without regard to the facts" (Pell, 34 NY2d at 231). If there is a rationalbasis for the determination, a reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment evenif the court concludes that it would have reached a different result than the one reachedby the agency (Peckham, 12 NY3d at 431).
Here, in determining whether ACS established maltreatment by a fair preponderanceof the evidence in accordance with Social Services Law § 422 (8) (whichwas amended in 2008 to comply with rulings that the prior "some credible evidence"standard violated due process), the ALJ applied the correct standard of review pursuantto Nicholson v Scoppetta (3NY3d 357, 368 [2004]), i.e., "first, that a child's physical, mental or emotionalcondition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired and second,that the actual or threatened harm to the child is a consequence of the failure of the parentor caretaker to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing the child with propersupervision or guardianship." Indeed, the ALJ specifically cited to these standards in hisdecision.
It is therefore unclear why the majority sets forth the litigation and legislative historyrelating to the Social Services Law and the pre-2008 standard requiring that a childprotective agency had to show that there was "some credible evidence" of maltreatment.Nothing in this record supports a finding that this outdated standard was applied by theALJ.
Further, the ALJ properly utilized the statutory definition of a maltreated childpursuant to 18 NYCRR 432.1 (b) (1), which provides in pertinent part that a maltreatedchild is one
"whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminentdanger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent or other personlegally responsible for his care to exercise a minimum degree of care. . .
"(ii) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonablyinflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or a substantial risk thereof, including theinfliction of excessive corporal punishment; or by misusing a drug or drugs; or bymisusing alcoholic beverages to the extent that he loses self-control of his actions; or byany other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court."
The ALJ also applied the correct definition for impairment of mental or emotionalhealth pursuant to Family Ct Act § 1012 (h). That section provides asfollows: " 'Impairment of emotional health' and 'impairment of mental oremotional condition' includes a state of substantially diminished psychological orintellectual functioning in relation to, but not limited to, such factors as failure to thrive,control of aggressive or self-destructive impulses, ability to think and reason, or actingout or misbehavior, including incorrigibility, ungovernability or habitual truancy;provided, however, that such impairment must be clearly attributable to the unwillingnessor inability of the respondent to exercise a minimum degree of care toward thechild."
Based on the foregoing applicable standards and the undisputed record evidence, theALJ rationally concluded that petitioner's actions in exploiting her five-year-old son tosteal caused the child's mental and emotional condition to be in imminent danger ofimpairment. There can be no doubt that exploiting a child to steal and teaching a childthat such behavior is acceptable has long-lasting consequences for that child's emotionaland mental development at an age when the child primarily learns from observation ofthe parent's actions. There is simply nothing irrational about reaching such aconclusion.
Similarly, the ALJ rationally found that petitioner's action in using her child tocommit a crime placed her son in imminent danger of physical harm. While this casedoes not entail the more extreme circumstances present in Matter of Rashard D. (15AD3d 209 [1st Dept 2005] [child directed to rob a bank]), even the commission ofminor crimes, especially those [*10]involving theft, raisesthe potential for physical harm to the participants.
In fact, using a child to aid in shoplifting "would support a finding of neglect"(Matter of Bernthon v Mattioli, 34 AD3d at 1166).[FN2] Even a single incident "where theparent's judgment was strongly impaired and the child exposed to a risk of substantialharm can sustain a finding of neglect" (Matter of Kayla W., 47 AD3d 571, 572 [1st Dept 2008][internal quotation marks omitted]). And, utilizing and teaching a child to steal is the typeof outrageous behavior which in and of itself creates an imminent risk of emotional harmto the child (see e.g. Matter of Christina LL., 233 AD2d 705 [3d Dept 1996],lv denied 89 NY2d 812 [1997]).
