| LaSalle Bank N.A. v Oberstein |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 00462 [146 AD3d 945] |
| January 25, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee forCertificate Holders of EMC Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-A, Mortgage Loan Pass-ThroughCertificates, Series 2005-A, Respondent, v Michael R. Oberstein et al.,Defendants, and Sperry Associates Federal Credit Union,Appellant. |
Scott A. Rosenberg, P.C., Garden City Park, NY (Kenneth J. Pagliughi of counsel),for appellant.
Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, White Plains, NY (Kenneth J.Flickinger of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Sperry Associates Federal CreditUnion appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Adams, J.), enteredJanuary 13, 2014, which denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3) to vacate ajudgment of foreclosure and sale of the same court dated June 1, 2010, entered upon itsfailure to answer the complaint, and for leave to serve a late answer.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly denied the appellant's motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) (3) to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale entered upon its default in answering.Under the circumstances of this case, the appellant failed to move for relief pursuant toCPLR 5015 (a) (3) within a reasonable time after entry of the judgment (see Fishkin, Pugach &Finkelstein, P.C. v Biggio, 128 AD3d 1006 [2015]; Empire State Conglomerates vMahbur, 105 AD3d 898 [2013]; Bank of N.Y. v Stradford, 55 AD3d 765 [2008]; Aames Capital Corp. vDavidsohn, 24 AD3d 474 [2005]). In any event, the appellant failed todemonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default, which is required when a CPLR 5015(a) (3) motion alleges intrinsic fraud, i.e., that the allegations in the complaint are false(see Deutsche Bank Natl. TrustCo. v Karlis, 138 AD3d 915, 916 [2016]; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Peters, 127 AD3d 742, 742-743[2015]; New Century Mtge.Corp. v Corriette, 117 AD3d 1011, 1012 [2014]), rather than "extrinsic fraud,"which is "a fraud practiced in obtaining a judgment such that a party may have beenprevented from fully and fairly litigating the matter" (Shaw v Shaw, 97 AD2d403, 403 [1983]; see U.S. Bank, N.A. v Peters, 127 AD3d at 742-743; Bank of N.Y. v Lagakos, 27AD3d 678, 679 [2006]; Tamimi v Tamimi, 38 AD2d 197 [1972]). Contraryto the appellant's contention, it failed to demonstrate some device, trick, or deceit that ledit to believe that it need not defend the suit (see Empire State Conglomerates v Mahbur, 105 AD3d 898[2013]; Mortgage Elec.Registration Sys., Inc. v Schotter, 50 AD3d 983 [2008]; Putnam CountyNatl. Bank of Carmel v Simpson, 204 AD2d 297 [1994]; cf. Avenoso vAvenoso, 266 AD2d 326 [1999]; Shaw v Shaw, 97 AD2d at 403). Moreover,despite the appellant's allegations of improper practices by the plaintiff's agents inunrelated matters, it failed to meet its burden of establishing fraud, [*2]misrepresentation, or other misconduct on the part of theplaintiff in this matter that could warrant vacatur of the default judgment of foreclosureand sale pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3) (see Golden First Bank v Tal, 136 AD3d 974 [2016]; Citimortgage, Inc. vBustamante, 107 AD3d 752, 753 [2013]).
As the appellant failed to proffer an excuse for failing to answer the complaint, it isunnecessary to consider whether it sufficiently demonstrated the existence of apotentially meritorious defense (see EMC Mtge. Corp. v Toussaint, 136 AD3d 861,862-863 [2016]). Leventhal, J.P., Chambers, Austin and LaSalle, JJ., concur.