| People v Williams |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 00011 [146 AD3d 410] |
| January 3, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v James Williams, Appellant. |
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Katharine Skolnick ofcounsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Patricia Curran of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Laura A. Ward, J., at suppressionhearing; Melissa C. Jackson, J., at jury trial and sentencing), rendered December 23,2013, convicting defendant of assault in the first degree, and sentencing him, as a secondviolent felony offender, to a term of 18 years, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting a slang expert, whom thecourt deemed an expert in "street lingo and terminology," to testify regarding the possiblemeanings of several words and phrases used by defendant in a recorded call he madeduring his pretrial incarceration. This testimony did not violate the principles articulatedin People v Inoa (25 NY3d466, 474 [2015]). The witness, who notably had no connection with theinvestigation of the case, neither testified about the general meaning of the recordedconversation nor relied on the other facts of the case in translating the handful of slangexpressions about which he testified. The record of the expert's testimony, viewed as awhole, demonstrates that the court did not permit the expert to state what the slang termsmeant in the context of the case; that determination was left for the jury to make. To theextent any slight portion of the testimony could be viewed as interpreting theconversation, the error was harmless (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230[1975]). Defendant's argument that the expert's description of his police experience andqualifications in translating slang tended to connect defendant with gang or drug activityis unpreserved and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternativeholding, we reject it on the merits.
The court properly permitted the victim to testify about an anonymous threateningphone call he received approximately 10 hours after he was attacked, warning him not topursue the matter. The evidence was admissible, notwithstanding that the People couldnot demonstrate that defendant knew the caller or authorized the call, because it was notintroduced to prove consciousness of guilt, but rather to support particular aspects of thePeople's theory of the case (see generally People v Scarola, 71 NY2d 769, 777[1988]). Specifically, in conjunction with elements of defendant's recorded call, theanonymous threatening call tended to support the theory that someone who knew thevictim and his travel habits, and bore a grudge against him, paid defendant to attackhim.
The court correctly denied defendant's suppression motion. The police hadreasonable suspicion to detain defendant for a showup identification, based on a radioeddescription that was sufficiently specific, in context, because the extremely close spatialand temporal proximity between the crime and the police observation of defendant madeit "highly unlikely that the suspect had departed and that, almost at the same moment, aninnocent person of identical appearance coincidentally arrived on the scene" (People v Johnson, 63 AD3d518, 518 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 797 [2009]). At the very least, thepolice acquired reasonable suspicion when defendant fled after the police pulled their carin front of him to cut him off. Defendant did not preserve his claim that the officers'conduct in blocking his path was a seizure that already [*2]required reasonable suspicion, and we decline to review itin the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we reject it on the merits (see People v Stevenson, 55AD3d 486 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 788 [2009]). The showupidentification procedure conducted following the stop was not unduly suggestive,because "the overall effect of the allegedly suggestive circumstances was notsignificantly greater than what is inherent in any showup" (People v Brujan, 104 AD3d481, 482 [1st Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1014 [2013]).
We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence. Concur—Friedman, J.P.,Sweeny, Richter, Manzanet-Daniels and Kapnick, JJ.