People v Mateo

2017 NY Slip Op 01569 [148 AD3d 727]

March 1, 2017

Appellate Division, Second Department

As corrected through Wednesday, May 3, 2017

[*1]

The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Domingo Mateo, Appellant.

Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, NY (Yvonne Shivers of counsel), for appellant.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (John M. Castellano, JohnnetteTraill, Joseph N. Ferdenzi, and Jill A. Gross-Marks of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Margulis,J.), rendered February 20, 2013, convicting him of murder in the second degree (three counts),kidnapping in the first degree, kidnapping in the second degree, burglary in the first degree (threecounts), robbery in the first degree (three counts), and robbery in the second degree, upon a juryverdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, ofthat branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to lawenforcement officials.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating the conviction of kidnappingin the second degree, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of theindictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support hisconviction of kidnapping in the first degree (Penal Law § 135.25 [3]) is unpreservedfor appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 491-492 [2008]). In any event,viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes,60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt ofthat crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon our independent review pursuant to CPL470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt on that count was not against the weight ofthe evidence (see People vDanielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007]; People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

Contrary to the People's contention, the defendant's contention that his conviction ofkidnapping in the second degree is precluded by the merger doctrine is preserved for appellatereview (see People v Banks, 42AD3d 574, 575-576 [2007]; see also People v Morales, 148 AD2d 325, 326-327[1989]). Moreover, the contention has merit. The merger doctrine " 'is intended topreclude conviction for kidnapping based on acts which are so much the part of anothersubstantive crime that the substantive crime could not have been committed without such actsand that independent criminal responsibility may not fairly be attributed to them' " (People v Bussey, 19 NY3d 231,237 [2012], quoting People v Cassidy, 40 NY2d 763, 767 [1976]; see People v Hanley, 20 NY3d601, 605 [2013]; People vCrosdale, 103 AD3d 749, 751 [2013]). "[A] kidnapping is generally deemed to mergewith another offense only[*2]'where there is minimal asportationimmediately preceding' the other crime or 'where the restraint and underlying crime areessentially simultaneous' " (People v Hanley, 20 NY3d at 606, quoting Peoplev Gonzalez, 80 NY2d 146, 153 [1992]). Here, the defendant's restraint of the victim andcommission of the underlying crimes of burglary in the first degree and robbery in the first andsecond degrees were essentially simultaneous. Contrary to the People's contention, the manner inwhich the victim was restrained did not preclude application of the merger doctrine (cf.People v Gonzalez, 80 NY2d at 153; People v Rivera, 41 AD3d 740, 741 [2007]; People vEsposito, 135 AD2d 727 [1987]). Accordingly, we vacate the defendant's conviction ofkidnapping in the second degree and the sentence imposed thereon, and dismiss that count of theindictment (see People v Garnes,127 AD3d 1104, 1105 [2015]; People v McFarlane, 106 AD3d 836 [2013]; People vAlston, 279 AD2d 583, 584 [2001]).

The defendant contends that the hearing court erred in denying that branch of his omnibusmotion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials because there wasinsufficient attenuation between his statements and police conduct found by the hearing court toviolate Payton v New York (445 US 573 [1980]). Contrary to the People's contention, thedefendant's contention is preserved for appellate review, as the record establishes that theSupreme Court expressly decided the issue (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Lugg, 124 AD3d 679,679 [2015]; People v Loper, 115AD3d 875, 878 [2014]). However, the contention is without merit. The Fourth Amendmentbars a warrantless arrest in a suspect's home, absent exigent circumstances or consent (seePayton v New York, 445 US 573 [1980]; People v Mitchell, 126 AD3d 1010, 1010 [2015]). Under the NewYork State Constitution, "statements obtained from an accused following a Paytonviolation must be suppressed unless the taint resulting from the violation has been attenuated"(People v Harris, 77 NY2d 434, 437 [1991]). Whether there is sufficient attenuationdepends on the temporal proximity of the police misconduct and the defendant's statement,whether there were intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the policemisconduct (see People v Bradford,15 NY3d 329, 333 [2010]; People v Harris, 77 NY2d at 441; People v Small, 110 AD3d 1138,1140 [2013]). The People have the burden of proving the applicability of the attenuationexception (see People v Small, 110 AD3d at 1141).

Here, the People met their burden. Approximately 91/2 hours elapsed after thedefendant was arrested in his home by a police officer in Reading, Pennsylvania, before he wasinterrogated by New York detectives. Moreover, the defendant was given Mirandawarnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), signed a Miranda card,and agreed to speak with the detectives before making oral and written statements. Moreover, thefact that the defendant was taken into custody only after the arresting officer learned that he waswanted for a homicide in New York was a significant intervening event that served to break thecausal connection between the conduct by the arresting officer that the hearing court found to beimproper and the defendant's subsequent statements (cf. People v Harris, 77 NY2d at441). The evidence does not indicate that the arresting officer's conduct was motivated by badfaith or a nefarious police purpose (see People v Bradford, 15 NY3d at 334).Accordingly, the hearing court properly determined that there was sufficient attenuation betweenthe defendant's statements and the police conduct found to be improper.

The defendant also contends, for the first time on appeal, that his statements to lawenforcement officials should be suppressed because they may have been obtained in violation ofhis constitutional right to counsel. Contrary to the People's contention, "[a]n alleged deprivationof the constitutional right to counsel may be raised on appeal, irrespective of whether such claimhas been preserved for appellate review" (People v Flournoy, 303 AD2d 762, 762 [2003];see People v Kinchen, 60 NY2d 772, 773 [1983]; People v Samuels, 49 NY2d218, 221 [1980]). However, we are unable to review the defendant's right to counsel claim, as thefactual record underlying his claim is insufficient (see People v Flournoy, 303 AD2d at762). As the People correctly contend, a CPL 440.10 proceeding is the appropriate proceduralvehicle for reviewing this claim (seePeople v Slack, 137 AD3d 1568, 1571 [2016]).

In light of our determination vacating the defendant's conviction of kidnapping in the seconddegree and the sentence imposed thereon, which was imposed consecutively to the sentenceimposed on the defendant's remaining convictions, the sentence imposed on the defendant'sremaining convictions was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).Balkin, J.P., Hall, LaSalle and Barros, JJ., concur.