| People v Turner |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 08253 [145 AD3d 745] |
| December 7, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Terrence Turner, Appellant. |
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, NY (William B. Carney of counsel), forappellant, and appellant pro se.
Eric Gonzalez, Acting District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove andSolomon Neubort of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Ozzi, J.), rendered May 2, 2013, convicting him of rape in the first degree (two counts)and assault in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to twoconsecutive terms of imprisonment on the convictions of rape in the first degree to runconcurrently with the sentence imposed on the conviction of assault in the thirddegree.
Ordered that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest ofjustice, by providing that the sentences imposed on the convictions of rape in the firstdegree shall run concurrently with each other; as so modified, the judgment isaffirmed.
When a defendant is accused of a felony, the indictment must be dismissed unless thePeople are ready for trial within six months after the commencement of the criminalaction (see CPL 30.30 [1] [a]; People v Malloy, 137 AD3d 1304, 1304 [2016]; People v Young, 110 AD3d1107, 1107-1108 [2013]). Here, the total time chargeable to the People was less thanthe six-month period provided by CPL 30.30 (1) (a). Accordingly, the Supreme Courtproperly denied the defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 30.30 to dismiss theindictment.
The defendant was not deprived of his right of confrontation (see US ConstSixth Amend) when the Supreme Court curtailed defense counsel's cross-examination ofthe complainant regarding her grand jury testimony. "[C]urtailment [ofcross-examination] will be judged improper when it keeps from the jury relevant andimportant facts bearing on the trustworthiness of crucial testimony" (People vAshner, 190 AD2d 238, 247 [1993]; see People v Castellanos, 65 AD3d 555 [2009]). Here, thecourt's ruling was proper.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly curtailed thedefendant's introduction of extrinsic evidence and denied his request to call a witness tocontradict the complainant's answers concerning collateral matters, both of which weresolely for the purpose of impeaching the complainant's credibility (see People vPavao, 59 NY2d 282, 288-289 [1983]; People v Lloyd, 115 AD3d 766, 769 [2014]).
[*2] The sentence imposed was excessive to the extentindicated herein.
The defendant's remaining contentions raised in his pro se supplemental brief, thatthe rape counts were duplicitous and that the Supreme Court erred in allowing thecomplainant to testify about certain previous incidents, are without merit. Rivera, J.P.,Roman, Cohen and Miller, JJ., concur.