| People v Gonzales |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 08619 [145 AD3d 1432] |
| December 23, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Josue Gonzales, Appellant. |
Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Piotr Banasiak of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
Josue Gonzales, defendant-appellant pro se.
William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (Victoria M. White of counsel),for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Thomas J. Miller, J.),rendered November 26, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, ofmurder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the seconddegree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimouslyaffirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a juryverdict of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]) andcriminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03 [3]).Although we agree with defendant that certain actions of the prosecutor during the grandjury proceedings were improper, we conclude that County Court properly determinedthat the exceptional remedy of dismissal of the indictment is not warranted (seegenerally People v Huston, 88 NY2d 400, 409 [1996]; People v Elioff, 110 AD3d1477, 1477-1478 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1040 [2013]). To the extentthat defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury, thatcontention is "not reviewable on this appeal from the ensuing judgment based uponlegally sufficient trial evidence" (People v Edgeston, 90 AD3d 1535, 1535-1536 [2011],lv denied 19 NY3d 973 [2012]). Furthermore, viewing the evidence in light ofthe elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), wereject defendant's contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence (seegenerally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).
Contrary to defendant's contention, the court did not err in allowing the prosecutor tointroduce, on redirect examination, the prior consistent statement of a prosecutionwitness. Even assuming, arguendo, that the court erred in allowing the prior consistentstatement under the rationale that the trial testimony of the witness was"assailed—either directly or inferentially—as a recent fabrication" bydefense counsel on cross-examination (People v McDaniel, 81 NY2d 10, 18[1993]), we conclude that the court properly determined, as a second rationale, thatdefense counsel had opened the door to that testimony on cross-examination (seePeople v Melendez, 55 NY2d 445, 451 [1982]). It is well established that "[w]here. . . the opposing party 'opens the door' on cross-examination to matters nottouched upon during the direct examination, a party has the right on redirect 'to explain,clarify and fully elicit [the] question only partially examined' on cross-examination"(id.). "[A] trial court should decide 'door-opening' issues in its discretion, byconsidering whether, and to what extent, the evidence or argument said to open the dooris incomplete and misleading, and what if any otherwise inadmissible evidence isreasonably necessary to correct the misleading impression" (People v Massie, 2NY3d 179, 184 [2004]). In our view, once defense counsel elicited selected portions ofthe prior statement of the witness on cross-examination, the prosecutor was free to elicitthe balance of the statement in order to give the evidence before the jury its full andaccurate context. Contrary to defendant's further contention on this point, the court"allow[ed] [only] so much additional evidence to be introduced on redirect as [was]necessary to 'meet what ha[d] been brought out in the meantime upon thecross-examination' " (Melendez, 55 NY2d at 452).
Contrary to the contention of defendant, he received effective assistance of counsel(see generally People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 141 [1981]). Defense counsel'sfailure to obtain an expert on identification evidence does not constitute ineffectiveassistance of counsel inasmuch as " '[d]efendant has not demonstrated that suchtestimony was available, that it would have assisted the jury in its determination or thathe was prejudiced by its absence' " (People v Jurgensen, 288 AD2d 937,938 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 684 [2001]). Furthermore, "[d]efense counsel'sfailure to request a missing witness charge did not constitute ineffective assistance ofcounsel [inasmuch as t]here was no indication that the witness would have providednoncumulative testimony favorable to the People" (People v Smith, 118 AD3d 1492, 1493 [2014], lvdenied 25 NY3d 953 [2015]). Lastly, defendant failed to demonstrate the absence ofstrategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel's alleged error in failing to requestan "expanded" single eyewitness jury instruction (see generally People v Stanley, 108 AD3d 1129, 1130[2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 959 [2013]).
Defendant also contends that he was deprived of a fair trial based on improperremarks from the prosecutor during the cross-examination of witnesses and duringopening and closing statements. Defendant failed to preserve his contention for ourreview with respect to many of the instances of alleged misconduct (see CPL470.05 [2]). In any event, we reject defendant's contention inasmuch as "[r]eversal ongrounds of prosecutorial misconduct 'is mandated only when the conduct has caused suchsubstantial prejudice to the defendant that he has been denied due process oflaw' " (People v Rubin, 101 AD2d 71, 77 [1984], lv denied 63NY2d 711 [1984]). To the extent that any of the prosecutor's comments during openingor closing statements exceeded the bounds of propriety, we conclude that they" 'were not so pervasive or egregious as to deprive defendant of a fairtrial' " (People vJackson, 108 AD3d 1079, 1080 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 997 [2013]).We reject defendant's further contention that the photo array shown to two witnesses wasunduly suggestive inasmuch as it did not "create a substantial likelihood that thedefendant would be singled out for identification" (People v Chipp, 75 NY2d327, 336 [1990], cert denied 498 US 833 [1990]). Additionally, we conclude thatthe sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.
Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contentions in his pro sesupplemental brief concerning the court's questioning of potential jurors, and we declineto exercise our power to review those contentions as a matter of discretion in the interestof justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]).
Contrary to defendant's further contention in his pro se supplemental brief, weconclude that he failed to satisfy his burden of coming forward with substantial evidencethat he was absent from a material stage of the trial (see People v Andrew, 1 NY3d 546, 547 [2003]; People v Chacon, 11 AD3d906, 907 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 755 [2004]). "The absence of a notationin the record indicating that defendant was present is not sufficient to demonstrate that hewas not present" (People vMartin, 26 AD3d 847, 848 [2006], affd sub nom. People v Kisoon, 8NY3d 129 [2007]). In any event, the bench and sidebar conferences referenced bydefendant in his pro se supplemental brief "did not implicate his peculiar knowledge orotherwise present the potential for his meaningful participation" (People v Fabricio, 3 NY3d402, 406 [2004]). As a consequence, contrary to defendant's final contention in hispro se supplemental brief, there is no reason to remit this matter for a reconstructionhearing (see People vFoster, 1 NY3d 44, 49 [2003]). Present—Centra, J.P., Peradotto,DeJoseph, NeMoyer and Curran, JJ.