Contrary to the majority's contention, it is of no moment that there was no evidencebefore the ALJ that the child suffered a specific tangible injury (see Nicholson, 3NY3d at 369 [" 'Imminent danger' reflects the Legislature's judgment that afinding of neglect may be appropriate even when a child has not actually been harmed"]).The imminent danger standard exists specifically to protect children who have not yetbeen harmed and to prevent impairment (see Matter of Nassau County Dept. of SocialServs. v Denise J., 87 NY2d 73, 79 [1995]). Here, the basis for the ALJ'sdetermination was not actual harm but a risk of imminent harm to the child. Thus, forexample, we have upheld a finding of neglect where a mother was found intoxicated onthe street with her child even though the child did not suffer actual injury (see Matter of Pedro C. [JosephineB.], 1 AD3d 267 [1st Dept 2003]). It is of no moment that ACS determined inits discretion not to pursue a neglect proceeding against petitioner.
Nor were findings from mental health experts necessary to support the ALJ'sdetermination. While such additional evidence may have been helpful, it was rational forthe ALJ to conclude that this serious incident of theft, which, according to the child, mayhave occurred before, presented an imminent risk of impairment to the child.
As to the issue of imminence, I see nothing irrational about finding that the risk tothis child caused by petitioner's actions was "near or impending" and not "merelypossible" (Nicholson, 3 NY3d at 369). Initially, the potential for physicalconfrontation during a theft is imminent. Further, utilizing a child to commit a crime andteaching a child that such behavior is acceptable must have an immediate impact on thatchild's emotional and mental well-being, particularly in a young child who is justlearning to differentiate between right and wrong. As the ALJ noted, this is so evenwhere the child does not "comprehend the gravity of the circumstances."
I disagree with the majority that cases finding no maltreatment where a parentengaged in a single instance of corporal punishment are dispositive here (see e.g. Matter of Senande vCarrion, 83 AD3d 851 [2d Dept 2011] [mother hit child with a slipper]). Whilethe majority may consider only physical harm to be "far more immediate," mental andemotional harm can be just as immediate. Nor is a finding of maltreatment limited tosituations in which parents engage in even more "extreme parental behavior resulting inobvious danger" (see e.g. Matterof Rosemary V. [Jorge V.], 103 AD3d 484 [1st Dept 2013] [father left childrenhome alone at night so he could engage in a narcotics transaction]).
More significant, to describe the ALJ's determination as "subjective" or to intimatethat petitioner's actions were merely "foolish" or constituted "undesirable parentalbehavior" (Nicholson, 3 NY3d at 369) is simply unfounded and erroneous. Themajority relies on cases involving the accidental or passive creation of a risk to a child.However, this case does not [*11]concern the type ofaccidental corporal punishment at issue in Matter of Parker v Carrión (80AD3d 458 [1st Dept 2011]). Nor does it concern the range of things that might beconsidered merely undesirable parenting such as corporal punishment, allowing a child tostay up late, permitting the consumption of excessive unhealthy foods, or allowing achild to watch an extremely violent film. Here, we have a parent teaching a child how tocommit a crime.
Certainly, this case bears no relation to the "undesirable parental behavior" at issue inNicholson, which concerned the difficult choices faced by battered mothers(see 3 NY3d at 371). Indeed, this case is not akin to the circumstances of a childbeing exposed to domestic violence against his parent. Rather, this case concernspetitioner exhibiting a strongly impaired judgment when she purposely used her child tosteal and taught him such behavior was appropriate. Once again, a child of such tenderage learns from observing the parent's actions whose actions will have a long-lastingeffect on the child. Of course, the majority can identify no precedent treating theintentional exploitation of a child to commit a crime as merely undesirable.
I would also find that the ALJ rationally found that petitioner's actions are reasonablyrelated to a position in childcare. As a matter of common sense, it should go withoutsaying that an individual who utilizes her own child to commit a crime and teaches thechild how to steal lacks the necessary judgment to care for children, and would serve as apoor role model for them. In any event, the ALJ's decision indicates that he consideredthe relevant OCFS Guidelines. Initially, SCR's denial of petitioner's request was beforethe ALJ and it detailed various relevant factors, including the detrimental or harmfuleffects of petitioner's actions on her son and her son's age at the time of the incident. Inaddition, the guidelines emphasize that "not all factors will be relevant to each particularcase" and thus, contrary to the majority's position, the ALJ was not mandated to discussall the factors.
