Matter of Lisa T. v King E.T.
2017 NY Slip Op 01487 [147 AD3d 670]
February 28, 2017
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 29, 2017


[*1](February 28, 2017)
 In the Matter of Lisa T., Respondent,
v
King E.T.,Appellant.

Richard L. Herzfeld, P.C., New York (Richard L. Herzfeld of counsel), for appellant.

Law Offices of Randall S. Carmel, Syosset (Randall S. Carmel of counsel), forrespondent.

Order, Family Court, Bronx County (John J. Kelley, J.), entered on or about June 30, 2015,which, inter alia, found that respondent willfully violated two temporary orders of protection,unanimously affirmed, without costs. Order, same court and Judge, entered on or about July 8,2015, which issued a one-year order of protection against respondent, affirmed, withoutcosts.

Respondent was on notice of the conduct prohibited under the October 3, 2013 order ofprotection, with which he was served in court. Despite his nonappearance in court on November20, 2013, the prominent warning on the face of the October 3, 2013 order put respondent on fairnotice that the order would be extended (see People v Hopkins, 275 AD2d 667 [1st Dept2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 935 [2000]).

Respondent's April 3, 2014 email contained statements clearly intended to harass petitioner,in violation of the order of protection that was entered that same day (see Matter of Jaynie S. v Gaetano D.,134 AD3d 473, 474 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 917 [2016]; Matter of Angela C. v Harris K., 102AD3d 588, 589 [1st Dept 2013]).

Respondent's appeal from the July 8, 2015 order of protection has not been rendered mootsolely by the expiration of that order. As the Court of Appeals held in Matter of Veronica P. v Radcliff A. (24NY3d 668, 671 [2015]), the "expiration of the order of protection does not moot the appealbecause the order still imposes significant enduring consequences upon respondent, who mayreceive relief from those consequences upon a favorable appellate decision."

Because the appeal has not been rendered moot, we must consider the merits of the order ofprotection, and we now find that it was properly issued. Family Court Act § 846-a,"Powers on failure to obey order," is "punitive [in] nature"; it prescribes the procedure andpenalties for failing to obey a temporary order of protection (see Matter of Walker vWalker, 86 NY2d 624, 629 [1995]). Specifically, the court is permitted to issue a new orderof protection if the respondent is "brought before the court for failure to obey [a] . . .temporary order of protection issued pursuant to this act . . . and if, after hearing, thecourt is satisfied by competent proof that the respondent has willfully failed to obey. . . such order" (Family Ct Act § 846-a). Under Family Court Act§ 846-a the new order of protection must be in accordance with Family Court Act§ 842, which permits a court to issue such an order upon a finding "on the recordthat the conduct alleged in the petition is in violation of a valid order of protection."

Here, the Family Court found, on the record after a hearing, that respondent had willfullyviolated the temporary order of protection with his April 3, 2014 emails containing statementsclearly intended to harass petitioner. As a result of this determination, the Family Courtconducted a dispositional hearing on respondent's violation of the temporary order of protection,and thereafter issued a new order of protection. The Family Court adhered to the prescribed [*2]procedure and did not exceed its jurisdiction by issuing this finalorder of protection.[FN1]

Our dissenting colleague contends that Family Court Act § 846-a must be readto provide that a "final" order of protection can only be issued upon the Family Court'sdetermination that: (1) the respondent willfully violated a final order of protection that itself wasissued upon a finding that a family offense was committed; or (2) the respondent's violation of atemporary order of protection constituted a family offense; or (3) the respondent's violation of afinal order of protection constituted a family offense. There is no support in the statute or in thecase law for this proposition. The dissent's argument would require this Court to read languageinto the statute that is, simply, not there. Family Court Act § 846-a does not requirea finding of the commission of a family offense.

The dissent's reliance on Family Court Act § 812 is misplaced, since thatsection addresses concurrent jurisdiction between the Family Court and Criminal Court. FamilyCourt Act § 841—"Orders of disposition"—also does not save thedissent's argument, as that section provides that the court may, upon a determination that nofamily offense has been committed, dismiss the petition. Moreover, as previously stated, we readFamily Court Act § 846-a as prescribing the remedies available to the court when arespondent violates a temporary order of protection, which is what is at issue here.

The case of Matter of V.C. v H.C. (257 AD2d 27 [1st Dept 1999]), cited by ourdissenting colleague, is inapposite and simply details the steps a court should take when a familyoffense is found to have been committed; it does not dictate that the finding of a family offensemust exist before an order of protection can be issued. Moreover, the court in Matter ofV.C. did not address Family Court Act § 846-a. Matter of Mary C. v Anthony C. (61AD3d 682 [2d Dept 2009]) and Matter of Steinhilper v Decker (35 AD3d 1101 [3d Dept 2006])also do not dictate that a finding that the respondent committed a family offense must exist inorder for the court to issue an order of protection. Rather, in both cases, the courts focused on theallegations in the petitions and the fact that the alleged acts did not constitute acts specificallyenumerated in Family Court Act § 812, and thus concluded that they lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction over the family offense proceedings and dismissed the petitions. Such is notthe case here, where the petition before the court alleged acts that are specifically enumerated inFamily Court Act § 812.

