| People v Iqbal |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 00662 [147 AD3d 782] |
| February 1, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Muhammad Iqbal, Appellant. |
Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, NY (Mark W. Vorkink of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (John M. Castellano, JohnnetteTraill, and Roni C. Piplani of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lasak, J.),rendered February 11, 2014, convicting him of murder in the second degree, criminal tamperingwith physical evidence (two counts), and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree,upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that he was denied his constitutional rights to a fair trial and topresent a defense by the Supreme Court's preclusion of expert testimony on the issue of falseconfessions is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Lane, 7 NY3d 888, 889[2006]). In any event, the defendant's constitutional rights were not violated. Moreover, to theextent the defendant claims evidentiary error, the contention is without merit, as the courtprovidently exercised its discretion in precluding the proposed testimony because it was notrelevant to the specific circumstances of this case (see People v Bedessie, 19 NY3d 147, 161 [2012]; People v Kaye, 137 AD3d 938[2016]; People v Joubert, 125 AD3d686 [2015]; People v Rosario,100 AD3d 660 [2012]).
The defendant's contention that he was denied the right to present a defense by the SupremeCourt's denial of his request to charge the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbanceis unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Lane, 7 NY3dat 889). In any event, the court properly declined to charge the jury with the affirmative defenseof extreme emotional disturbance. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to thedefendant, there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find by a preponderance of the evidencethat, at the time of the subject strangulation, the defendant suffered from a mental infirmitytypically manifested by a loss of self-control (see Penal Law §§ 125.25[1] [a]; 125.20 [2]; People v Roche, 98 NY2d 70, 76-77 [2002]; People v White,79 NY2d 900, 904 [1992]; People v Walker, 64 NY2d 741, 743 [1984]).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).Chambers, J.P., Austin, Hinds-Radix and Barros, JJ., concur.