| People v Casey |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 02673 [149 AD3d 771] |
| April 5, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Troy Q. Casey, Appellant. |
Randall D. Unger, Bayside, NY, for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (John M. Castellano, JohnnetteTraill, and Jonathan K. Yi of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant, by permission, from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Lopez, J.), dated September 10, 2015, which denied his motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 tovacate a judgment of conviction rendered December 22, 2014, on the ground that he wasdeprived of the effective assistance of counsel.
Ordered that the order is affirmed.
The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Hemoved to vacate the judgment pursuant to CPL 440.10, on the ground that he was deprived of theeffective assistance of counsel at a pretrial suppression hearing and at trial. The defendant arguedthat trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach a police detective based on priorallegations made against that detective in several federal lawsuits. The defendant also argued thattrial counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine that detective as to the contents of apolice "stop and frisk" report that was purportedly inconsistent with the detective's hearing andtrial testimony.
To establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel,a defendant must show, first, "that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness," and additionally, "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel'sunprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different" (Strickland vWashington, 466 US 668, 688, 694 [1984]). Under the New York State Constitution, "adefendant must demonstrate that counsel failed to provide meaningful representation based onthe totality of the representation" and "does not have to establish prejudice, as is required underthe federal standard" (People vHogan, 26 NY3d 779, 790 [2016]; see People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147[1981]).
Here, the Supreme Court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to vacate thejudgment of conviction on the ground that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Thesubject stop and frisk report was not inconsistent with the detective's hearing and trial testimony;rather, the report simply contained information about which that police officer was notquestioned.
Furthermore, while specific and relevant allegations of misconduct in a civil action [*2]filed against a law enforcement officer may be used for the limitedpurpose of impeaching that law enforcement witness at trial (see People v Smith, 27 NY3d 652, 662 [2016]; People v Enoe, 144 AD3d 1052,1053-1054 [2016]), such impeachment is subject to the court's broad discretion in controlling thepermissible scope of cross-examination (see People v Tavares-Nunez, 87 AD3d 1171, 1174 [2011]; Matter of Andre S., 51 AD3d1030, 1033 [2008]). Here, the failure of the defendant's trial counsel to engage in suchimpeachment did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Indeed, a single error by trialcounsel will not be deemed to have deprived a defendant of the effective assistance of counsel,unless that error is "sufficiently egregious and prejudicial as to compromise a defendant's right toa fair trial" (People v Caban, 5NY3d 143, 152 [2005]; see Peoplev Turner, 5 NY3d 476, 480 [2005]). The record as a whole establishes that trial counselcompetently represented the defendant and provided him with meaningful representation (seePeople v Baldi, 54 NY2d at 147). Under these circumstances, trial counsel's failure to engagein this area of cross-examination did not, standing alone, deprive the defendant of a fair trial(see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708 [1998]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d at 147).Mastro, J.P., Chambers, Miller and Barros, JJ., concur.