| Matter of Albany Academies v New York State Pub. High Sch.Athletic Assn. |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 08290 [145 AD3d 1258] |
| December 8, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of The Albany Academies et al., Appellants, v New York State Public HighSchool Athletic Association, Respondent. |
Featherstonhaugh, Wiley & Clyne, LLP, Albany (Jonathan S. McCardle ofcounsel), for appellants.
Renee L. James, Jamesville, for respondent.
Peters, P.J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Melkonian, J.), enteredJune 19, 2015 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioners' application, in aproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, challenging respondent's Bylaw and EligibilityStandard Rule 29 and subsequent modifications thereof (54 Misc 3d 1204[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 52016[U] [Sup Ct, Albany County 2015]).
Respondent is a not-for-profit corporation organized under the aegis of theCommissioner of Education (see 8 NYCRR part 135) to provide a centralassociation through which secondary schools may operate and coordinate theirinterscholastic athletic programs. Petitioners—various charter and private highschools in New York—are voluntary member schools of respondent who, inexchange for their membership, have agreed to be bound by the rules and regulationsadopted by respondent. One such rule, Bylaw and Eligibility Standard Rule 29, known asthe transfer rule, provides that a student who transfers without a corresponding change inresidence of his or her parents (or other persons with whom the student has resided for atleast six months) is ineligible to participate in any interscholastic athletic contest in aparticular sport for one year if, as a ninth through twelfth grade student, such studentparticipated in that sport during the one-year period immediately preceding the transfer.Such rule allows a one-time transfer to the public school district of the residence of thestudent's parents or to a private school within that district's boundaries while maintainingeligibility to participate in interscholastic sports immediately.
There are six enumerated exceptions to the transfer rule, empowering respondent towaive the otherwise mandatory period of ineligibility under the followingcircumstances:
"1. The student reaches the age of majority and [has] established residency in adistrict and can substantiate that [he/she is] independent and self-supporting.
"2. If a private or parochial school ceases to operate a student may transfer to anotherprivate or parochial school of his/her choice. Otherwise, a student must enroll in thepublic school district of his/her parents' residency.
"3. A student who is a ward of the court or state and is placed in a district by courtorder. Guardianship does not fulfill this requirement.
"4. A student from divorced or separated parents who moves into a new schooldistrict with one of the aforementioned parents. Such a transfer is allowed once every sixmonths. . . .
"5. A student who is declared homeless by the superintendent pursuant toCommissioner [of Education]'s Regulation 100.21.
"6. A student of a military employee who is transferred to an active military base mayenroll in the non-public school closest to [his/her] residence and maintain eligibility if thestudent enrolls in a non-public school immediately following the change inresidence."
The transfer rule also provides that any member school may petition on behalf of astudent for an approval of a transfer without penalty based upon an "undue hardship" forthe student. Respondent has adopted guidelines setting forth the circumstances thatwarrant a waiver of the transfer rule and criteria to be used in evaluating the unduehardship waivers. The guidelines list three general categories of undue hardship, namely,(1) financial, (2) health and safety, and (3) educational.
In October 2014, respondent's executive committee voted to modify three aspects ofthe transfer rule and the corresponding guidelines. The first revision eliminated one ofthe three general categories of undue hardship, known as the "educational waiver," fromthe transfer rule guidelines. The educational waiver previously allowed a student totransfer without sitting out a year of athletics if the school he or she transferred to offeredthree classes not offered at the prior school. Thus, beginning with the 2015-2016 schoolyear, students who transferred schools without a corresponding change of address couldnot obtain a waiver of the transfer rule on the basis of educational undue hardship. Thesecond revision modified the fourth enumerated exception to the transfer rule byrequiring that parents be "legally separated," as opposed to simply "separated," in orderto qualify for the exception. The third revision added language to the transfer rule itselfproviding that, "[f]or athletic eligibility, a residency is changed when one is abandonedby the immediate family and another residency established through action and intent.Residency requires one's physical presence as an inhabitant and the intent to remainindefinitely."
On February 23, 2015, petitioners commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding toannul the transfer rule and/or the subsequent modifications thereto on the ground thatthey are arbitrary and capricious. Finding a rational basis for each of the challengedactions, Supreme Court rejected petitioners' claims and dismissed the petition. Thisappeal ensued.
We note at the outset that, in its answer to the petition, respondent raised the defenseof statute of limitations in response to petitioners' challenge to the transfer rule itself,which was promulgated more than two decades ago. Although respondent was entitled toraise that issue on appeal as an alternative ground for affirmance (see generallyParochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 539, 545-546[1983]), it has not done so. We therefore deem that issue to be abandoned (see Huen N.Y., Inc. v Board ofEduc. Clinton Cent. School Dist., 67 AD3d 1337, 1337-1338 [2009]; Measom v Greenwich & PerrySt. Hous. Corp., 42 AD3d 366, 366 [2007], lvs dismissed 9 NY3d 946,986 [2007]; Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984, 984 [1994]).