We have considered respondent's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.Concur—Acosta, J.P., Richter, Mazzarelli and Kapnick, JJ.

Gesmer, J., dissents in part in a memorandum as follows: I respectfully dissent in part.

I agree with the majority's decision except its affirmance of the final order of protectionissued by the Family Court on July 8, 2015 (the 2015 OP). When the Family Court issued thatorder, it had not found that respondent (the father) had committed any family offense. Issuing anorder of protection under these circumstances is inconsistent with article 8 of the Family CourtAct, which gives the Family Court jurisdiction to issue a final order of protection only where ithas concluded by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the respondent committed acts that[*3]constitute one of the enumerated family offenses (seeFamily Ct Act §§ 812, 832).

This proceeding arises in the context of a contentious custody dispute. Petitioner (the mother)filed a family offense petition against the father on December 10, 2012, and the Family Courtissued an ex parte temporary order of protection (TOP) that day. The Family Court repeatedlyextended the TOP, with the result that the TOP remained in effect until July 8, 2015. The motherfiled several petitions alleging that the father had violated the TOP.

The Family Court held a trial on the original family offense petition, combined with ahearing on the violation petitions, on May 8, 12 and 27, 2015, more than 21/2 yearsafter the original petition was filed. In its order entered on or about June 30, 2015, the FamilyCourt found that (1) the mother had failed to prove that the father had committed any familyoffenses based on the allegations in the original petition; (2) the father had violated the TOP bysending the mother two emails, on December 22, 2013 and April 3, 2014; and (3) neither thefather's sending of the emails, nor any other conduct by the father, constituted any of theenumerated family offenses. The Family Court dismissed the mother's original family offensepetition and scheduled a dispositional hearing on the father's violation of the TOP for July 8,2015. On that day, the Family Court issued a one-year order of protection, the 2015 OP, as aremedy for the father's violations of the TOP. I conclude that the Family Court erred in doingso.

"Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction [and] cannot exercise powers beyond thosegranted to it by statute" (Matter of JohnaM.S. v Russell E.S., 10 NY3d 364, 366 [2008]; see NY Const, art VI,§ 13; Family Ct Act § 115). Section 812 of the Family Court Actprovides that the Family Court has concurrent jurisdiction with Criminal Court "over anyproceeding concerning acts which would constitute" any of the enumerated family offenses, eachof which constitutes a crime pursuant to the Penal Law, where those acts occur between membersof the same family or household, or between persons who have had an intimate relationship witheach other.[FN1] Section821 provides that a proceeding under article 8 must be commenced by a petition alleging that therespondent committed one or more of the enumerated family offenses (Family Ct Act§ 821 [1] [a]).

Upon the filing of a family offense petition, the Family Court may issue a temporary order ofprotection "for good cause shown" (Family Ct Act § 828 [1] [a]). "A temporaryorder of protection is not a finding of wrongdoing" (Family Ct Act § 828 [2]). Thereis no provision for a respondent to contest a temporary order of protection in the Family Court,and a temporary order of protection is not appealable as of right (Merril Sobie, PracticeCommentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct Act § 828 at287). Moreover, there is no limit on the number of times, or the length of time, a temporary orderof protection may be extended, with the result that it can remain in effect for years. In this case,the TOP was repeatedly extended, with the result that it remained in effect for 21/2years, even though the allegations had not been proven [*4]at ahearing at which the father had an opportunity to be heard. This is six months longer than themaximum term of a final order of protection, absent proof of aggravating circumstances notpresent here (Family Ct Act § 842).

Section 841 sets forth the dispositional powers of the Family Court following a fact-findinghearing on a petition for a final order of protection. It provides, inter alia, for dismissal of thepetition "if the allegations of the petition are not established" (subd [a]) or "making an order ofprotection in accord with section eight hundred forty-two of this part" (subd [d]). Section 842lists the conditions that may be contained in an order of protection "under section eight hundredforty-one of this part."

Upon a finding of willful violation of a "lawful" order of protection, the Family Court may"make a new order of protection in accordance with section eight hundred forty-two" (Family CtAct § 846-a). As the reference in this provision to section 842 suggests, since theFamily Court only has jurisdiction to issue a final order of protection where a petition alleges thata family offense has been committed and the allegations in the petition are proved (Family Ct Act§§ 812, 841, 842; see also Matter of V.C. v H.C., 257 AD2d 27, 31-32[1st Dept 1999]; Matter of Mary C. vAnthony C., 61 AD3d 682, 683 [2d Dept 2009]; Matter of Steinhilper v Decker, 35 AD3d 1101, 1102 [3d Dept2006]),[FN2] section 846-amust be read to provide that the Family Court may only issue a final order of protection underthis section upon a finding that the respondent willfully violated a final order of protection issuedupon a finding that a family offense was committed, or a finding that the respondent's violationof a temporary order of protection or a final order of protection constituted a family offense.However, in this case, the Family Court did not find that the father committed a family offenseeither based on the allegations in the original petition or by his conduct, which the court foundviolated the TOP. Since the Family Court did not find that the father committed any familyoffense, I would hold that it did not have the authority to issue a final order of protection. It is avast expansion of the Family Court's limited powers to permit it to issue an order of protectionunder these circumstances.

