| People v Mujica |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 00323 [146 AD3d 902] |
| January 18, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Arturo Mujica, Appellant. |
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, NY (Benjamin S. Litman of counsel), forappellant.
Eric Gonzalez, Acting District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove and RuthE. Ross of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Harrington, J.), rendered April 7, 2014, convicting him of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree, course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree, criminal sexual act in the second degree (24 counts), sexual abuse in the second degree (six counts) and endangering the welfare of achild, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved forappellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492 [2008]). In anyevent, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see Peoplev Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish thedefendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility toconduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder'sopportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (seePeople v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490,495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guiltwas not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
Because each count of criminal sexual act in the second degree and sexual abuse inthe second degree was premised upon a single act occurring within a specified period oftime, and was supported by the victim's testimony as to each such act, reversal of hisconviction of those counts is not warranted on the ground of duplicitousness (seePeople v Farbman, 231 AD2d 588, 589 [1996]; People v Cosby, 222 AD2d690, 691 [1995]).
The defendant's contention that the sentence imposed by the Supreme Courtpunished him for exercising his right to a jury trial rather than accepting a plea offer isunpreserved for appellate review (see People v Hurley, 75 NY2d 887, 888[1990]; People v Brown, 38AD3d 676, 677 [2007]). In any event, the fact that the sentence imposed after trialwas greater than the sentence offered [*2]during pleanegotiations does not, standing alone, establish that the defendant was punished forexercising his right to trial (seePeople v Bowers, 144 AD3d 1049, 1049-1050 [2016]). Moreover, the sentenceimposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]). Rivera,J.P., Austin, Cohen and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.