| People v Douglas |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 01708 [148 AD3d 822] |
| March 8, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Tyreck A. Douglas, Jr., Also Known as "Little," Appellant. (Appeal No.1.) The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Tyreck A. Douglas, Jr., Appellant.(Appeal No. 2.) |
Carol Kahn, New York, NY, for appellant.
William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, NY (Kirsten A. Rappleyea of counsel),for respondent.
Appeals by the defendant from (1) a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County(Greller, J.), rendered August 21, 2014, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substancein the third degree under indictment No. 77/13, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence,and (2) a judgment of the same court, also rendered August 21, 2014, convicting him of criminalpossession of a weapon in the second degree under Superior Court Information No. 175/14, uponhis plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.
The defendant contends that both of his pleas of guilty were not knowing, voluntary, andintelligent because he had an active mental illness at the time of the pleas, he was equivocalabout his decision to plead guilty, and the County Court failed to fully explain his constitutionalrights. However, this contention is unpreserved for appellate review, because the defendant didnot move to vacate his pleas or otherwise raise the issue in the County Court (see CPL220.60 [3]; People v Peque, 22NY3d 168, 182 [2013]; People v Clarke, 93 NY2d 904, 906 [1999]; People v Jackson, 114 AD3d 807[2014]; People v Ovalle, 112 AD3d971 [2013]; People v Devodier,102 AD3d 884 [2013]). In any event, this contention is without merit. Although thedefendant initially appeared to be reluctant at the beginning of the plea proceeding on the weaponpossession charge, the court confirmed that he was pleading guilty voluntarily and that heunderstood the nature of that plea (seePeople v Perez, 82 AD3d 1451 [2011]; People v Swindell, 72 AD3d 1340, 1341 [2010]). The court thenadequately advised the defendant with respect to both pleas of guilty of the rights he wassurrendering by pleading guilty, and the record affirmatively demonstrates the defendant'sunderstanding and waiver of these constitutional rights, and the entry of a knowing, voluntary,and intelligent plea of guilty (see People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 19-20 [1983]; [*2]Peoplev Sirico, 135 AD3d 19, 22 [2015]; People v Isaiah S., 130 AD3d 1081 [2015]; People vJackson, 114 AD3d at 807-808).
Furthermore, while the defendant had been prescribed medications by a psychiatrist, there isno basis in the record to support the conclusion that, at the time of the plea proceeding, thedefendant lacked the capacity to understand the nature of the proceeding or the consequences ofhis pleas (see People vDeBenedetto, 120 AD3d 1428, 1429 [2014]). During the plea colloquy, the defendantindicated that he was clear headed and understood everything that was happening.
The defendant's contention that the felony complaint charging him with criminal possessionof a weapon in the second degree was jurisdictionally defective is also without merit. Anaccusatory instrument charging that offense need not allege a previous conviction in order to besufficient as that is not an element of the offense (see Penal Law§ 265.03; People vJones, 22 NY3d 53, 59 [2013]). As such, the allegation that the defendant's youthfuloffender adjudication was a previous conviction was a minor inaccuracy and did not render thefelony complaint jurisdictionally defective (see People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227, 231[2000]). Further, the waiver of indictment and Superior Court Information properly alleged thatthe defendant's conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree was aprevious conviction (see Penal Law § 265.03).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).Chambers, J.P., Roman, LaSalle and Barros, JJ., concur.