| People v Morin |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 00322 [146 AD3d 901] |
| January 18, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Travis Morin, Appellant. |
Arza Feldman, Uniondale, NY (Steven A. Feldman of counsel), for appellant.
Anthony A. Scarpino, Jr., District Attorney, White Plains, NY (Virginia A.Marciano, Laurie Sapakoff, and Steven A. Bender of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County(Neary, J.), rendered April 9, 2014, convicting him of robbery in the second degree andunlawful imprisonment in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposingsentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's prosecution stems from the robbery, kidnapping, and murder ofEpifanio Medina. On the morning of June 12, 2011, Medina's body was found byhorseback riders in a clearing of Graymark Preserve in North Salem, WestchesterCounty. The body was heavily decomposed and was severely infested with maggots.Medina was last seen near a liquor store in Passaic, New Jersey, on June 2, 2011, atabout 4:05 p.m.
The evidence at trial included codefendant Jessica French's testimony implicating heraccomplices, Charles Blanchard, Patrick Smith, and the defendant. According to French'stestimony, Medina was grabbed from the street in front of the liquor store by thedefendant and Blanchard. After hitting and punching Medina and forcing him onto thefloor of the backseat of their car, the defendant and Blanchard removed various items ofjewelry from Medina's person. The defendant, Blanchard, Smith, and French then droveMedina from Passaic, New Jersey, across the Hudson River, to a secluded and woodedarea of North Salem, where Medina was left. Thereafter, the defendant, Blanchard,Smith, and French drove back to New Jersey where Smith and French entered Medina'sapartment using a key taken from Medina's pocket to search for money.
The defendant was charged with murder in the second degree (two counts),kidnapping in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, and unlawful imprisonmentin the first degree. The jury convicted the defendant of robbery in the second degree andunlawful imprisonment in the first degree, and acquitted the defendant of the murder andkidnapping charges.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the County Court's Sandoval ruling(see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974]) was a provident exercise ofdiscretion. The court balanced the relevant factors, formulated an appropriatecompromise (see People vHarris, 129 AD3d 990, 992 [2015]; People v English, 119 AD3d 706, 707 [2014]), andproperly determined that the prior crimes were probative of the defendant's veracitybecause they indicated his willingness to put his own interests above those of society(see People v Harris, 129 AD3d at 992; People v Quezada, 116 AD3d 796 [2014]).
[*2] The defendant's contention that the admission of aphotograph of Medina's decomposed body was unduly prejudicial is without merit.Generally, "photographs [of the deceased] are admissible if they tend 'to prove ordisprove a disputed or material issue, to illustrate or elucidate other relevant evidence, orto corroborate or disprove some other evidence offered or to be offered.' They should beexcluded 'only if [their] sole purpose is to arouse the emotions of the jury and toprejudice the defendant' " (People v Wood, 79 NY2d 958, 960 [1992],quoting People v Pobliner, 32 NY2d 356, 369, 370 [1973]; see People vWebster, 248 AD2d 738 [1998]). Here, the manner of death and the probable time ofdeath were both material issues in the case. Therefore, the photograph was properlyadmitted to corroborate and illustrate the People's evidence regarding the positioning ofthe body, and the manner and time of death (see People v DeBerry, 234 AD2d470, 470-471 [1996]).
Furthermore, the County Court properly denied the defendant's request that his jurybe present for the testimony of his codefendant Patrick Smith. Prior to trial, the trial courtgranted a partial severance directing that the defendant and Smith be tried jointly, butbefore two separate juries. Given the possibility that the defenses would be antagonistic,the trial court's ruling was a provident exercise of discretion (see People v Braham, 91 AD3d666, 667 [2012]). The defendant was permitted to, and did, call Smith as a defensewitness in his own case, thereby nullifying any prejudice the defendant claimed to havesuffered as a result of the court's ruling.
The County Court providently exercised its discretion in allowing the People to call arebuttal witness to Smith's testimony. Although a witness may not be impeached withextrinsic evidence on a collateral issue (see People v Wise, 46 NY2d 321 [1978]),here, the rebuttal witness's testimony was relevant to the defense put forth by thedefendant through the testimony of Smith. Smith's testimony was properly rebutted byevidence of a prior inconsistent statement made by him (see People v Knight, 173AD2d 736 [1991]).
The defendant's remaining contentions, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, arewithout merit. Chambers, J.P., Roman, Miller and Barros, JJ., concur.