Also contrary to the majority's claim, the ALJ considered more than one factor.Indeed, by referring to his previous discussion about the nature of petitioner's actions, theALJ was considering the seriousness of the incident (factor 1) and the age of the child(factor 4), both of which do not weigh in petitioner's favor. Nor would I find that thepassage of only one year between the incident and the hearing (factor 5) weighed inpetitioner's favor. The fact that no serious injury occurred to the child (factor 2) or thatno other incidents of maltreatment were known to the ALJ (factor 6) are not factors thatneeded to be discussed. Nor was factor 10, which concerns incidents of serious injury ordeath, relevant to the determination.
Moreover, as the majority recognizes, the ALJ properly took a strong inferenceagainst petitioner for failing to testify at the hearing (see Denise J., 87 NY2d at79). Accordingly, he properly found that factor 8 (b), which concerns whether there isany evidence of rehabilitation, weighed against petitioner, who decided not to testify atthe hearing. Further, a negative inference could be drawn not only that shoplifting wouldreoccur but also that it had happened in petitioner's past based on the child's response toACS' investigator's question concerning whether petitioner had ever stolen before; thechild initially responded "yes" then "no."
Finally, it appears that the majority's decision is based in part on a concern thatpetitioner "will essentially be barred from pursuing a career in her chosen field of earlychildhood development." First, this ignores the fact that petitioner will not be precludedfrom such work but would be required to face an appropriate obstacle given her actions.If petitioner can demonstrate she has changed, an employer may choose to hire her andwill simply explain why she is an appropriate hire in writing. More important, themajority ignores what should be the main concern: the purpose of the registry is primarilyto protect children who may have the misfortune of being cared for and miseducated bycaregivers such as petitioner. If petitioner can exploit her own child to commit a crime,how can she be entrusted to care for other children when no evidence was presented toshow petitioner has been rehabilitated? The focus of concern should be on the vulnerablechildren who are in need of child or foster care and adoption. Regardless, the majority isimproperly substituting its judgment for that of the agency, which most certainly had arational basis for its determination.
[*12] Forthese reasons, I would reverse Supreme Court's order and dismiss this proceeding.
Footnote 1:Respondents-appellants'brief states that the police took petitioner and the child to the precinct. However, the onlyrelevant evidence in the record shows that the child's aunt picked him up at the store andhe was not present when his mother was arrested.
Footnote 2:The statutory standardfor the initial determination that a report is indicated was not amended, so a person whodoes not request a review does not have the benefit of the higher standard(compare Social Services Law § 412 [7], and SocialServices Law § 422 [8] [a] [i], [ii]; [c] [ii]).
Footnote 3:Use of expert testimonyis available at the fair hearing stage. The Child Protective Services AdministrativeHearing Procedures provide that "[p]roof of the impairment of emotional health orimpairment of mental or emotional condition as a result of the unwillingness or inabilityof the appellant to exercise a minimum degree of care toward a child may includecompetent opinion or expert testimony and may include proof that such impairmentlessened during a period when the child was in the care, custody or supervision of aperson or agency other than the appellant" (18 NYCRR 434.10 [e]).
Footnote 1:While the majoritycorrectly notes that there is no evidence that the child was transported to the precinct,contrary to the majority's description, the statement of the store detective contained in theACS investigation notes was that the child was present when his mother was arrested.The separate statement from petitioner in which she claims her son was not present whenshe was arrested may refer to her formal arrest at the precinct.
Footnote 2:The "legal questions atstake in Bernthon" are different from those raised here, but the reason theThird Department permitted hearsay statements at the custody trial was because thosestatements—that the child had been used by her father to aid hisshoplifting—supported the allegations of neglect raised in that custodyproceeding. In any event, it is a correct statement of the law to note that evidence ofusing a child to aid in shoplifting would support a finding of neglect.