Addressing the merits, it is settled that "courts should not interfere with the internalaffairs, proceedings, rules and orders of a high school athletic association unless there isevidence of acts which are arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion" (Matter ofGerard v Section III of N.Y. State Pub. High School Athletic Assn., 210 AD2d 938,939-940 [1994] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Suburban ScholasticCouncil v Section 2 of N.Y. State Pub. High School Athletic Assn., Inc., 23 AD3d728, 730 [2005]; Section VI of N.Y. State Pub. High School Athletic Assn. vNew York State Pub. High School Athletic Assn., 134 AD2d 819, 820 [1987], lvdenied 72 NY2d 801 [1988]; see 6 Am Jur 2d, Associations and Clubs§ 27; see also Matter of Eastern N.Y. Youth Soccer Assn. v New YorkState Pub. High School Athletic Assn., 67 NY2d 665, 667 [1986]). Such"determination rests on whether the athletic association's actions have a sound basis inreason and a foundation in fact" (Suburban Scholastic Council v Section 2 of N.Y.State Pub. High School Athletic Assn., Inc., 23 AD3d at 730 [internal quotationmarks and citation omitted]; seeMatter of Pena v New York State Pub. High Sch. Athletic Assn., Inc., 118 AD3d1456, 1457 [2014]; see generally Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union FreeSchool Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County,34 NY2d 222, 231 [1974]).
We find that petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the actions taken byrespondent warrant our interference. The purpose of the transfer rule, which waspromulgated by respondent pursuant to its constitution and by authority delegated to itthrough the regulations of the Commissioner of Education (see Matter of Brooks vSection v of N.Y. State Pub. High School Athletic Assn., 300 AD2d 1094, 1095[2002]), is to deter athletic school-shopping and the recruitment of high school athletesby schools. By establishing an objective standard for eligibility that prohibits, withcertain limited exceptions, immediate eligibility upon a transfer not accompanied by aparental change of residence, the transfer rule reasonably and rationally furthers theselegitimate goals. Indeed, "[t]he absence of such a rule might reasonably invitestrategically motivated transfers thinly disguised as transfers in the best (nonathletic)interest of the student" (Indiana High Sch. Athletic Assn., Inc. v Carlberg, 694NE2d 222, 233 [Ind 1997] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). While thetransfer rule may, at times, encompass students who change schools neither primarily forathletic reasons nor as a result of recruitment, respondent has reasonably determined thatconducting a factual inquiry into the motivation for each and every transfer would not befeasible given its limited resources and the volume of transfers that would have to beexamined. Further, respondent has balanced these competing interests by creating the sixenumerated exceptions to the transfer rule and providing for immediate eligibility upondemonstration of an undue hardship. Inasmuch as the transfer rule is reasonable andaccomplishes the legitimate purpose for which it was promulgated, it is not within ourprovince to assess the merits of such a rule or the wisdom of its adoption.[FN1]
Nor are we persuaded that the October 2014 modifications to the transfer rule lack arational basis or are otherwise arbitrary or capricious. With regard to its decision toeliminate the educational waiver from its guidelines, respondent's submissions establishthat member schools had raised serious concerns regarding the use of such waivers andwhether academic advantage constituted an "undue hardship" within the meaning of therule itself. After reviewing the guidelines over the course of several years and collectingdata concerning the number and types of undue hardships granted, respondentdetermined that the educational undue hardship waiver had been misused to circumventthe transfer rule and that its elimination was the best means to discourage recruitment andathletic shopping by students and parents. We cannot say that respondent's decision inthat regard was irrational. Likewise, respondent's modification to the fourth enumeratedexception to the transfer rule—requiring parents to be "legally separated" in orderto qualify for the exception—was a rational response to concerns that parents werestrategically circumventing the transfer rule by procuring a second residence and livingseparately for a period of time with no intention of divorcing.[FN2] Finally, respondent did not actarbitrarily or capriciously in requiring parents to demonstrate an intent to remainindefinitely in their new home in order for the relocation to constitute a "change inresidence" under the transfer rule. This modification, like that made to the fourthenumerated exception, was meant to address efforts to evade the transfer rule, as well asto bring the meaning of the term residency in line with the Department of Education andCourt of Appeals' interpretation of that term (see Longwood Cent. School Dist. v Springs Union Free SchoolDist., 1 NY3d 385, 388-390 [2004]; Appeal of J.H.L., 48 Ed Dept Rep190 [Decision No. 15,827]; Appeal of Haldane Cent. Sch. Dist., 32 Ed Dept Rep156 [Decision No. 12,790]).
Lynch, Devine, Clark and Aarons, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed,with costs.
Footnote 1:Notably, transfer rulessimilar to the one at issue here have been enacted by high school athletic associations inseveral states and have repeatedly been upheld as rational (see e.g. Parker v ArizonaInterscholastic Assn., Inc., 204 Ariz 42, 59 P3d 806 [2002]; Indiana High Sch.Athletic Assn., Inc. v Carlberg, 694 NE2d at 233; Alabama High Sch. AthleticAssn. v Scaffidi, 564 So 2d 910 [1990]; Ulliman v Ohio High Sch. AthleticAssn., 184 Ohio App 3d 52, 919 NE2d 763 [2009]; Morgan v OklahomaSecondary Sch. Activities Assn., 2009 OK 21, 207 P3d 362 [2009]; Hebert vVentetuolo, 480 A2d 403 [RI 1984]; Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Assn. vHopkins County Bd. of Educ., 552 SW2d 685 [Ky Ct App 1977]; Chabert vLouisiana High Sch. Athletic Assn., 323 So 2d 774 [La 1975]; Crandall v NorthDakota High Sch. Activities Assn., 261 NW2d 921 [ND 1978]; State ex rel. Mo.State High Sch. Activities Assn. v Romines, 37 SW3d 421 [Mo Ct App, ED 2001]).
Footnote 2:In modifying thisexception, respondent's executive committee expressly noted the undue hardship waivercould be used to grant eligibility in cases where parents could not afford a legalseparation.