I am by no means suggesting that a person should never face a penalty for violating atemporary order of protection that is ultimately found to be based upon allegations of acts that donot constitute a family offense. The Family Court may direct other forms of relief upon finding aviolation of a temporary order of protection, including forfeiture of bail, directing the respondentto pay the petitioner's counsel fees, and commitment of the respondent to jail for up to sixmonths (Family Ct Act § 846-a). However, none of those alternative remedies isappropriate on this record, since there is no bail to forfeit, both parties are indigent and haveassigned counsel, and the allegations in the violation petition were not proved beyond areasonable doubt, as required in order to direct incarceration as a remedy for contempt(People v Wood, 95 NY2d 509, [*5]513 n 3 [2000][contempt under Family Ct Act § 846-a is punitive in nature]; Matter of Rubackin v Rubackin, 62AD3d 11, 21 [2d Dept 2009] [standard of proof required for incarceration under Family CtAct § 846-a is beyond a reasonable doubt]). Moreover, the father has already beeneffectively punished by the issuance of the 2015 OP and has been suffering its legal andreputational consequences in effect for a year. Accordingly, I would vacate the 2015 OP.

I disagree with the majority's contention that this result is inconsistent with the goal ofFamily Ct Act § 842: to prevent further abuse and additional violence and toprovide victims of domestic violence with legal protection. Although the Family Court Act doesnot contain a definition of domestic violence, the Social Services Law provides:

" 'Victim of domestic violence' means any person over the age of sixteen, anymarried person or any parent accompanied by his or her minor child or children in situations inwhich such person or such person's child is a victim of an act which would constitute a violationof the penal law, including, but not limited to acts constituting disorderly conduct, harassment,aggravated harassment, sexual misconduct, forcible touching, sexual abuse, stalking, criminalmischief, menacing, reckless endangerment, kidnapping, assault, attempted assault, attemptedmurder, criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, or strangulation; and

"(i) such act or acts have resulted in actual physical or emotional injury or have created asubstantial risk of physical or emotional harm to such person or such person's child; and

"(ii) such act or acts are or are alleged to have been committed by a family or householdmember" (Social Services Law § 459-a; see also L 1994, ch 222,§ 1 [amending Family Ct Act § 846-a to add forfeiture of bail andpayment of petitioner's counsel fees as remedies, and finding that "domestic violence is criminalconduct occurring between members of the same family or household"]).

Thisdefinition dovetails with the criteria that permit a court to issue an order of protection. Thus, inthis case, since the Family Court did not find that the mother was a victim of any of theenumerated offenses in the penal code, the mother cannot be considered a victim of domesticviolence. Accordingly, permitting the court to issue an order of protection in her favor does notadvance the statutory purposes.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:The legislative history of FamilyCourt Act § 842 makes plain that the primary goal of the statute is to prevent furtherabuse and additional violence and to provide victims of domestic violence with meaningfulaccess to the protection of the law (see Mem of Assembly Judiciary Committee, BillJacket, L 2010, ch 325 at 5-6). Indeed, the statutory language specifically provides that on amotion to extend an order of protection, the "fact that abuse has not occurred during thependency of an order shall not, in itself, constitute sufficient ground for denying or failing toextend the order" (Family Ct Act § 842).

Footnote 1:The majority takes the view that,because Family Ct Act § 846-a does not expressly require a finding of thecommission of a family offense, no such finding was necessary in this case in order to issue afinal order of protection as a remedy for a violation of the TOP. However, Family Ct Act§ 812 already provides that Family Court only has subject matter jurisdiction overcases involving commission of one or more family offenses, and Family Ct Act§ 841 provides for dismissal of the family offense petition where no family offensehas been proven. Moreover, since the purpose of family offense proceedings is "to protectvictims of domestic violence" (Matter of V.C. v H.C., 257 AD2d 27, 31 [1st Dept 1999];see also Mem of Assembly Judiciary Committee, Bill Jacket, L 2010, ch 325 at 5-6), thatpurpose is not served if a court issues an order of protection where it has not found that thecomplainant was in fact a victim of domestic violence.

Footnote 2:The majority's attempt todistinguish these cases is unavailing. Matter of V.C. v H.C. does not merely establish aprocedure; it affirmatively states that "[a]mong the purposes of a family offenses proceedingunder article 8 of the Family Court Act is to protect victims of domestic violence by providing 'acivil, non-criminal alternative to a criminal prosecution' (Besharov, Practice Commentaries,McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct Act § 812, at 181) whenfamily members commit certain designated criminal offenses" (257 AD2d 27, 31-32 [1999][footnote omitted and emphasis added]). In Matter of Mary C. v Anthony C. andMatter of Steinhilper v Decker, our sister departments vacated orders of protection wherethe Family Court found that the respondents had not violated criminal acts that did not violateany of the enumerated family offenses. That is exactly the situation here, because the FamilyCourt did not find that the father had ever violated any of the sections of the penal codeenumerated in Family Ct Act § 812.


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