| People v Stevenson |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 02847 [149 AD3d 1271] |
| April 13, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Craig L.Stevenson, Appellant. |
Randolph V. Kruman, Cortland, for appellant.
Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (Jordan J. Yorke of counsel), forrespondent.
Garry, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Rich Jr., J.),rendered January 16, 2015, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminalpossession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlledsubstance in the fourth degree, and the violation of criminal possession of marihuana in thefourth degree.
In August 2013, at about 10:45 p.m., a police officer on routine foot patrol in a housingcomplex in the City of Elmira, Chemung County observed a vehicle in a tenant-only parkingspace with its headlights on and motor running, but without a tenant parking permit, as requiredby the local ordinance. Defendant was in the driver's seat and his wife was in the front passengerseat of the vehicle. The officer approached and, upon questioning, defendant advised that he wasnot a tenant and that he was visiting a tenant; however, the officer knew the tenant and had justencountered this tenant leaving the complex shortly before observing defendant. The officerrequested defendant's driver's license, discovered that it was suspended and, after a second officerarrived, arrested defendant. Immediately thereafter a cursory search of the vehicle resulted in thediscovery of cocaine and marihuana, in a bag located upon the driver's seat. As a result,defendant was indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree,criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree and criminal possession ofmarihuana in the fourth degree. Following a Mapp hearing, County Court denieddefendant's motion to suppress the contraband on the basis that, as pertinent here, the initial stopwas justified and the search was incident to a lawful arrest. After a [*2]jury trial, defendant was convicted of all counts. Defendant appeals,challenging only the denial of his suppression motion.
Contrary to defendant's contention upon appeal, the officer's initial approach and request fordefendant's driver's license were proper. Unlike stopping a moving vehicle, an approach of anoccupied, stationary vehicle to request information, including identification and informationrelated to the lawful operation of the vehicle, is permitted where there is "an objective, crediblereason" for doing so (People v Ocasio, 85 NY2d 982, 984 [1995]; see People v O'Brien, 140 AD3d1325, 1326 [2016]; People vBoler, 106 AD3d 1119, 1121 [2013]; see also People v Karagoz, 143 AD3d 912, 914 [2016]; People v Thomas, 19 AD3d 32, 42[2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 795 [2005]). Notably, in his memorandum in support of hismotion to suppress, defendant conceded that the officer's observations "clearly authorized" himto approach defendant for information and to engage in a common-law inquiry.
After discovering that defendant's license was suspended, the officer had probable cause toarrest him (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [1] [a]). Finally, defendanthas not challenged County Court's finding that the search was authorized incident to the arrest,thus abandoning this potential issue (seePizarro v State of New York, 19 AD3d 891, 892 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 717[2005]). In any event, we find no error in this ruling (see People v Cruz, 131 AD3d 724, 726 [2015], lv denied 26NY3d 1087 [2015]; People vRuppert, 42 AD3d 817, 818 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 964 [2007]).Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
McCarthy, J.P., Rose, Mulvey and Aarons, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.