| People v Deitz |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 02266 [148 AD3d 1653] |
| March 24, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v MichaelDeitz, Appellant. |
Bruce R. Bryan, Syracuse, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (James P. Maxwell of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Thomas J. Miller, J.), renderedJanuary 25, 2016. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of predatory sexualassault against a child.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty ofpredatory sexual assault against a child (Penal Law § 130.96). We reject defendant'scontention that County Court erred in refusing to suppress his statement to the police as"involuntarily made" (CPL 60.45 [1]). "The voluntariness of a confession is to be determined byexamining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession" (People vCoggins, 234 AD2d 469, 470 [1996]; see People v Clark, 139 AD3d 1368, 1369 [2016], lv denied28 NY3d 928 [2016]). Here, the record establishes that defendant voluntarily agreed toaccompany the police officers from his place of employment to another location and, once in theinterview room there, he agreed to speak to the officers after receiving Miranda warnings(see People v Jacobson, 60 AD3d1326, 1327 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 916 [2009]). Contrary to defendant'scontention, we conclude that the interrogating officer's assurances to defendant that defendantwas not a sexual predator or a bad person, and that he would feel better if he told the truth "werenot improper or unusual where, as here, there is no evidence that defendant was of subnormalintelligence or susceptible to suggestion" (Clark, 139 AD3d at 1369; see People v Johnson, 52 AD3d1286, 1287 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 738 [2008]). Nor was defendant's statementrendered involuntary by any alleged deception by the officer, inasmuch as no specific promiseswere made to defendant to induce him to confess (see People v Johnston, 143 AD3d 1227, 1228 [2016], lvdenied 28 NY3d 1146 [2017]), and "it cannot be said that the alleged deception was sofundamentally unfair as to deny [defendant] due process" (People v Clyburn-Dawson, 128 AD3d 1350, 1351 [2015], lvdenied 26 NY3d 966 [2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]). In sum, even assuming,arguendo, that the police misled defendant, we conclude that " 'such deception did notcreate a substantial risk that defendant might falsely incriminate himself' " (People v Camacho, 70 AD3d1393, 1394 [2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 886 [2010]).
Finally, we conclude that the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.Present—Whalen, P.J., Smith, Centra, Curran and Scudder, JJ.